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CVE-2026-88773 — Python proof-of-concept exploiting a 32-bit chunk-size accumulator wrap in NetScaler nsppe's HTTP/1.1 chunked parser to trigger request smuggling. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/fyyre/cve-2026-88773
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GitHubfyyre/cve-2026-88773

CVE-2026-88773

Python proof-of-concept exploiting a 32-bit chunk-size accumulator wrap in NetScaler nsppe's HTTP/1.1 chunked parser to trigger request smuggling.

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CVE-2026-88773 - NetScaler nsppe 32-bit chunk-size accumulator wrap

by Fyyre - https://github.com/Fyyre

Proof-of-concept for an HTTP request-smuggling issue in the NetScaler nsppe HTTP/1.1 chunked-body parser.

A nine-digit chunk-size value (100000005) is accumulated into a 32-bit register with no overflow check, silently wrapping to 5. The proxy forwards the original framing but uses the wrapped size to decide where the request ends. A correct backend computing the full 64-bit length and a proxy that has already finished the request now disagree about message boundaries.

Observed outcomes

  • Flow A (64-bit backend): connection wedge. The backend waits for ~4 GB of body that never arrives.
  • Flow B (backend that also truncates to 32 bits): the trailing bytes are reclassified as a second, independent request and executed.

Usage

python3 88773.py <host> [--port 443] [--sni poc] [--plain] [--flow {a,b,both}] [--timeout 5] [-v]

No authentication is required. The only precondition is reachability of an HTTP virtual server on the appliance.

Controls

The script first sends a chunked POST and a pair of pipelined GETs. These establish that the target relays both single and multi-request traffic before the smuggle payload is attempted. These folks did the detailed research. I highly suggest you read it -> https://github.com/Scyrix-LLC/CVE-2026-88773

Notes

  • Payload is a single 122-byte TCP segment (85-byte prefix + 37-byte trailer).
  • Detection relies on timeouts (Flow A) or the appearance of the smuggled path in a subsequent response (Flow B).
  • Tested against a lab VPX (NetScaler NS14.1: Build 12.30.nc, Date: Nov 22 2023, 10:31:37 - results depend on the backend's own chunk-size handling.

This is a research proof-of-concept. It does not include weaponization (sorry!)

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