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CVE-2025-50154 — PowerShell toolkit to audit, harden, and hunt for insecure NTLM/SMB usage, addressing CVE-2025-50154 credential leak risks with event log analysis and detection queries. | Kitploit
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GitHubzenzue/cve-2025-50154

CVE-2025-50154

341 year agoNot yet reviewed

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PowerShell toolkit to audit, harden, and hunt for insecure NTLM/SMB usage, addressing CVE-2025-50154 credential leak risks with event log analysis and detection queries.

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NTLM/SMB Hardening & Threat Hunt Toolkit

Author: w01f
Version: 1.0
Purpose: Audit, harden, and hunt for insecure NTLM/SMB usage to mitigate risks such as CVE-2025-50154.


CVE-2025-50154 Overview

Severity: High
Type: NTLM Credential Leak + Patch Bypass (Zero-Click)
Affected: Windows 10/11, Windows Server
Summary:
CVE-2025-50154 is a bypass of Microsoft's earlier patch for CVE-2025-24054. Even with the previous mitigation, a crafted file or UNC path can trigger Windows Explorer to fetch a remote resource and initiate NTLM authentication without any user interaction (zero-click).
This can lead to:

  • NTLM hash leakage (offline cracking risk)
  • NTLM relay attacks for privilege escalation/lateral movement
  • Potential execution of untrusted remote resources (via icon parsing)

Why it matters: This bypass shows that attackers can still exploit legacy authentication paths through Explorer’s resource handling. Hardening NTLM and SMB client behavior, plus monitoring for suspicious Explorer-initiated connections, is critical.


Toolkit Features

  • Audit Mode:
    Reads current registry, service, and firewall configs; outputs pass/fail with recommended fixes.
  • Harden Mode:
    Applies security settings (NTLM restrictions, SMB signing, WebClient disable, UNC hardening, SMBv1 disable, firewall blocks).
  • Revert Mode: Restores backed-up settings.

  • Event Hunting:
    Gathers:
    • NTLM Operational log events
    • Security Logon events (4624 NTLM)
    • Sysmon EID 3 (Explorer.exe initiating SMB)
    • Filters by allowlist CIDRs
  • Benign Connectivity Test:
    Safe TCP:445 checks to sample hosts (no coercion or exploit).
  • Export: JSON/CSV output for reporting/CI pipelines.

  • Usage

    Audit Example

    root@kitploit:~
    .\NTLM_SMB_HardeningToolkit.ps1 -Mode Audit -AllowlistCIDRs "10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16" -HoursBack 24 -ExportJson .\ntlm_audit.json
    

    Harden Example

    root@kitploit:~
    .\NTLM_SMB_HardeningToolkit.ps1 -Mode Harden -AllowlistCIDRs "10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16" -SampleHosts "filesrv01.corp,10.0.5.20"
    

    Revert Example

    root@kitploit:~
    .\NTLM_SMB_HardeningToolkit.ps1 -Mode Revert
    

    Hunt & Detection Ideas

    Below are drop-in detection queries to identify suspicious NTLM/SMB usage potentially related to CVE-2025-50154 exploitation patterns.

    Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (KQL)

    1. Explorer.exe initiating SMB to untrusted

    root@kitploit:~
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
    | where RemotePort in (445, 139)
    | where not(RemoteIP in ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16"))
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
    

    2. LNK file drop + SMB connection (within 5 minutes)

    root@kitploit:~
    let lnk = DeviceFileEvents
        | where FileName endswith ".lnk"
        | where FolderPath has @"\Users\" and FolderPath has @"\Desktop";
    let smb = DeviceNetworkEvents
        | where RemotePort in (445,139)
        | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe";
    lnk
    | join kind=innerunique (smb) on DeviceId
    | where smb.Timestamp between (lnk.Timestamp .. lnk.Timestamp + 5m)
    | project DeviceName, lnk.Timestamp, smb.Timestamp, FolderPath, RemoteIP
    

    3. NTLM logons to unknown hosts

    root@kitploit:~
    DeviceLogonEvents
    | where LogonType == "Network"
    | where AuthenticationPackage =~ "NTLM"
    | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP, AccountUpn, bin(Timestamp, 10m)
    | order by count_ desc
    

    Sysmon (XML Config Needed)

    • EID 3 (NetworkConnect) from explorer.exe to TCP 445/139 outside allowlist.
    • EID 11 (FileCreate) for .lnk files on user desktops.
    • Correlate the two for zero-click SMB events.

    Windows Event Log (Security)

    • 4624 (Logon) with:
      • Logon Type = 3 (Network)
      • Authentication Package = NTLM
      • Remote IP outside trusted ranges.

    Mitigation Checklist

    • Restrict NTLM: Outgoing → Deny All
    • Require SMB signing (client/server)
    • Harden UNC Paths (NETLOGON, SYSVOL)
    • Disable WebClient if unused
    • Disable SMBv1 (client/server)
    • Block outbound TCP 445/139 to untrusted networks
    • Monitor for Explorer.exe SMB connections to non-approved IPs

    License

    This toolkit is provided for educational and defensive security purposes only.
    Do not use in production environments without change control and testing.

    Download Tool