关于此漏洞:https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-20698
在 ntoskrnl.exe 中,有两个被修补的函数:sub_1406AE224 和 WbAddLookupEntryEx。存在漏洞的函数是 WbAddLookupEntryEx。该函数的调用路径如下:

要调用此函数,我们需要调用 NtQuerySystemInformation,第一个参数为 0xb9。用户提供的缓冲区中的第一个字节是此 switch 的选项:
switch ( first_byte_in_usermod_buf )
{
case 1:
status_1 = WbDecryptEncryptionSegment(item, copy_of_usermod_buf, NumberOfBytes_1);
goto set_status_and_return;
case 2:
status_1 = WbReEncryptEncryptionSegment(item, copy_of_usermod_buf, NumberOfBytes_1);
goto set_status_and_return;
case 3:
status_1 = WbHeapExecuteCall(item, copy_of_usermod_buf, usermod_buffer, NumberOfBytes_1);
goto set_status_and_return;
case 4:
if ( !copy_of_usermod_buf )
{
status_1 = patched_case4_no_user_buffer(item, another_item);
set_status_and_return:
status = status_1;
goto return;
}
break;
case 5:
case 6:
status = usermod_buffer != 0i64 ? STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED : STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto return;
case 7:
status_1 = WbRemoveWarbirdProcess(item->proc_handle);
goto set_status_and_return;
case 8:
status_1 = WbProcessStartup(item, copy_of_usermod_buf, NumberOfBytes_1);
goto set_status_and_return;
case 9:
status_1 = WbProcessModuleUnload(item, copy_of_usermod_buf, NumberOfBytes_1);
goto set_status_and_return;
}
对于每个使用参数 0xb9 调用 NtQuerySystemInformation 的进程,都会创建一个结构体,该结构体将存储在内存中,直到进程终止。我将此结构体称为 item_instance。首先,函数 sub_1406AF294 试图在其他此类结构体中查找当前进程的结构体。这些结构体的指针按进程 ID 顺序存储在内存中。如果未找到该结构体,则会通过 WbCreateWarbirdProcess 创建。然后,该结构体的指针将通过存在漏洞的 WbAddLookupEntryEx 添加到数组中。
补丁前的 WbAddLookupEntryEx 代码:
NTSTATUS WbAddLookupEntryEx(
items_info *items_info,
__int64 new_item_pointer,
__int64 not_used,
unsigned int new_item_index)
{
unsigned int last_item_index;
NTSTATUS status;
unsigned int old_items_count;
unsigned int size_of_item;
last_item_index = items_info->last_item_index;
status = 0;
old_items_count = items_info->old_items_count;
if ( last_item_index + 1 >= old_items_count )
{
status = WbReAlloc(
items_info->vuln_buffer,
old_items_count * items_info->size_of_item,
items_info->size_of_item * (old_items_count + items_info->count_of_new_items),
&items_info->vuln_buffer);
if ( status < 0 )
return status;
items_info->old_items_count += items_info->count_of_new_items;
old_items_count = items_info->old_items_count;
last_item_index = items_info->last_item_index;
}
if ( new_item_index > last_item_index || !old_items_count )
return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
memmove(
(char *)items_info->vuln_buffer + (new_item_index + 1) * items_info->size_of_item,
(char *)items_info->vuln_buffer + new_item_index * items_info->size_of_item,
items_info->size_of_item * (last_item_index - new_item_index));
size_of_item = items_info->size_of_item;
++items_info->last_item_index;
*(_QWORD *)((char *)items_info->vuln_buffer + new_item_index * size_of_item) = new_item_pointer;
return status;
}
它重新分配指针数组,并插入一个新指针。
补丁添加了以下安全检查:
status = RtlULongMult(old_items_count, items_info->size_of_item, &size_of_old_items);
if ( status < 0 )
return status;
status = RtlULongAdd(old_items_count, items_info->count_of_new_items, &sum_result);
if ( status < 0 )
return status;
status = RtlULongMult(sum_result, mb_item_size, result_size_8byte);
if ( status < 0 )
return status;
这使得加法和乘法运算在溢出时安全。因此,在未修补版本中,我们可以在以下情况下实现整数溢出:
整数溢出发生后,指针数组将被重新分配,但大小更小。然后,memmove 将尝试移动元素以为新元素腾出空间。因此,它会破坏新分配块之后的内存块。
要触发整数溢出,我们需要创建 0xffffffff / size_of_item + 1 个结构体。size_of_item 始终为 8。因此,我们需要创建 0x20000001 个结构体。每个结构体代表一个进程。所以我们需要拥有 0x20000001 (536870913) 个并发进程。在我的虚拟机上,我只能创建 12492 个并发进程,而在我的主机上可以创建 39652 个。