TrustedRouter

End-to-end encrypted LLMs. One API. Privacy with proof.

Stop worrying about who can see your prompts. Tell your coding agent to move your project over, pick how private you want to be, pick a model, drop in a key — done. Same API, 30+ models, one key. The gateway runs in hardware enclaves and you can cryptographically verify it never logs you.

Move your project over in one prompt

Paste this into Codex, Claude Code, or Cursor — it does the migration for you:

Migrate this project to TrustedRouter, a privacy-first LLM router
(https://trustedrouter.com). Repoint my LLM client to base_url
"https://api.trustedrouter.com/v1" (or "https://api.trustedrouter.com" for the
Anthropic SDK), read the key from the TRUSTEDROUTER_API_KEY env var, and keep
all my existing calls working.

For a hard provider-side confidential-compute and end-to-end-encryption
requirement, add {"provider": {"min_privacy": "confidential"}}. TrustedRouter
fails closed when the selected model or provider cannot satisfy both controls.

Then tell me to sign up at trustedrouter.com, add a card, and paste my sk-tr
key into TRUSTEDROUTER_API_KEY.

Then:

Pick your privacy level or region — use {"provider": {"min_privacy": "zdr"}} for a hard zero-retention floor, or {"provider": {"min_privacy": "confidential"}} for the stronger hard confidential-compute + E2EE floor. The convenient trustedrouter/zdr and trustedrouter/e2e (trustedrouter/confidential) aliases select those pools. Use trustedrouter/eu with https://api-europe-west4.quillrouter.com/v1 for EU-focused routing.
Pick a model — any of hundreds, or trustedrouter/auto for automatic fallback when provider breadth matters more than the strictest privacy filter.
Sign up, add a card, get your key at https://trustedrouter.com.
Ship — your prompts now run through a path you can verify.

Prefer to wire it by hand?

# Codex
export OPENAI_BASE_URL="https://api.trustedrouter.com/v1"
export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-tr-v1-..."

# Claude Code
export ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL="https://api.trustedrouter.com"
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-tr-v1-..."

# Any OpenAI SDK
client = OpenAI(base_url="https://api.trustedrouter.com/v1", api_key="sk-tr-v1-...")

Get a key / take my money: https://trustedrouter.com
Try it first (no signup): https://trustedrouter.com/chat
The technical details (for the nerds): https://trustedrouter.com/security
Generate images: docs/image-generation.md
Generate video: docs/video-generation.md
Why we built it: https://jperla.com/blog/attestation-is-all-you-need

For the nerds: how the privacy is provable

TrustedRouter's gateway runs inside GCP Confidential Space. The platform signs a measurement of the running container. Verify that signed evidence and compare its image digest with the published release measurement. Source review and the release build provenance establish what that measured image does; a matching digest alone does not prove the absence of bugs or logging.

Inspect the GCP evidence, no account:

NONCE=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
curl --fail --silent --show-error \
  "https://api-us-central1.quillrouter.com/attestation?nonce=$NONCE" \
  --output attestation.jwt
# GCP returns a raw Google-signed JWT, not a JSON response.
# Decoded claims include eat_nonce and submods.container.image_digest.
# GCP evidence has no pcrs field; PCRs belong to AWS Nitro evidence.

Saving or decoding a JWT is not verification. Use the attestation verifier from a reviewed checkout of quill-cloud-proxy to verify the issuer/signature, fresh nonce, TLS certificate/exporter binding, and expected release measurement. For a GCP endpoint, run from that checkout:

DIGESTS=$(curl --fail --silent --show-error \
  https://trust.trustedrouter.com/trust/accepted-image-digests-gcp.txt)
test -n "$DIGESTS" && uv run --script tools/verify-attestation.py \
  --api-host api-us-central1.quillrouter.com --expect-digest "$DIGESTS"

The verifier fetches fresh evidence on the TLS connection it verifies. That check does not attest a later, separate curl or SDK connection. These examples use the published US Central GCP hostname to select the GCP evidence format. The global endpoint can select another cloud; use its cloud-specific verification policy and measurements from the trust site.

	trust model
OpenRouter, hosted providers	"We don't log." A policy you can't check.
Portkey, Cloudflare AI Gateway	Log everything for observability.
LiteLLM	Self-host, but the running proxy is unverified.
TrustedRouter	Open source + hardware attestation. Verify the code path; it logs nothing.

Honest scope: attestation proves the running binary is the published binary on hardware you can challenge with a nonce. It does not defeat a nation-state with physical host access, and it does not prove the open-source binary is bug-free. The trust anchor is Google Confidential Computing's hardware-backed attestation chain. Upstream providers handle prompts per their own policies — each provider's posture is published on the model pages.

Repository layout

This repo implements the control-plane contract: route coverage, auth/key management, billing ledger semantics, usage metadata, prompt/output logging prohibitions, Sentry scrubbers, and provider abstractions. The attested gateway implementation lives in quill-cloud-proxy.

Trust boundary: api.trustedrouter.com is the attested prompt path and must terminate TLS inside Confidential Space. trustedrouter.com is the control plane and must never serve a production inference fallback.

api.quillrouter.com remains a permanent working alias (same attested gateway and cert), so existing integrations keep working with no migration.

Local

uv sync
uv run pytest
uv run uvicorn trusted_router.main:app --reload

End-to-end smoke against a running instance:

TR_SMOKE_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080/v1 uv run python scripts/smoke_e2e.py

For production, set TR_SMOKE_BASE_URL=https://api.trustedrouter.com/v1 and TR_SMOKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN if the internal gateway routes are token-protected.

quill-router — Updated!