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CVE-2026-114656-POC — POC for CVE-2026-114656 - Traefik mTLS client certificate bypass via negated Host matchers forcing default TLS options. Vulnerable vs fixed differential included. | Kitploit
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GitHubfixedbyreboot/cve-2026-114656-poc

CVE-2026-114656-POC

POC for CVE-2026-114656 - Traefik mTLS client certificate bypass via negated Host matchers forcing default TLS options. Vulnerable vs fixed differential included.

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11 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-114656 — Traefik mTLS client-certificate bypass via negated Host matcher

Language CVSS Affected Status Advisory License

A negated !Host() matcher in a router rule is (wrongly) counted as a served domain when Traefik deduces the domains behind a router. When another router actually serves that host with non-default tls.options, Traefik sees two routers claiming the same host with different TLS options, declares a conflict, and falls back to the default TLS options - silently dropping RequireAndVerifyClientCert. An unauthenticated client can then complete the TLS handshake and reach the protected backend. Fixed in Traefik v2.11.58 and v3.7.13. CVSS v4 6.9 moderate (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N).

Meta

  • Affected: Traefik v2 <= 2.11.57 and v3 >= 3.0.0 <= 3.7.12 (v3 below 3.7 is EOL and unpatched)
  • Fixed: v2.11.58, v3.7.13
  • Advisory: https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-2272-4vv8-65ww (traefik org, published 2026-10-07); the reviewed GitHub advisory GHSA-rq4g-2h45-7vgr rates the same bug 7.5 Medium (CVSS v3.1)
  • CWE-436 (interpretation conflict) / CWE-863 (incorrect authorization)
  • Mitigation on unpatched versions: set core.strictTLSOptions=true (disables the fallback to default options)

Usage

The lab is two routers on one entrypoint (:8443), one whoami backend, a server cert for mtls.local and a client certificate signed by a dedicated client CA. The strict TLS options enforce RequireAndVerifyClientCert for the protected host. Vulnerable and control variants differ only in the router rules file mounted into Traefik:

  • traefik/routers-vuln.yml - shadow router with a negated matcher against the protected host: PathPrefix(`/`) && !Host(`mtls.local`)
  • traefik/routers-control.yml - same shadow router with a plain matcher for an unrelated domain: PathPrefix(`/`) && Host(`other.local`)

Generate lab certificates (throwaway PKI, generated locally):

./gen-certs.sh

Start the docker-compose lab with the vulnerable configuration:

TRAEFIK_VERSION=v3.7.12 TRAEFIK_ROUTERS=routers-vuln.yml docker compose up -d

TRAEFIK_VERSION selects the image (v3.7.12 vulnerable, v3.7.13 fixed). TRAEFIK_ROUTERS selects the router rules (routers-vuln.yml vulnerable, routers-control.yml control). Then:

python3 poc.py --port 8443 --mode both --label "v3.7.12 + routers-vuln.yml"

--port is the Traefik entrypoint, --mode runs the no-certificate probe, the signed-certificate probe, or both, and --label is echoed into the output for evidence capture.

Expected output

Vulnerable (Traefik v3.7.12, negated matcher): the handshake completes with no client certificate at all and the request reaches the protected backend:

=== Traefik v3.7.12 + routers-vuln.yml (negated !Host shadow router) -> VULNERABLE ===
[no client cert ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...
[signed cert    ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...

ERR On EntryPoint "websecure", Host "mtls.local" is served by multiple routers
with different TLS options, default TLSOptions will be applied for the
following routers: [secure-mtls@file shadow-negated@file]

Control (same Traefik, plain matcher; or fixed v3.7.13 with the negated matcher): the handshake is rejected without a client certificate:

[no client cert ] TLS handshake REJECTED: TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
[signed cert    ] CONNECTED 200 -> TLS TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, backend: ...

Raw captures of all three variants (vulnerable bypass, config control, fixed version control) are in evidence/, together with the Traefik ERROR line showing the conflict fallback and the runtime state at probe time.

Why it works

Domain deduction for a router rule walks its matchers; for a negated !Host(x) matcher the implementation counts x as a domain the router serves instead of excluding it. The lab's shadow router claims to serve mtls.local (the host it is supposed to exclude), so Traefik computes TLS options per domain and finds two routers with different options for mtls.local: strict@file (client cert required) and the default (no client cert). Rather than choosing deterministically, it logs the conflict and applies the default options to both routers - which is exactly the downgrade the attacker wants: the mTLS-protected host now accepts TLS handshakes from clients presenting no certificate whatsoever.

The control configuration proves the trigger is the negation, not the extra router: with a plain Host(other.local) matcher on the same shadow router, domain deduction claims only other.local, no conflict occurs, strict stays attached to mtls.local, and the identical no-certificate probe dies with TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED. The fixed release (v3.7.13) stops counting negated hosts, so the vulnerable router rules file enforces mTLS again on v3.7.13.

Notes

  • Both the v2 and v3 lines are affected; v3 below v3.7 is EOL and does not receive the patch - upgrade to a maintained, patched version or enable core.strictTLSOptions=true.
  • The downgrade is visible in Traefik logs at ERROR level ("served by multiple routers with different TLS options, default TLSOptions will be applied") - any occurrence is worth investigating even without this CVE, since it means non-default TLS options were silently dropped.
  • Evidence for this repo was captured with the official Traefik release binaries (v3.7.12 and v3.7.13) and traefik/whoami's backend behavior reproduced by a stock python3 -m http.server on the lab host, because that host's kernel temporarily lacked overlayfs for container runs; docker-compose.yml reproduces the identical lab on a normal Docker host.
  • The certificate material in certs/ is throwaway, generated by gen-certs.sh, and only valid for mtls.local/other.local in the lab.
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