Make your own app expensive to reverse. A build-time audit, harden and verify harness for native binaries and mobile apps, built to counter AI-assisted reverse engineering.
Make your own app expensive to reverse — measure it, harden it, prove it.
Anyone can now reverse-engineer a shipped app by typing one sentence to an AI agent; blue-harness makes that expensive, measures how expensive, and proves each defense actually fires.
A build-time anti-reverse-engineering hardening & audit harness for native binaries and mobile apps you own.
Recorded with docs/assets/demo.tape. Real output, nothing staged.
git clone https://github.com/seifheakal/blue-harness && cd blue-harness
make demo # audit a sample build, show its hardening plan, then PROVE every defense fires
make verify # run every check and print one posture summary
Point it at your own binary:
make report BIN=path/to/your/binary # exposure audit + the ordered hardening plan
make harden BIN=path/to/your/binary # apply every post-build hardening (honest about the rest)
No external dependencies: a C toolchain, make, and Python 3.
[!CAUTION]
🔴 Help wanted — test blue-harness against a bigger model
Our before/after below is one run (N=1) by a small, 4-bit-quantised 7B model on a laptop (RTX 3070, 8 GB VRAM / 16 GB RAM) — a floor, not a ceiling. If you have the hardware, point a larger local or a frontier model at the same two builds and send the scored result back as a PR. A stronger attacker is the only way to test the layers our small run never reached. It is now one command —
make slice-k-run MODEL=<your-model>builds the sealed pair, drives the agent, and prints the honest before/after (and we fixed the tool-call friction that blocked commodity local models). Five-minute guide: docs/HOW-WE-TESTED.md.
Reverse engineering used to take real skill. Now anyone can point an AI agent at a binary, type one sentence, and get back readable code or a working patch — and commodity cracking of shipped software exploded with it.
blue-harness is a defensive toolkit aimed at that threat. It runs against your own build and does three things, audit-first:
| build | cracked (hash-verified) | tokens | wall | steps |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unprotected | YES | 1,256 | 1.6 s | 3 |
| hardened | no | 16,785 | 195 s | 13 |
The same agent cracked the unprotected build in under two seconds; against the hardened build it burned 13× the tokens and ~120× the wall-clock and still failed. String encryption, anti-debug, and analysis-surface exhaustion were all seen firing. Honestly: the honeytoken layer never fired — the agent was stopped earlier, so that layer went untested (exactly what a bigger model would exercise). Method and caveats: docs/HOW-WE-TESTED.md · full write-up.
Nine countermeasures, each proven to fire by a test and each carrying an honest strength tier and a named bypass — nothing here claims to be unbreakable.
| Countermeasure | Blunts | Tier | Named bypass |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-debug / anti-ptrace | live debugging & tracing (GDB, Frida attach) | Meaningful | Frida hooks the check; spawn-paused bypass loads first |
| String encryption (decode-on-demand) | reading secrets straight from the bytes | Speed-bump→Meaningful | embedded key → recover at rest; lift from memory |
| Dev→release identity transform (strip / rename / decoy) | names & symbols an agent reasons from | Speed-bump→Meaningful | behavioural cross-check ignores names |
| Anti-Frida detector | Frida injection (maps / threads / port) | Meaningful | stealth mode, renamed gadget, non-default port |
| Code-integrity + server attestation | patching a hot function | Meaningful→Strong (server-tied) | sustained live hook; client key is extractable |
| Core-dump suppression | crash-core memory reads | Speed-bump | re-enable cores on their host; read live memory |
| Analysis-surface exhaustion | the "ingest everything" agent's budget | Trivial→Speed-bump | filter to real sections + referenced symbols |
| Honeytokens / canaries | poisons string-mined "findings" + attributes a leak | Speed-bump / Meaningful (detection) | xref-validate drops decoys; rename the tell-tale section |
| Mach-O local-symbol strip | internal names in a macOS/iOS binary | Speed-bump→Meaningful | exported names remain; runtime-identical proven on macOS only |
Mach-O decoy non-mapped segment (vmsize=0 LC + trailer) | the "ingest everything" agent on a Mach-O | Trivial→Speed-bump | a loader-faithful tool drops vmsize==0 LCs + the trailer |
| Mach-O honeytokens / canaries | poisons string-mined "findings" + attributes a leak | Speed-bump / Meaningful (detection) | xref-validate drops decoys; rename the tell-tale marker |
A Claude skill reads the posture and tells you the next highest-value hardening — with its tier and bypass, every time.
Working today
harden, the driving Claude skill, and a CI gate that re-proves
every defense fires on each push (362 checks green).make slice-k-run) with a
robust tool-call shim so a commodity local model can actually drive it.