Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
OutilsExploitsBlog
Log in
Soumettre
OutilsExploitsBlog
Soumettre

Outils de Hacking, PenTest et Cybersécurité pour votre Arsenal de Sécurité !

Kitploit est un répertoire d'outils de hacking, de cybersécurité et de pentesting. Découvrez les dernières mises à jour des projets pour trouver des vulnérabilités, analyser des systèmes, automatiser les tests et renforcer votre sécurité.

FluxContactConfidentialité© 2026 Kitploit

Répertoire d'outils

Catégories

Voir toutes les catégories
Loading categories
openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158 — Audits, hardens, and detects exposure to the OpenSSH musl authentication bypass (CVE-2026-123158) via a POSIX fleet auditor, zero-trust sshd configs, Ansible rollback, and Falco eBPF rules. | Kitploit
Outils/GitHubGitHub/mc493/openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158
Defensive ToolsVulnerability AnalysisConfiguration AuditingSecurity VirtualizationDevSecOpsAuthenticationIntrusion DetectionMisconfigurationIncident Response
Labs & Practice
GitHubmc493/openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158

openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158

Audits, hardens, and detects exposure to the OpenSSH musl authentication bypass (CVE-2026-123158) via a POSIX fleet auditor, zero-trust sshd configs, Ansible rollback, and Falco eBPF rules.

Voir le dépôt
il y a 8 joursPas encore vérifié
Partager
Contenu non disponible dans la langue demandée. Affichage de la version anglaise.

openssh-musl-enterprise-hardening (CVE-2026-123158)

Enterprise Defense-in-Depth, Vulnerability Auditor, and Zero-Trust Hardening Toolkit for OpenSSH musl Salt-Truncation Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-123158 / OpenSSH 10.6p2)

CI Release License: MIT Target: OpenSSH musl CVSS Score Vendor Aligned


Executive Summary

In November 2026, security researchers disclosed an unauthenticated remote authentication bypass vulnerability in OpenSSH servers compiled against musl libc (predominantly Alpine Linux). Under specific preconditions, supplying an oversized password string between 256 and 1,024 bytes triggers an internal string comparison match that grants unauthorized interactive shell or root access without credentials.

The flaw results from an architectural contract collision between independent components:

  • The Target Account: An account exists with no password set, represented by an asterisk * in the /etc/shadow password field.
  • Salt Borrowing: To prevent username enumeration through timing side-channels (CVE-2016-6210), OpenSSH borrows a valid SHA-256 ($5$), SHA-512 ($6$), yescrypt ($y$), or bcrypt ($2b$) salt from an active, unlocked account on the host. Locked accounts prefixed with !, expired accounts, or malformed hashes cannot act as salt donors.
  • musl Truncation Sentinel: The musl libc implementation of crypt_sha512.c and crypt_sha256.c enforces a 256-byte maximum password key length (KEY_MAX). When input length reaches or exceeds 256 bytes, musl returns the literal error sentinel string * instead of computing a hash digest.
  • The Comparison Collision: OpenSSH executes strcmp("*", "*") == 0, evaluating the authentication check as successful.

CRITICAL REMEDIATION DIRECTIVE: The definitive remediation is deploying vendor-patched packages. System administrators must apply vendor updates immediately:

  • Upstream Release: OpenSSH 10.6p2
  • Alpine Linux Official Backports:
    • Alpine 3.24: openssh-10.3_p1-r2
    • Alpine 3.23: openssh-10.2_p1-r1
    • Alpine 3.22: openssh-10.0_p1-r11
    • Alpine 3.21: openssh-9.9_p2-r1

⚠️ OPERATIONAL WARNING: On Alpine Linux, running apk add -u openssh updates the binary on disk, but does not restart the running sshd service. The daemon must be restarted (rc-service sshd restart or container redeploy) to flush the unlinked, vulnerable code from process memory.

In enterprise environments requiring qualification windows prior to binary replacement, protocol-level mitigation completely eliminates exposure. This repository provides automated fleet auditing, universal zero-trust drop-in configurations, Ansible deployment automation with verified compensating rollback, and eBPF runtime detection rules.


4-Layer Defense Architecture

flowchart TD
    classDef l1 fill:#022c22,stroke:#10b981,stroke-width:2px,color:#f8fafc;
    classDef l2 fill:#1e293b,stroke:#38bdf8,stroke-width:2px,color:#f8fafc;
    classDef l3 fill:#2e1065,stroke:#a855f7,stroke-width:2px,color:#f8fafc;
    classDef l4 fill:#451a03,stroke:#f59e0b,stroke-width:2px,color:#f8fafc;

    L1["Layer 1: Primary Prevention\nVendor Patch and Hardening\nPasswordAuth Disabled"]:::l1
    L2["Layer 2: Exposure Assessment\nPOSIX Fleet Auditor v1.1.6\n5-State SCAP/OVAL Engine"]:::l2
    L3["Layer 3: Runtime Detection\nFalco eBPF Security Rules\nCredential Tampering Defense"]:::l3
    L4["Layer 4: Verification Gate\n30-Scenario Regression Suite\nUbuntu + Alpine CI Matrix"]:::l4

