
Blue-team lab: detecting & mitigating CVE-2025-24054 (Windows NTLM hash disclosure) with Sysmon, Wazuh SIEM, and Group Policy
Project log for a defensive security lab on CVE-2025-24054, the Windows New Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) Hash Disclosure Spoofing vulnerability, under the assumption that the affected system cannot be patched short-term.
Blue-team educational project (Murdoch University ICT279). The exploitation technique is publicly documented (Check Point, CISA KEV); the original contribution is the detection + mitigation methodology. No live credentials or the VM credential sheet are stored in this repository.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| CVE | CVE-2025-24054 |
| Class | Spoofing / Forced Authentication |
| Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) | CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1187 (Forced Authentication) |
| Affected | Windows 10 / 11, Windows Server 2008 R2 → 2025 |
| Real-world use | Phishing vs. Polish & Romanian government targets, March 2025 |
| CISA KEV | Added 17 April 2025 |
Windows auto-parses .library-ms files (Extensible Markup Language (XML)
library descriptors). A malicious file embeds a Universal Naming Convention
(UNC) path to an attacker server; on merely viewing or extracting it, Windows
opens an outbound Server Message Block (SMB) connection on Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) port 445 and transmits the user's Net-NTLMv2 hash — no click
required.
Isolated lab network (<SUBNET>/24, air-gapped)
┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
│ Attacker (Kali)│ │ Victim (Win10) │ │ SIEM (Ubuntu) │
│ Responder │◄──┤ Sysmon + Agent ├──►│ Wazuh Manager │
└────────────────┘SMB└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘
445
Detection pipeline: Sysmon → Windows Event Log → Wazuh Agent → Wazuh Manager → Custom Rules → Dashboard Alert
detection/ — Sysmon config + custom Wazuh rulesmitigation/ — Group Policy Object (GPO) NTLM restrictionexploit/ — defensive description of the trigger (placeholder IPs)docs/ — walkthrough, limitations, and screenshot evidence logSystem (Process ID 4),
the kernel SMB redirector — not explorer.exe. The detection rule
therefore uses no image-name filter, which is what makes it fire.