High-performance open-source security scanner combining SAST, SCA, Secret Detection, and IaC analysis, built for developers and CI/CD pipelines, using AI for recommendation!
An open-source, comprehensive security scanner combining SAST, SCA, and secret detection aligned with OWASP Top 10:2025 — created for intelligent remediation.
Full-depth SCA. The dependency engine now reads the tree that actually ships — every transitive package, at the version installed — for all eight supported ecosystems, instead of the handful a manifest declares.
mvn dependency:tree artifact for artifact. gradle.lockfile is read too.Required : via com.example:core — so the fix lands on the dependency a
developer can actually change.partialFingerprints.Full details in the CHANGELOG.
📖 Full Documentation: --> Drogonsec Doc
| Engine | Description |
|---|---|
| SAST | Static Application Security Testing for 20+ languages |
| SCA | Software Composition Analysis — the full transitive tree, not just what you declared |
| Leaks | Secret detection — 50+ patterns (AWS, GCP, GitHub, JWT, SSH keys...) |
| IaC | Infrastructure as Code misconfigurations (Terraform, Kubernetes) |
| AI | AI-powered remediation — Ollama (local/free) or cloud providers |
Python Java JavaScript TypeScript Go Kotlin C# PHP Ruby Swift Dart Elixir Erlang Shell C/C++ HTML Terraform Kubernetes Nginx
A manifest names a handful of packages, at version ranges. A lockfile names every package that will actually be installed, at the version it will be installed at — and that second group is nearly all the code you ship, and where nearly all the advisories are. So the column that matters is depth:
| Ecosystem | Read from | Depth |
|---|---|---|
| Node.js | package-lock.json, yarn.lock, node_modules/, package.json | Full tree |
| Python | poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, .venv/, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt | Full tree |
| PHP | composer.lock, vendor/composer/installed.json, composer.json | Full tree |
| Rust | Cargo.lock, Cargo.toml | Full tree |
| Ruby | Gemfile.lock | Full tree |
| Go | go.mod, routes from the module cache | Full set |
| Java | pom.xml resolved offline against ~/.m2, gradle.lockfile | Full tree |
| Dart | pubspec.lock, pubspec.yaml | Full tree |
For npm, Python and PHP the engine falls back through three sources — the
lockfile, then the installed tree on disk (node_modules/, a virtualenv,
vendor/), then the manifest. A repository that does not commit a lockfile is
still scanned in full after an install.
For Go, Dart and Java the edges come from the package manager's own cache — the
module cache, the pub cache, the Maven local repository — which already holds
every dependency's manifest once the project has been built. Maven, which has no
lockfile, is resolved offline by Maven's own rules (parent POMs, imported BOMs,
nearest-wins, dependency management, exclusions) and matches
mvn dependency:tree artifact for artifact.
Every finding carries whether the package is direct and, where the source records it, the route that introduced it:
#8 [CRITICAL] guzzlehttp/psr7 1.9.1
CVE : CVE-2026-49214 CVSS: 9.0
Required : via guzzlehttp/guzzle
Fixed in : 2.10.2
A range is not a version. A dependency read from a manifest is checked
against advisories only when the requirement names a single release.
lodash: "4.17.15" is checked; lodash: "^4.17.15" is not — it installs
4.17.21, and reporting the advisories for 4.17.15 would name a version you never
installed. Those packages still appear in the inventory and the SBOM, and the
scan says how many it had to skip. Committing a lockfile is the fix, and it buys
the transitive tree at the same time.
No network. Resolving a range against a registry would answer a different question — what would install today — and would put a scan that runs air-gapped on the far side of the internet.
Full detail in docs/modules.md.
Go Install (requires Go 1.26.6+):
go install github.com/filipi86/drogonsec/cmd/drogonsec@latest
From source:
git clone https://github.com/filipi86/drogonsec
cd drogonsec
make install
Docker:
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/scan ghcr.io/filipi86/drogonsec scan /scan
# Scan current directory
drogonsec scan .
# Scan with JSON output
drogonsec scan ./myproject --format json --output report.json
# Scan with HTML report
drogonsec scan . --format html --output report.html
# Scan with AI remediation (local Ollama — free, no API key needed)
drogonsec scan . --enable-ai
# Scan with AI remediation (cloud provider — requires API key)
AI_API_KEY="..." drogonsec scan . --enable-ai --ai-provider anthropic
# Scan git history for secrets
drogonsec scan . --git-history
# Only report HIGH and CRITICAL
drogonsec scan . --severity HIGH
# Disable specific engines
drogonsec scan . --no-sca
drogonsec scan . --no-leaks
drogonsec scan . --no-sast
Drogonsec Security Scanner
═══════════════════════════════════════════
Target : /path/to/project
SAST : enabled
SCA : enabled
Leaks : enabled
═══════════════════════════════════════════
═══ SAST FINDINGS ══════════════════════
#1 [HIGH] SQL Injection via string formatting
File : src/users.py:42
Rule : PY-001
OWASP : A05:2025 - Injection
CWE : CWE-89 CVSS: 9.8
Fix : Use parameterized queries...