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CVE-2026-112866-woo-product-filter-sqli-poc — Proof-of-concept and Docker lab for CVE-2026-112866, an unauthenticated SQL injection in the WooCommerce Product Filter plugin, with vulnerable and patched validation controls. | Kitploit
도구/GitHubGitHub/hassham1/cve-2026-112866-woo-product-filter-sqli-poc
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityLabs & Practice
GitHubhassham1/cve-2026-112866-woo-product-filter-sqli-poc

CVE-2026-112866-woo-product-filter-sqli-poc

Proof-of-concept and Docker lab for CVE-2026-112866, an unauthenticated SQL injection in the WooCommerce Product Filter plugin, with vulnerable and patched validation controls.

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CVE-2026-112866 - Product Filter by WBW Unauthenticated SQL Injection Validation Lab

Security-research material for reproducing and validating CVE-2026-112866: Product Filter by WBW (woo-product-filter) <= 3.4.6 lets an unauthenticated caller drive the frontend filter AJAX flow (woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend) with fully attacker-supplied filter definitions, URL context and - in 3.4.6 - no nonce. The filter's f_list attribute slug is used raw as a taxonomy, matched against the attacker-controlled currenturl query string, and the matched parameter name becomes the temporary-table name postfix, which is interpolated into DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE statements without identifier sanitization.

  • Affected: Product Filter by WBW <= 3.4.6
  • Fixed: 3.4.7 (check_ajax_referer() + sanitize_html_class() + resolve_filter_taxonomy() - a ^[A-Za-z0-9_.%\-]{1,200}$ whitelist that rejects the payload before any SQL is built - plus createTemporaryTable() hardening)
  • CVSS 3.1: 9.3 per Patchstack, required privilege: unauthenticated
  • Sink: createTemporaryTable() - DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE \wpf_temp_table_` raw identifier interpolation (modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3725/3730` in 3.4.6)

Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. The PoC is a structural oracle (the filter response's exists member flips between a JSON object and a broken JSON array with only the injected backtick). No data extracted, no persistent changes - only ephemeral TEMPORARY tables inside the request.

Verdict

Status: proven in the supplied lab.

woo-product-filter 3.4.6 (WordPress 7.1.2, WooCommerce 11.2.1, nopriv AJAX):

f_list "pa_color" : filter_state.exists = {"pa_color": {term ids: counts}}
                    (benign control: endpoint fully functional, terms counted)
f_list "color`"   : filter_state.exists = []   (JSON empty array)
                    (DROP TEMPORARY TABLE `wpf_temp_table_wpf_filter_color``
                     - the injected backtick closes the identifier early and
                     alters the executed DDL; the follow-up SELECT then runs
                     against an empty table name)
3.4.7 with the public nonce: benign pa_color still works (exists object),
                    backtick payload rejected by resolve_filter_taxonomy
                    (oracle silent)

The flip between object and array with only the injected character proves the payload reaches SQL execution as a table identifier. The PoC does not demonstrate data extraction beyond the structural oracle (extending the injected identifier into full statement injection is the same sink and is deliberately left out).

Root cause (verified against the 3.4.7 fix)

The gate that is missing in 3.4.6. The frontend endpoint is registered on wp_ajax_nopriv_ with WPF_GUEST permissions and no nonce:

// classes/class-woobewoo-pf-frame.php:388, 3.4.6
$noprivActions = array( 'woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend', 'saveStatistics' );
// 3.4.7 adds, modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters-controller.php:361
check_ajax_referer( 'woobewoo_pf_filter_action', 'woobewoo_pf_filter_nonce' );

The input chain. getFilterTaxonomies() takes the filter block's attribute slug from the request JSON and, for a non-numeric slug, leaves it raw in 3.4.6:

// modules/woofilters/class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3505, 3.4.6
$slug     = $filter['settings']['f_list'];
$taxonomy = ( is_numeric( $slug ) )
    ? wc_attribute_taxonomy_name_by_id( (int) $slug )
    : WooBeWoo_PF_Dispatcher::applyFilters( 'getCustomAttributeName', $slug, $filter );
// free version: no getCustomAttributeName subscriber -> $taxonomy = raw f_list
// 3.4.7 replaces both call sites with resolve_filter_taxonomy()
private function resolve_filter_taxonomy( $slug, $filter ) {
    ...
    if ( taxonomy_exists( $taxonomy ) ||
         preg_match( '/^[A-Za-z0-9_.%\-]{1,200}$/', $taxonomy ) ) {
        return $taxonomy;
    }
    return '';
}

