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GitHubcodestartup/cve-2026-117065

CVE-2026-117065

Public vulnerability report and proof-of-concept analysis of a cmd.exe /K argument injection (CWE-78) in the KytyPS5 launcher, covering root cause, verified RCE, and remediation.

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11 month agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-1: cmd.exe /K argument injection in the KytyPS5 launcher (RCE)

Status: confirmed end-to-end against the official release binary, not just the source tree.

Scope of this public report: CVE-1 only.

Target release: KytyPS5-2026-10-08-5a88080 (https://github.com/KytyPS5/KytyPS5/releases/tag/KytyPS5-2026-10-08-5a88080)

propertyvalue
release tagKytyPS5-2026-10-08-5a88080
git commit5a880808, reported version 0.3.0 (2026.10.08)
affected binarylauncher.exe (Windows x64, 4,175,360 bytes, SHA256 4796C3C445818B7957816DD28E1AD375C0E51757BD0DCD983EC3289AB6A9D515)
classificationCWE-78: OS Command Injection
sinkcmd.exe /K "<attacker controlled string>"
impactarbitrary command execution as the logged-in user
preconditionsno game execution required; only a saved configuration value + double-click
platformWindows only (see section 6)
CVSS 3.1CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.8 (High)

CVSS rationale: AV:L - the payload is a local config file the victim imports (no network attack surface). PR:N - the attacker needs no privileges on the victim machine. UI:R - the victim must import the configuration and launch the game. S:U - the injected command runs as the same user as the launcher, so no security authority boundary is crossed. C:H/I:H/A:H - the command can read, modify, and destroy anything that user can access. A scope-changed reading (S:C, not applicable here) would score 8.6.


1. What the bug is

The launcher does not start the emulator directly. On Windows it builds a shell command string and hands it to cmd.exe with the /K switch:

cmd.exe /K ""C:\...\kyty_emulator.exe" "--opt" "value" ... "--game" "..."

The purpose of /K is to keep the console window open after the emulator exits. The launcher quotes every token so that paths containing spaces survive.

Several emulator options take free-form string values that come from the user-editable configuration. Those strings are concatenated into the same cmd.exe command line. If an attacker can place a double quote and an ampersand into one of those values, cmd.exe's own parser is tricked into ending the quoted region early, executing the injected command, and then swallowing the remainder of the line with rem.

In the verified payload the injected command runs before kyty_emulator.exe ever starts.


2. Root cause

2.1 The escaping function is written for the wrong parser

src/launcher/src/mainDialog.cpp:389-392

// Quote one token for cmd.exe so paths with spaces survive /K parsing.
static QString WinCmdQuote(QString value) {
	value.replace(QLatin1Char('"'), QStringLiteral("\\\""));
	return QLatin1Char('"') + value + QLatin1Char('"');
}

WinCmdQuote escapes a literal " as \". That is the C runtime CommandLineToArgvW rule: backslash escapes the following quote when a program parses its argv.

cmd.exe does not implement that rule. cmd.exe decides whether &, |, <, > and ^ are metacharacters purely by tracking whether the current character position is inside or outside a double-quoted region, and a " simply toggles that state. A backslash in front of a " is, to cmd.exe, just a backslash followed by a quote.

So for cmd.exe the sequence

"....\"&calc&rem \""
 ^    ^ ^
 ON   | +-- toggles OFF, so the following & is OUTSIDE quotes
      +----- backslash is inert

The token still looks correctly quoted to any C program that later parses argv (that is why the emulator receives the raw value), but cmd.exe has already been tricked into running calc.

2.2 The command string is assembled by naive concatenation

src/launcher/src/mainDialog.cpp:394-401

static QString BuildWinCmdKCommand(const QString& interpreter, const QStringList& args) {
	QString command = WinCmdQuote(QDir::toNativeSeparators(interpreter));
	for (const auto& arg: args) {
		command += QLatin1Char(' ');
		command += WinCmdQuote(arg);
	}
	return command;
}

2.3 The sink

src/launcher/src/mainDialog.cpp:438-445

#elif defined(_WIN32)
	{
		// Use nativeArguments so Qt does not re-quote the /K command string.
		process->setProgram(CMD_EXE);
		process->setArguments({});
		process->setNativeArguments(QStringLiteral("/K \"") +
		                            BuildWinCmdKCommand(interpreter, args) + QLatin1Char('"'));
	}

nativeArguments is passed to CreateProcessW verbatim; Qt performs no further escaping (that is the explicit intent of the comment). CMD_EXE is cmd.exe (mainDialog.cpp:53).

CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE is set at mainDialog.cpp:453, so a visible console window is created for the injected command as well.

The vulnerable /K quoting path was introduced by PR #244 (fixing issue #179, paths with spaces) - a functional fix that was never reviewed as a security change.

2.4 Which values are attacker-controlled

src/launcher/src/mainDialog.cpp:217-295 (CreateEmulatorArgs) appends configuration strings unconditionally. The following are unbounded, arbitrary strings with no character allow-list:

optionconfiguration fieldline
--shader-log-foldershader_log_foldermainDialog.cpp:260
--command-buffer-dump-foldercommand_buffer_dump_foldermainDialog.cpp:262
--printf-output-fileprintf_output_filemainDialog.cpp:264
--micaudio_input_devicemainDialog.cpp:228
--controller-colorcontroller.colormainDialog.cpp:231

Configuration::SetGameSettings (configuration.cpp:110-149) copies these fields straight from the imported JSON with no sanitisation - compare user_name, which is capped at MAX_USER_NAME_LENGTH (16 bytes, common/emulatorConfig.h) but is not the only string that reaches the command line.

--shader-log-folder is of particular interest because it is passed unconditionally, even when shader_log_direction == Silent (the default), so no UI interaction beyond clicking the game row is needed.


3. Attack scenarios

#scenariorequired access
AShared configuration: the launcher's "Game Configs -> Import..." accepts a JSON file. A victim imports a "recommended settings" or "performance preset" from a forum, Discord, or cheat site, then double-clicks a game.victim interaction (import + launch)
BWritable Kyty.ini: on Windows the settings file is opened with QSettings::SystemScope (configurationListWidget.cpp:354-357), i.e. C:\ProgramData\Kyty\Kyty.ini. Any process or user that can write this file plants the payload; the next launch by any user of the machine executes it.write access to a shared settings path
CAlready-present foothold: RMM tool, other low-privilege malware, or a malicious dropper rewrites the ini before the user launches the game - escalating to interactive user code execution.existing foothold

The vulnerability does not require a malicious game image, does not require the emulator to run, and does not require any EXIT_IF-gated code path.


4. The QSettings INI escaping subtlety (required for a working PoC)

shader_log_folder is persisted by Qt QSettings in INI format, where backslash is the escape character. Measured behaviour (an internal probe wrote four candidate values and reported what actually reaches cmd.exe):

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