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CVE-2026-115565 — PoC and differential lab for CVE-2026-115565, a stored path traversal in storyblok-backup's writeJson that lets a crafted component name write files outside the backup directory. | Kitploit
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-115565

CVE-2026-115565

PoC and differential lab for CVE-2026-115565, a stored path traversal in storyblok-backup's writeJson that lets a crafted component name write files outside the backup directory.

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CVE-2026-115565 — storyblok-backup: stored path traversal via unsanitized component name (arbitrary file write)

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-115565
Componentstoryblok-backup — writeJson() (bin/storyblok-backup.mjs)
Affected< 0.7.1
Fixed in0.7.1 — commit f4e4bb1 (GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg)
CWECWE-22 (Path Traversal)
ImpactA component name containing path-traversal sequences causes backup files to be written outside the intended backup directory — a stored, second-order arbitrary file write on the machine of anyone who later backs up the affected Storyblok space
VectorStored — attacker with component-management access in the source Storyblok space plants a malicious component name
Triggercomponent name = "../../pwned"

The vulnerable writeJson built the output path by direct concatenation:

// storyblok-backup 0.7.0
const writeJson = (folder, file, content) => {
    let outputFile = backupDir
    if (folder !== null) outputFile += `/${folder}`
    outputFile += `/${file}.json`            // file = raw component name
    fs.writeFileSync(outputFile, JSON.stringify(content, null, 2), ...)
}

The fix sanitizes the file name before building the path:

// 0.7.1 (commit f4e4bb1)
file = file.replaceAll('/', '_')
file = file.replaceAll('\\', '_')
file = file.replaceAll('..', '_')

1. Root cause

For the components resource type, the backup file name is the component's own name field — free text editable by anyone with component-management access in the Storyblok CMS. writeJson(folder, file, content) concatenated backupDir + "/" + folder + "/" + file + ".json" with no sanitization or containment check, so a name like ../../pwned resolved to a path outside the backup directory and wrote pwned.json there. Because the malicious value is stored in Storyblok and only read back when the backup tool runs, this is a stored, second-order vulnerability: planted once, it triggers on every subsequent backup of that space. (Other resource types were already safe: stories/datasources use numeric IDs, assets take the last path segment.) The fix replaces /, \ and .. with _ in the file name.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
sb-vulncve-2026-115565:vulnreal writeJson from storyblok-backup 0.7.0
sb-fixedcve-2026-115565:fixedreal writeJson from 0.7.1 (vendor fix)
poccve-2026-115565-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The harness embeds the verbatim writeJson() extracted from each tag's bin/storyblok-backup.mjs, sets backupDir=/tmp/lab/backup, calls it with an attacker-controlled component name, and reports whether the file escaped the backup directory. Both sides differ only in the extracted upstream function.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # installs both npm releases, embeds each writeJson
./run-lab.sh up        # cve115565lab network: sb-vuln / sb-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — exit 1 when the file escapes the backup directory, 0 when contained; 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — narrated stored/second-order chain: planted component name → victim backup run → arbitrary file write outside the backup directory.
  • probe — traversal name vs benign component name.
  • mitigation — 0.7.1 / commit f4e4bb1.

A standalone full-chain exploit ships at exploit/exploit.py:

python3 exploit/exploit.py --host=sb-vuln
# exit 1 on confirmed path escape, 0 on a safe target

5. Expected results

component namesb-vuln (0.7.0)sb-fixed (0.7.1)
../../pwnedescaped=true — written outside backup direscaped=false, contained as ____pwned.json
normal-componentcontainedcontained

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-standalone-run.txt, evidence/exploit-standalone-fixed-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker); bounded containers on the isolated cve115565lab network; Node 20 runtime in the lab images.
  • Real-world exploitation requires component-management access in the source Storyblok space (not server access) and a victim who later runs a backup against that space.

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The fixed writeJson replaces /, \ and .. with _ before building the path, so traversal names are contained (____pwned.json) and benign component names are unaffected. No path-escape remains for components. Other resource types (stories/datasources by numeric ID, assets by last path segment) were already safe per the advisory.

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
exploit/exploit.py    standalone full-chain exploit
lab/lab.Dockerfile    installs both npm releases
lab/vendor/           verbatim writeJson() from each tag
lab/harness.mjs       calls writeJson, reports path escape
lab/service.mjs       Node HTTP wrapper (POST /write, GET /info)
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115565
  • GitHub advisory — https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg
  • Fix commit — https://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/commit/f4e4bb1979832abd7e4eb1666e2b3cfc767f587a
  • Fixed release — https://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/releases/tag/v0.7.1
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