rhboot/shim-reviewAvis de shim
Ce dépôt est destiné à l'examen des demandes de signature de shim. Pour créer une demande d'examen :
Notez que nous n'avons vraiment de l'expérience qu'avec GRUB2 ou systemd-boot sous Linux, donc nous demander d'approuver autre chose pour la signature nécessitera une certaine persuasion de votre part.
À compter du 20 octobre 2025, les shims envoyés à Microsoft seront signés avec les clés de 2011 et 2023. Pour chaque shim que vous soumettez, vous recevrez deux copies en retour, chacune signée par une clé différente. Voici les dernières informations de Microsoft : https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/hardware-dev-center/signing-with-the-new-2023-microsoft-uefi-certificates-what-submitters-need-to-kn/4455787
De nouvelles exigences de signature sont également entrées en vigueur, et sont disponibles ici : https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/hardware-dev-center/updated-microsoft-uefi-signing-requirements/1062916 Veuillez noter que passer par cet examen shim vous dispense des audits de sécurité annuels, tant que votre shim ne transmet le contrôle qu'à des chargeurs d'amorçage open source.
Astuce : consultez le répertoire docs de ce dépôt pour des conseils sur la soumission et l'obtention de la signature de votre shim.
Voici le modèle :
Nom de l'organisation et site web :
[votre texte ici]
Les examinateurs doivent pouvoir vérifier facilement que votre organisation est une entité légale, afin d'éviter les abus. Fournissez les informations qui peuvent prouver l'authenticité avec certitude.
Registre des sociétés / inscriptions fiscales ou équivalent :
(un lien vers l'entrée de l'organisation dans le registre de votre juridiction fera l'affaire)
[votre texte ici]
Les détails publics de votre organisation et de l'émetteur du certificat EV utilisé pour signer les fichiers .cab dans les services de signature de fichiers du Microsoft Hardware Dev Center.
(pas le certificat CA intégré dans votre binaire shim)
Exemple :``` Issuer: O=MyIssuer, Ltd., CN=MyIssuer EV Code Signing CA Subject: C=XX, O=MyCompany, Inc., CN=MyCompany, Inc.
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### À quel produit ou service cela est-il destiné ?
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[your text here]
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### Quelle est la justification que cela doive vraiment être signé pour que le monde entier puisse le démarrer ?
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[your text here]
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### Pourquoi ne pouvez-vous pas réutiliser le shim d'une autre distribution déjà signée ?
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[your text here]
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### Qui est le contact principal pour les mises à jour de sécurité, etc. ?
Les contacts de sécurité doivent être vérifiés avant que le shim puisse être accepté. Pour les demandes ultérieures, la vérification des contacts n'est nécessaire que si les contacts de sécurité ou leurs clés PGP ont changé depuis la dernière vérification réussie.
Un examinateur autorisé lancera la vérification des contacts en envoyant à chaque contact de sécurité un e-mail chiffré PGP contenant des mots aléatoires.
Il vous sera demandé de publier le contenu de ces e-mails dans votre problème `shim-review` pour prouver la propriété des adresses e-mail et des clés PGP.
Veuillez télécharger les clés PGP sur un keyserver bien connu comme keyserver.ubuntu.com et/ou les inclure dans la revue en tant que fichier .asc, et indiquez-les ici.
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- Nom :
- Poste :
- Adresse e-mail :
- Empreinte de la clé PGP :
- Emplacement du fichier/keyserver :
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### Qui est le contact secondaire pour les mises à jour de sécurité, etc. ?
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- Nom :
- Poste :
- Adresse e-mail :
- Empreinte de la clé PGP :
- Emplacement du fichier/keyserver :
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### Ces binaires ont-ils été créés à partir de l'archive tar de la version 16.1 de shim ?
Veuillez créer vos binaires shim en partant du fichier tar de la version 16.1 de shim : https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/16.1/shim-16.1.tar.bz2
Ceci correspond à https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/16.1 et contient le source gnu-efi approprié.
Assurez-vous que l'archive tar est correcte en vérifiant la somme de contrôle de votre téléchargement (SHA256, SHA512) avec les suivantes :```
46319cd228d8f2c06c744241c0f342412329a7c630436fce7f82cf6936b1d603 shim-16.1.tar.bz2
ca5f80e82f3b80b622028f03ef23105c98ee1b6a25f52a59c823080a3202dd4b9962266489296e99f955eb92e36ce13e0b1d57f688350006bba45f2718f159fb shim-16.1.tar.bz2
Make sure that you've verified that your build process uses that file as a source of truth (excluding external patches) and its checksum matches. You can also further validate the release by checking the PGP signature: there's a detached signature
The release is signed by the maintainer Peter Jones - his master key
has the fingerprint B00B48BC731AA8840FED9FB0EED266B70F4FEF10 and the
signing sub-key in the signature here has the fingerprint
02093E0D19DDE0F7DFFBB53C1FD3F540256A1372. A copy of his public key
is included here for reference:
pjones.asc
Once you're sure that the tarball you are using is correct and authentic, please confirm this here with a simple yes.