The URL-pattern hop. checkGetNames() builds the URL-parameter pattern from the raw taxonomy and matches it against the query string the client supplied in currenturl; the matched parameter NAME becomes a calculation mode key (addToArgsForLogicAnd()/removeFromArgsForLogicOr(): $calc[$param]):

// class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3647, 3.4.6
$pattern = 'wpf_filter_' . preg_replace( '/^pa_/', '', $taxonomy );
...
preg_match( '/^' . $pattern . '$/', $param, $matches );

The sink. getFilterExistsItems() passes the mode as $postfix to createTemporaryTable(), which interpolates the raw string into the DDL - the sanitized sanitizeIdentifier() result is computed but never used inside the statement:

// class-woobewoo-pf-woofilters.php:3694-3733, 3.4.6
public function createTemporaryTable( $table, $sql, $postfix = '' ) {
    if ( '' !== $postfix ) {
        $table .= '_' . str_replace( '-', '_', trim( $postfix ) );
    }
    $resultTable = WooBeWoo_PF_Db::sanitizeIdentifier( $table );   // computed only
    ...
    if ( ! WooBeWoo_PF_Db::query( "DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS `{$table}`" ) ) {
        return false;
    }
    if ( WooBeWoo_PF_Db::query( "CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `{$table}` (index my_pkey (id)) AS {$sql}", true ) === false ) {

A backtick inside f_list therefore closes the identifier early and alters the executed DDL. 3.4.7 kills the chain upstream (whitelist rejects the payload) and additionally hardens createTemporaryTable() (final ORDER BY/LIMIT regex stripping, trailing-semicolon removal, empty-identifier bail, empty-table guards at every call site).

Exploitation flow (as validated)

  1. Unauthenticated POST to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend, reqType=ajax, pl=wpf, mod=woofilters, a generalSettings JSON array carrying the wpfAttribute filter with the payload in settings.f_list, and a currenturl whose query string contains the matching parameter (wpf_filter_<payload>=1). In 3.4.6 no nonce field exists anywhere.
  2. checkGetNames() matches the URL parameter against the wpf_filter_<payload> pattern; the parameter name becomes the temp-table postfix.
  3. createTemporaryTable() executes DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS \wpf_temp_table_`` with the raw payload - the injected backtick alters the DDL.
  4. The response's filter_state.exists member is the oracle: object (benign) vs empty array (injection payload).

Quick start

Requirements: Docker with Compose v2, Python 3.10+ on the host.

./lab verify

Builds the 3.4.6 lab, requires the oracle to fire, then builds the 3.4.7 lab and requires it silent (the PoC scrapes the public nonce from the lab filter page there, exercising the full legitimate path). Remove everything with ./lab reset.

Expected evidence

Vulnerable control:

[*] benign attribute (pa_color)   : exists=object, 2 term(s)
[*] injected f_list (color`)      : exists=array

[!!!] SQL INJECTION CONFIRMED
  chain  : nopriv woobewoo_pf_filters_frontend (no nonce in <= 3.4.6)
           -> f_list raw taxonomy -> checkGetNames URL-pattern match
           -> mode key -> createTemporaryTable postfix
  sink   : DROP/CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE `wpf_temp_table_<payload>`
           raw identifier interpolation (sanitizeIdentifier result
           never used inside the DDL)
  oracle : filter_state.exists flips object -> array with only the
           injected backtick (DDL structure altered by the payload)
RESULT: VULNERABLE CONTROL CONFIRMED

Patched control:

[*] nonce obtained from the lab filter page (patched gate active)
[*] benign attribute (pa_color)   : exists=object, 2 term(s)
[*] injected f_list (color`)      : exists=other

[=] oracle silent. ...
RESULT: PATCHED CONTROL CONFIRMED

Manual lab lifecycle

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