
POC for CVE-2026-114656 - Traefik mTLS client certificate bypass via negated Host matchers forcing default TLS options. Vulnerable vs fixed differential included.
A negated !Host() matcher in a router rule is (wrongly) counted as a served
domain when Traefik deduces the domains behind a router. When another router
actually serves that host with non-default tls.options, Traefik sees two
routers claiming the same host with different TLS options, declares a conflict,
and falls back to the default TLS options - silently dropping
RequireAndVerifyClientCert. An unauthenticated client can then complete the
TLS handshake and reach the protected backend. Fixed in Traefik v2.11.58 and
v3.7.13. CVSS v4 6.9 moderate (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N).
core.strictTLSOptions=true (disables the fallback to default options)The lab is two routers on one entrypoint (:8443), one whoami backend, a
server cert for mtls.local and a client certificate signed by a dedicated
client CA. The strict TLS options enforce RequireAndVerifyClientCert for
the protected host. Vulnerable and control variants differ only in the router
rules file mounted into Traefik:
traefik/routers-vuln.yml - shadow router with a negated matcher against
the protected host: PathPrefix(`/`) && !Host(`mtls.local`)traefik/routers-control.yml - same shadow router with a plain matcher for
an unrelated domain: PathPrefix(`/`) && Host(`other.local`)Generate lab certificates (throwaway PKI, generated locally):
./gen-certs.sh
Start the docker-compose lab with the vulnerable configuration:
TRAEFIK_VERSION=v3.7.12 TRAEFIK_ROUTERS=routers-vuln.yml docker compose up -d
TRAEFIK_VERSION selects the image (v3.7.12 vulnerable, v3.7.13 fixed).
TRAEFIK_ROUTERS selects the router rules (routers-vuln.yml vulnerable,
routers-control.yml control). Then:
python3 poc.py --port 8443 --mode both --label "v3.7.12 + routers-vuln.yml"
--port is the Traefik entrypoint, --mode runs the no-certificate probe,
the signed-certificate probe, or both, and --label is echoed into the
output for evidence capture.
Vulnerable (Traefik v3.7.12, negated matcher): the handshake completes with no client certificate at all and the request reaches the protected backend:
=== Traefik v3.7.12 + routers-vuln.yml (negated !Host shadow router) -> VULNERABLE ===
[no client cert ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...
[signed cert ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...
ERR On EntryPoint "websecure", Host "mtls.local" is served by multiple routers
with different TLS options, default TLSOptions will be applied for the
following routers: [secure-mtls@file shadow-negated@file]
Control (same Traefik, plain matcher; or fixed v3.7.13 with the negated matcher): the handshake is rejected without a client certificate:
[no client cert ] TLS handshake REJECTED: TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
[signed cert ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...
Raw captures of all three variants (vulnerable bypass, config control, fixed
version control) are in evidence/, together with the Traefik ERROR line
showing the conflict fallback and the runtime state at probe time.
Domain deduction for a router rule walks its matchers; for a negated
!Host(x) matcher the implementation counts x as a domain the router serves
instead of excluding it. The lab's shadow router claims to serve
mtls.local (the host it is supposed to exclude), so Traefik computes TLS
options per domain and finds two routers with different options for
mtls.local: strict@file (client cert required) and the default (no client
cert). Rather than choosing deterministically, it logs the conflict and
applies the default options to both routers - which is exactly the
downgrade the attacker wants: the mTLS-protected host now accepts TLS
handshakes from clients presenting no certificate whatsoever.
The control configuration proves the trigger is the negation, not the extra
router: with a plain Host(other.local) matcher on the same shadow router,
domain deduction claims only other.local, no conflict occurs, strict
stays attached to mtls.local, and the identical no-certificate probe dies
with TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED. The fixed release (v3.7.13) stops
counting negated hosts, so the vulnerable router rules file enforces mTLS
again on v3.7.13.
core.strictTLSOptions=true.traefik/whoami's backend behavior
reproduced by a stock python3 -m http.server on the lab host, because
that host's kernel temporarily lacked overlayfs for container runs;
docker-compose.yml reproduces the identical lab on a normal Docker host.certs/ is throwaway, generated by
gen-certs.sh, and only valid for mtls.local/other.local in the lab.