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Tools/GitHubGitHub/evenomn/cve-2026-114516
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GitHubevenomn/cve-2026-114516

CVE-2026-114516

PoC and analysis for CVE-2026-114516, an unauthenticated path traversal in Etherpad's /static handler enabling arbitrary file read and chained admin RCE, with WAF bypass variants.

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8h 47m agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-114516 — Etherpad Pre-Auth Path Traversal (Arbitrary File Read) → Admin Chain RCE

  • Product: Etherpad (real-time collaborative editor), ether/etherpad-lite
  • Affected versions: >= 1.8.14, < 3.3.3, fixed in 3.3.3
  • Type: CWE-22 path traversal (pre-auth), chainable to code execution
  • CVSS 3.1: 9.8 Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Advisory: GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5 (vendor security advisory, Neodyme analysis)
  • Vulnerable component: /static/* plugin asset handler (src/node/utils/Minify.ts)

One-Sentence Principle

Etherpad's path sanitizer only converts backslashes to forward slashes on Windows (sanitizePathname.ts). On POSIX systems, %5C (encoded \) decodes to ordinary filename bytes and passes all validation checks as-is; after validation, Minify.ts unconditionally executes filename.replace(/\\/g, '/')—turning the inert ..\ segment into a real ../ traversal, with no further re-checking. This route is registered on the expressPreSession hook (before authentication), and the core pseudo-plugin ep_etherpad-lite always exists, so any unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files as the user running Etherpad:

GET /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd

On deployments configured with an administrator password, the same vulnerability can read /proc/self/environ (to obtain the runtime password) and settings.json, thereby entering the admin plugin installer to achieve in-process code execution (see poc/exploit_rce.py).

Directory Structure

analysis/root-cause.md           — 代码级根因分析(完整触发链)
analysis/variant-matrix.md       — 变体矩阵:40 类成功形状(含 13 类 WAF 规避 + 12 类段级局部自由度,全部带完整请求原文)
poc/exploit_afr.py               — 任意文件读取 PoC(变体引擎,单命令)
poc/exploit_rce.py               — 文件读取→管理员→安装器→RCE 完整链 PoC
poc/mock_registry.js             — 本地验证用 registry(模拟 npm 投毒)
poc/build_marker_package.sh      — 验证插件包构建脚本
requests/successful-requests.md  — 攻击成功请求与响应原文、检测要点

Quick Start

# 任意文件读取(未认证)
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 -f /etc/passwd

# 读取运行时环境变量(含管理员密码插值)
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 -f /proc/self/environ

# 运行变体矩阵
python3 poc/exploit_afr.py -u http://TARGET:9001 --scan

# 完整 RCE 链(前置条件见 poc/exploit_rce.py 头部说明)
python3 poc/exploit_rce.py -u http://TARGET:9001

Test only on systems you own or have explicit authorization to test. See DISCLAIMER.md.

Impact Summary

Deployment FormFile ReadFile Existence ProbingRCE Chain
Default Docker image (no admin password set)✅ Arbitrary files readable by the etherpad user✅ 500/404 distinction❌ (when ${ADMIN_PASSWORD:null} is null, no admin user is created, so the first link of the chain is unreachable)
Admin password configured (common in production)✅ Including /proc/self/environ, settings.json✅✅ Fully verified
Fixed version 3.3.3❌ Replay of the same payload is rejected (404)—❌

A noteworthy side channel: reading a file that exists but is not permitted (such as /etc/shadow) returns 500, while a nonexistent file returns 404—an unauthenticated attacker can use this to enumerate the file system.

On WAF Evasion

This repository verified 40 categories of successful shapes. Of these, 13 categories model traversal payloads (junk-word interleaving, four-dot segment interleaving, fully hex-encoded targets, %2f encoding, ./ keyword fragmentation, oversized traversal, absolute URIs, etc.; see Section 5 of the variant matrix); 12 categories target the local degrees of freedom of each URI segment (see Section 6): plugins/, the plugin name, and the second static/ all fall within the route wildcard capture range, and each segment can be arbitrarily URL-encoded—under the ultimate combination, no plaintext anchor exists anywhere in the URL except the /static/ route prefix. The common core: the folding performed by path.join/normalize is a pure text operation, so any rule modeled on "what traversal looks like" or "plaintext keywords" can be bypassed entirely; reliable detection must first perform full decoding and normalization before matching, or adopt the real path-containment validation semantics of the fixed version.

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