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cortex9-nbconvert-output-filename-traversal-model — Offline educational model of CVE-2026-114140 (nbconvert output filename path traversal) | Kitploit
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cortex9-nbconvert-output-filename-traversal-model

Offline educational model of CVE-2026-114140 (nbconvert output filename path traversal)

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cortex9-nbconvert-output-filename-traversal-model

Path-resolution model of CVE-2026-114140 (GHSA-pjvx-prjx-h659), the path traversal in nbconvert's ExtractOutputPreprocessor (nbconvert/preprocessors/extractoutput.py): the output filename taken from a notebook's out.metadata["filename"] was used as is, so ../../x or /abs/x could place an extracted output outside the output directory. Fixed in nbconvert 7.17.2 by commit ce4bd99aec31 (pre = before, post = after).

Educational, offline, deterministic, Python stdlib only. nbconvert is not installed or run, no notebook is converted, and the only files written are inside a tempfile sandbox during one test.

Spanish: README.es.md. Exercises: PRACTICE.md.

What the fix changes (lines of the saved diff)

Diff linesprepost
8 (context)empty or missing filename → default namesame
9 (removed)filename = out.metadata["filename"], unchanged—
10-12 (added)—filename = os.path.basename(fname)
13-18 (added)—empty basename → warning and continue (skip)
19-25 (added)—warning when components were stripped
26-27 (context)append ext if missingsame
48-56, 58-65 (tests)—/tmp/evil.png, ../../evil.png, sub/evil.png → nb_files/evil.png; ../../../tmp/ skipped

The join of output_files_dir and the filename follows the advisory text and the new test (diff line 54). Placing that under the build directory (/sandbox/build, a symbolic string) is a model assumption.

Differential evidence (results/differential.csv)

Caseprepost
../../evil.txtESCAPE_ROOT → /sandbox/evil.txt.pngINSIDE → nb_files/evil.txt.png
/abs/xESCAPE_ROOT → /abs/x.pngINSIDE → nb_files/x.png
a/../../xESCAPE_FILES_DIR → /sandbox/build/x.pngINSIDE
../../../tmp/PWNED.png (GHSA PoC name)ESCAPE_ROOT → /tmp/PWNED.pngINSIDE, warning
../../../tmp/ (diff line 61)ESCAPE_ROOT → /tmp/.pngSKIP
img.png (negative)INSIDEINSIDE

All 9 positives escape pre and are INSIDE or SKIP post; all 5 negatives keep their label. On a corpus of 9,360 generated names post never escapes the build directory, and with a real extension (.png) never leaves output_files_dir.

Model edge, unverified: with the name .. and ext == "." (what diff line 7 would give for a MIME type ending in /), post keeps .. and the target is the build directory itself (a02). It stays inside the build directory, it was not checked whether nbconvert can ever produce that ext, and it is not a finding.

Run

python3 tests/run.py                                   # any skip = failure
python3 scripts/derive_expected.py | diff - fixtures/expected.tsv
PYTHONPATH=src python3 -m nbconvert_model results fixtures/cases.tsv /tmp/r && diff -r results /tmp/r
PYTHONPATH=src python3 -m nbconvert_model case pre '../../evil.txt'

fixtures/cases.tsv holds hand-derived labels; scripts/derive_expected.py re-implements basename, join and POSIX normalisation without os.path or the model and writes fixtures/expected.tsv; the tests compare all three.

See LIMITATIONS.md and SOURCES.md. License: Apache-2.0.

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