    L1 --> L2
    L2 --> L3
    L3 --> L4
  1. Layer 1 — Primary Prevention: Upstream/Alpine backported binary updates + universal zero-trust SSH drop-in (PasswordAuthentication no, KbdInteractiveAuthentication no).
  2. Layer 2 — Exposure Assessment: SCAP/OVAL 5-state POSIX fleet auditor (audit_openssh_immunity.sh) verifying PID process identity (/proc/$PID/comm), package ownership (apk info -W, dpkg -S, rpm -qf), in-memory executable parity (/proc/$PID/exe), daemon command-line -f config recovery, strict 9-field /etc/shadow records, and full-field anchored algorithm-specific modular crypt hashes.
  3. Layer 3 — Runtime Detection: Falco eBPF rules detecting post-exploitation credential modification, authorized_keys tampering/atomic replacement, and unauthorized reverse shell spawning.
  4. Layer 4 — Independent Verification: 30-scenario unit, regression, and live integration test suite (tests/test_auditor.sh) executed across both Ubuntu (glibc) and Alpine Linux (musl libc) in GitHub Actions CI.

Official Vendor & Cybersecurity Advisory Alignment

ComponentStandard / DirectiveImplementation in this RepositoryTechnical Function
Authentication ProtocolCIS Benchmark 5.2.11PasswordAuthentication noTerminates password queries at protocol layer; bypasses crypt function entirely
Keyboard InteractiveCIS Benchmark 5.2.12KbdInteractiveAuthentication noDisables PAM challenge-response password fallback
Root Public Key AccessCIS Benchmark 5.2.5PermitRootLogin prohibit-passwordProhibits password authentication for administrative accounts
Algorithm RestrictionCIS Benchmark 5.2.14PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ...Enforces modern elliptic-curve standards (ED25519 / ECDSA / RSA-SHA2)
PAM DelegationOpenSSH Portable StandardUsePAM yesShifts authentication execution to PAM modules; safely ignored on no-PAM musl builds
Account Shadow GuardLinux Shadow Standardpasswd -l <user> (enforcing !)Replaces locked * sentinel with ! to prevent string comparison collisions

Assessment & Verification: The Fleet Exposure Auditor (v1.1.6)

Verified Execution Workflow

To assess fleet systems without deploying external runtimes, download the POSIX auditor script, verify the cryptographic digest, and execute:

# 1. Download auditor script and canonical SHA-256 digest
curl -sSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mc493/openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158/main/audit/audit_openssh_immunity.sh
curl -sSLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mc493/openssh-musl-enterprise--hardening-cve-2026-123158/main/audit/audit_openssh_immunity.sh.sha256

# 2. Verify cryptographic SHA-256 digest
sha256sum -c audit_openssh_immunity.sh.sha256

# 3. Execute fleet inspection
chmod +x audit_openssh_immunity.sh
./audit_openssh_immunity.sh

Dual-Gate Test-Harness Isolation

To prevent accidental environment variable bleed in production environments, all mock overrides (AUDIT_MOCK_*) are unconditionally unset unless both the --internal-test-mode CLI flag and AUDIT_ENABLE_TEST_HARNESS=1 environment variable are supplied. Note: this dual gate is a test-isolation mechanism, not a privilege boundary against an untrusted caller who controls process invocation.

JSON Telemetry Mode for CI/CD & SIEM

For integration with Ansible, Datadog, or centralized log ingestion:

./audit_openssh_immunity.sh --json

Populaires

Voir tout →

Découvrez les outils les plus utilisés par notre communauté.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 La boîte à outils OSINT ultime : graphe d'enquête, notation de confiance, familles d'alias, carte, chronologie et rapports. 49 modules, plus de 400 sites, aucune clé API requise.

    1.1k
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    # Application d'exécution en un clic GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499)

    618
  • 3

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    Plateforme CSIRT qui ingère les rapports Shadowserver dans MongoDB et les rejoue sous forme de cartes interactives, d'analyses, de constats, d'avis et de tableaux de bord exécutifs.

    407
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    Plateforme autonome de tests d'intrusion multi-agents basée sur des LLM, avec agents planificateur/ouvrier, graphes d'actifs et d'exploration, enregistrement du trafic MITM et retest des vulnérabilités.

    324
  • 5

    jumpserver

    jumpserver/jumpserver

    JumpServer est une plateforme open-source de Gestion des Accès Privilégiés (PAM) qui offre aux équipes DevOps et IT un accès sécurisé et à la demande aux terminaux SSH, RDP, Kubernetes, bases de données et RemoteApp via un navigateur web.

    279
  • 6

    Aliens_eye

    arxhr007/aliens_eye

    Moteur OSINT alimenté par l'IA pour découvrir et cartographier plus de 7 700 identités sur les réseaux sociaux à travers le web

    270

Explorer tous les outils

Parcourez notre collection d'outils

Voir tous les outils →
Télécharger l’outil