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email-security-header-analyzer — Email header & .eml analyzer for SPF/DKIM/DMARC, spoofing and phishing. Runs 100% in your browser, so your emails are never uploaded. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/0xanalyst/email-security-header-analyzer
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GitHub0xanalyst/email-security-header-analyzer

email-security-header-analyzer

Email header & .eml analyzer for SPF/DKIM/DMARC, spoofing and phishing. Runs 100% in your browser, so your emails are never uploaded.

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1 day agoNot yet reviewed
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Email Security Header Analyzer (ESHA)

Open ESHA in your browser →

[!IMPORTANT] Your emails never leave your device. The hosted version runs the whole analyzer inside your browser tab with WebAssembly. There is no ESHA server: the headers and .eml files you open are never uploaded, stored or shared, not even with GitHub or the ESHA project.

  • No uploads: analysis runs locally in a background worker in the page.
  • No third parties: no CDNs, analytics, trackers, or DNS or reputation lookups.
  • Enforced by the browser: the page's Content Security Policy (connect-src 'self') blocks it from contacting any other server.
  • Verifiable: open your browser's DevTools, go to Network, analyze a message, and you'll see no request carrying it.

That makes it suitable for sensitive or confidential messages, such as phishing reports from colleagues or incident evidence.

Paste an email's headers, or drop the whole .eml or Outlook .msg file, and ESHA tells you where the message really came from: whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC passed, which identities don't match the sender, and which signs of phishing or spoofing it shows. Analysis runs entirely on your machine and never contacts third-party services.

Built for SOC analysts, incident responders and IT admins who triage suspicious email. ESHA started from the open-source MHA (E-Mail Header Analyzer) by @lnxg33k, and its analysis engine, interface, API and command line have since been rewritten.

What it checks

Authentication and mismatches

  • SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC and Microsoft composite-auth (compauth) verdicts, taken from the receiving server's Authentication-Results, or Received-SPF and DKIM-Signature when that's missing
  • DMARC worked out from SPF and DKIM alignment when no verdict was recorded
  • A domain alignment table comparing the From domain against the SPF envelope sender, each DKIM signer, Return-Path, Reply-To, Sender, Message-ID and the sending server's HELO name, using organisational domains from the Public Suffix List
  • SPF or DKIM that passes for an unrelated domain while DMARC fails (the classic spoofing pattern via bulk mail services)
  • Weak p=none DMARC policies, conflicting SPF results, and fake Authentication-Results headers inserted by the sender
  • DKIM signatures that don't cover From, that use the l= body-length tag, or that sign too few headers
  • BIMI logos, including BIMI headers inserted on mail that fails DMARC
  • Mail sent through email service providers (SendGrid, Mailchimp, Amazon SES, Mailgun, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, Postmark, SparkPost, Brevo, HubSpot, Microsoft 365, Google Workspace), so expected envelope and DKIM mismatches are explained instead of flagged. When DMARC fails, ESHA explains why an SPF or DKIM pass for the service's domain proves nothing.
  • Mailing-list messages: list Reply-To, Sender and footer-broken DKIM are notes, not warnings, when DMARC passes

Sender identity

  • Look-alike domains imitating major brands: typos (paypa1), homoglyphs and Cyrillic/Greek confusables (раураl), punycode, brand names embedded in other domains
  • Cousin domains of the sender's own organisation in Reply-To or links (acmecorp-hr.com vs acme-corp.com), typical of invoice and payroll fraud
  • Display names that contain a different email address, or claim a brand the domain doesn't belong to
  • Reply-To, Return-Path and Sender mismatches, missing Message-ID or Date, forged dates
  • Thread tricks: "RE:" subjects with no thread behind them, and replies from a look-alike of a domain in the conversation (thread hijacking)
  • Bulk mail without List-Unsubscribe, or without one-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058)

Route

  • Every relay hop: HELO, reverse DNS, IPv4/IPv6, protocol, TLS, timestamp and per-hop delay
  • Correct handling of server clock skew and missing time zones (the original MHA reported these as 24-hour delays or crashed)
  • Originating IP with country (plus city and network owner if you add the free MaxMind City/ASN databases)
  • Residential or dynamic sending IPs, missing reverse DNS, bare-IP HELO greetings

Content (when the body is included)

  • Links whose visible text points somewhere else, raw-IP links, URL shorteners, punycode and look-alike link domains, free hosting often used for phishing, open redirects, javascript: and data: links
  • Risky attachments (HTML, SVG, ISO/IMG, LNK, scripts, executables, macro documents, OneNote), double extensions (invoice.pdf.html), and files whose content doesn't match their name
  • HTML smuggling: HTML or SVG attachments that build a file in the browser (atob, Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, large base64 data)
  • Inside archives and disk images: password-protected and nested archives, and shortcuts, scripts or programs in ZIP files and ISO/IMG images. RAR, VHD and UDF images are checked for file names in their raw data. Only listings are read; nothing is extracted.
  • Calendar invites (.ics) from organisers outside the sender's domain, with their links added to the link table
  • Image-only messages and requests to scan a QR code (quishing). ESHA does not decode QR codes.
  • Remote images and tracking pixels (shown as a note)
  • Login and data-collection forms in the message or its attachments

Outlook .msg files: received messages keep their original internet headers, so they're analyzed exactly like an .eml, attachments and embedded messages included. Messages saved from Sent Items or Drafts have no transport headers; ESHA rebuilds From, To, Subject and Date from Outlook's properties and says the route can't be checked. Bodies stored only as RTF aren't decoded.

Spam filters: Microsoft 365 (SCL, BCL, SFV, CAT such as SPOOF or PHSH) and SpamAssassin verdicts.

Indicators and export

  • An Indicators tab lists the sender's IPs, domains, email addresses, URLs (raw or defanged) and attachment SHA-256/MD5 hashes, each with its role (origin, reply-to, link, and so on) and whether it looks suspicious. Recipients and your own mail servers are left out.
  • Export the indicators as CSV, JSON, a STIX 2.1 bundle or a MISP event. In STIX and MISP, only suspicious items become indicators or to_ids attributes, so benign mail services aren't marked malicious.
  • HTML report saves one self-contained file for a ticket: no scripts, nothing loaded, and links defanged. Printing the page also includes every tab.

Every result is combined into a 0–100 risk score. Each finding has a plain-language explanation, advice on what to do and its MITRE ATT&CK techniques. The report is split into tabs: Findings, Route, Authentication, Links & attachments (when the message body is included) and All headers. The score is heuristic: treat it as triage, not proof.

Use it in your browser

ESHA is published as a static site on GitHub Pages: https://0xanalyst.github.io/email-security-header-analyzer/

The hosted version runs the same Python analyzer inside your browser tab with Pyodide (WebAssembly). Headers and .eml files you open are never uploaded. GitHub serves the page's files and doesn't see any email content. The page's Content Security Policy (connect-src 'self') blocks it from contacting any other server, and Pyodide is hosted with the site rather than loaded from a CDN. The first visit downloads about 14 MB (less after compression), which your browser then caches.

To build and preview the static site yourself:

pip install -r requirements.txt
python scripts/build_site.py               # writes ./site
python -m http.server -d site 8000         # http://127.0.0.1:8000
node scripts/check_site.js site tests/samples   # optional smoke test of the in-browser engine

Every push to main rebuilds and deploys the site (.github/workflows/pages.yml).

Run it locally

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