
PoC and analysis for CVE-2026-114516, an unauthenticated path traversal in Etherpad's /static handler enabling arbitrary file read and chained admin RCE, with WAF bypass variants.
>= 1.8.14, < 3.3.3, fixed in 3.3.3AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/static/* plugin asset handler (src/node/utils/Minify.ts)Etherpad's path sanitizer only converts backslashes to forward slashes on Windows (sanitizePathname.ts). On POSIX systems, %5C (encoded \) decodes to ordinary filename bytes and passes all validation checks as-is; after validation, Minify.ts unconditionally executes filename.replace(/\\/g, '/')—turning the inert ..\ segment into a real ../ traversal, with no further re-checking. This route is registered on the expressPreSession hook (before authentication), and the core pseudo-plugin ep_etherpad-lite always exists, so any unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files as the user running Etherpad:
GET /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd
On deployments configured with an administrator password, the same vulnerability can read /proc/self/environ (to obtain the runtime password) and settings.json, thereby entering the admin plugin installer to achieve in-process code execution (see poc/exploit_rce.py).
analysis/root-cause.md — 代码级根因分析(完整触发链)
analysis/variant-matrix.md — 变体矩阵:40 类成功形状(含 13 类 WAF 规避 + 12 类段级局部自由度,全部带完整请求原文)
poc/exploit_afr.py — 任意文件读取 PoC(变体引擎,单命令)
poc/exploit_rce.py — 文件读取→管理员→安装器→RCE 完整链 PoC
poc/mock_registry.js — 本地验证用 registry(模拟 npm 投毒)
poc/build_marker_package.sh — 验证插件包构建脚本
requests/successful-requests.md — 攻击成功请求与响应原文、检测要点
# 任意文件读取(未认证)
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 -f /etc/passwd
# 读取运行时环境变量(含管理员密码插值)
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 -f /proc/self/environ
# 运行变体矩阵
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 --scan
# 完整 RCE 链(前置条件见 poc/exploit_rce.py 头部说明)
python3 poc/exploit_rce.py -u http://TARGET:9001
Test only on systems you own or have explicit authorization to test. See DISCLAIMER.md.
| Deployment Form | File Read | File Existence Probing | RCE Chain |
|---|---|---|---|
| Default Docker image (no admin password set) | ✅ Arbitrary files readable by the etherpad user | ✅ 500/404 distinction | ❌ (when ${ADMIN_PASSWORD:null} is null, no admin user is created, so the first link of the chain is unreachable) |
| Admin password configured (common in production) | ✅ Including /proc/self/environ, settings.json | ✅ | ✅ Fully verified |
| Fixed version 3.3.3 | ❌ Replay of the same payload is rejected (404) | — | ❌ |
A noteworthy side channel: reading a file that exists but is not permitted (such as /etc/shadow) returns 500, while a nonexistent file returns 404—an unauthenticated attacker can use this to enumerate the file system.
This repository verified 40 categories of successful shapes. Of these, 13 categories model traversal payloads (junk-word interleaving, four-dot segment interleaving, fully hex-encoded targets, %2f encoding, ./ keyword fragmentation, oversized traversal, absolute URIs, etc.; see Section 5 of the variant matrix); 12 categories target the local degrees of freedom of each URI segment (see Section 6): plugins/, the plugin name, and the second static/ all fall within the route wildcard capture range, and each segment can be arbitrarily URL-encoded—under the ultimate combination, no plaintext anchor exists anywhere in the URL except the /static/ route prefix. The common core: the folding performed by path.join/normalize is a pure text operation, so any rule modeled on "what traversal looks like" or "plaintext keywords" can be bypassed entirely; reliable detection must first perform full decoding and normalization before matching, or adopt the real path-containment validation semantics of the fixed version.