A short guide on verifying public keys and signatures should be available in the docs directory.
[your text here]
Hint: If you attach all the patches and modifications that are being used to your application, you can point to the URL of your application here (https://github.com/YOUR_ORGANIZATION/shim-review).
You can also point to your custom git servers, where the code is hosted.
[your url here]
Mention all the external patches and build process modifications, which are used during your building process, that make your shim binary be the exact one that you posted as part of this application.
[your text here]
See https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/hardware-dev-center/nx-exception-for-shim-community/ba-p/3976522 for more details on the signing of shim without NX bit.
[your text here]
Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2.
[your text here]
Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2, otherwise make sure these are present and confirm with yes.
[your text here]
Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2, otherwise do you have an entry in your GRUB2 binary similar to:
grub,5,Free Software Foundation,grub,GRUB_UPSTREAM_VERSION,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/?
[your text here]
If you had no previous signed shim, say so here. Otherwise a simple yes will do.
[your text here]
Hint: upstream kernels should have all these applied, but if you ship your own heavily-modified older kernel version, that is being maintained separately from upstream, this may not be the case.
If you are shipping an older kernel, double-check your sources; maybe you do not have all the patches, but ship a configuration, that does not expose the issue(s).
[your text here]
Hint: If it does not, we are not likely to sign your shim.
[your text here]
[your text here]
[your text here]
[your text here]
This ensures that your new shim+GRUB2 can no longer chainload those older GRUB2 binaries with issues.
If this is your first application or you're using a new CA certificate, please say so here.
[your text here]
A reviewer should always be able to run docker build . to get the exact binary you attached in your application.
Hint: Prefer using frozen packages for your toolchain, since an update to GCC, binutils, gnu-efi may result in building a shim binary with a different checksum.
If your shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case, what the differences would be and what build environment (OS and toolchain) is being used to reproduce this build? In this case please write a detailed guide, how to setup this build environment from scratch.
[your text here]
This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc.
[your text here]
For example, signing new kernel's variants, UKI, systemd-boot, new certs, new CA, etc..
Skip this, if this is your first application for having shim signed.
[your text here]
[your text here]
Describe the security strategy that is used for key protection. This can range from using hardware tokens like HSMs or Smartcards, air-gapped vaults, physical safes to other good practices.
[your text here]
A yes or no will do. There's no penalty for the latter.
[your text here]
A yes or no will do. There's no penalty for the latter. However, if yes: does that certificate include the X509v3 Basic Constraints to say that it is a CA? See the docs for more guidance about this.
[your text here]
Hint: The history of SBAT and more information on how it works can be found here. That document is large, so for just some examples check out SBAT.example.md
If you are using a downstream implementation of GRUB2 (e.g. from Fedora or Debian), make sure you have their SBAT entries preserved and that you append your own (don't replace theirs) to simplify revocation.
Remember to post the entries of all the binaries. Apart from your bootloader, you may also be shipping e.g. a firmware updater, which will also have these.
Hint: run objcopy --dump-section .sbat=/dev/stdout YOUR_EFI_BINARY to get these entries. Paste them here. Preferably surround each listing with three backticks (```), so they render well.
[your text here]
Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2.
Hint: this is about those modules that are in the binary itself, not the .mod files in your filesystem.
[your text here]
[your text here]
[your text here]
Hint: The most common case here will be a firmware updater like fwupd.
[your text here]
Skip this, if you're not using GRUB2 or systemd-boot.
[your text here]
Summarize in one or two sentences, how your secure bootchain works on higher level.
[your text here]
[your text here]
[your text here]
The reviewing process is meant to be a peer-review effort and the best way to have your application reviewed faster is to help with reviewing others. We are in most cases volunteers working on this venue in our free time, rather than being employed and paid to review the applications during our business hours.
A reasonable timeframe of waiting for a review can reach 2-3 months. Helping us is the best way to shorten this period. The more help we get, the faster and the smoother things will go.
For newcomers, the applications labeled as easy to review are recommended to start the contribution process.
[your text here]
[your text here]