PHQ110(OPPO OP5613 / Android 14 / C.53)内存态 uid0 研究快照:CVE-2026-43499 GhostLock 链 + uid0 rootd + Shizuku。不写分区、不持久化。
On OPPO PHQ110 (Android 14 / C.53 / kernel 5.4.254-qgki), starting from an ordinary
adb shelland using CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock) to obtain uid0.No flashing, no bootloader unlock, no writing to any partition, no touching user data. The cost is: it only lives in memory and disappears on reboot.
This is not an app, nor is it a flashing package. It is an auditable research snapshot: a 1 MB static aarch64 binary, accompanying source code, a Termux client, and documentation that spells out every address, every offset, and every failure.
Starting from uid=2000 / u:r:shell:s0 (the default identity of adb shell, which can do almost nothing), in a single run:
| Stage | Result | Evidence level |
|---|---|---|
| A. In-memory uid0 | The process's uid/euid/gid all become 0, CapEff ⊇ 0xc6, the SELinux domain is still u:r:shell:s0, and enforcing remains = 1 throughout | Verified on real device (two independent cold boots) |
| B. A usable root channel | Forks a uid0 rootd listening on 127.0.0.1:10369, authenticated with a 32-byte secret | Verified on real device |
| C. Obtaining root on the phone side | In Termux, termux_uid0.py ... id → uid=0 ... ctx=u:r:shell:s0 | Verified on real device |
| D. Shizuku running as root | shizuku_server starts as uid0, binder delivery completes, shizuku.json is written to disk | Verified on real device (server side) |
E. Can rish on the app side really escalate privileges? | Not verified | Pending human testing in an authorized app |
The most counterintuitive point is that SELinux is not turned off. enforcing is always 1; we merely make SELinux treat
the single domain shell as "permissive" for capability checks—by pointing policydb->permissive_map
to a page of forged ebitmap. The rest of the machine remains enforcing for all other apps; the
untrusted_app_27 domain where Termux resides does not have this opening.
adb shell (uid 2000, shell 域, Enforcing)
│
├─ ① 6 发「读」 把内核当内存读写器:找到本进程的 task_struct → cred → selinux_state
├─ ② 2 发「写」 把 permissive_map 指向 pmsg 页里的 fake ebitmap(只放行 shell 域)
├─ ③ 5 发「写」 把 cred 里 5 个 capability 字段改成受控值 V
├─ ④ setresgid/setresuid(0,0,0) ← 此刻 enforcing 仍=1,但 shell 域已被放行
├─ ⑤ fork rootd(不走 exec,所以 uid0 与 caps 原样保留)→ 127.0.0.1:10369
└─ ⑥ 可选 fork+exec Shizuku starter → shizuku_server 以 uid0 运行
rt_mutex_waiter on the victim thread's kernel stack; subsequently sched_setattr triggers rb_erase, yielding a controlled 8-byte write.data slot of tcp_mem, then read /proc/.../tcp_mem — the kernel copies out those 16 bytes for us. The side effect is that every read corrupts target−8.base+0x830C6: the value of the write primitive cannot be 0 (a zero-value write will directly kill the process); a non-zero value will also be dereferenced by the kernel as a pointer for a second write. So the cap value must be something that "both contains the 0xC6 bit and is a valid kernel pointer".&init_cred would make the SID become u:r:kernel:s0 (the delivery leg fails outright), and a static object being freed by put_cred will inevitably panic. Only in-place field modification is possible.KASLR is not a problem: each boot uses perf_event_open to sample kernel IPs and solve for the slide D on the spot; it proceeds only if two independent samples agree, otherwise it aborts cleanly (never fires at a wrong address).permissive_map in the kernel pointing to the pmsg page, and the fake structures in that page will be trampled by a second run. To start over, simply reboot the phone.The full derivation, the target address and source of each shot, and the success criteria and failure surface of each shot are all in ARCHITECTURE.md.
OP5613), Android 14 / version C.53, kernel 5.4.254 — all link-time constants are for this machine and this build, switching models/builds makes it unusable;adb;python3);Enforcing, shell domain, /proc/kallsyms and /sys/fs/pstore unreadable to shell.# 1) 前置只读检查:任何一项不对就停,不要 push
adb shell getenforce # 必须 Enforcing
adb shell cat /proc/self/attr/current # 必须 u:r:shell:s0
adb shell 'head -1 /proc/kallsyms; echo rc=$?' # 必须被拒(能读 = 本 boot 已被武装过)
# 2) 推上去 + 复核指纹
adb push build/glx_p11n /data/local/tmp/glx_p11n.r<NN>
adb shell chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/glx_p11n.r<NN>
adb shell sha256sum /data/local/tmp/glx_p11n.r<NN>
# 期望 90b9e66b0122fc94bb4decba731359fa4b6e7e828654cfdb603fd448106549e4
# 3) 跑一次(必须真 pty,否则崩溃前的日志会被吞掉)
adb shell -t -t 'cd /data/local/tmp && ./glx_p11n.r<NN> --mode device --round <NN> \
--stop-after=shzlaunch --shz-after-deliver --deliver-fork \
--zd=tcp --zd-port=10369 --zd-client-selftest; echo GLX_SHELL_EXIT=$?'
Run it in Termux:
python3 ~/termux_uid0.py --chan=tcp --port=10369 --secret-file="$HOME/zd_secret" id
# → uid=0 euid=0 gid=0 pid=<rootd pid> ctx=u:r:shell:s0
After obtaining uid0, there is still one more step: deploy rootgate as a persistent channel. rootd is only a springboard
(lifespan 1–5 minutes, connection budget of 32), not a daily-use channel:
cp ops/rootx.py ops/deploy_root.py ops/rootgate_client.py ~/bin/ && chmod 700 ~/bin/*.py
adb push ops/rootgate.sh /data/local/tmp/ && adb shell chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/rootgate.sh
python3 ~/bin/deploy_root.py 10370 # 只花 rootd 1 条连接预算
python3 ~/bin/rootx.py 'id' # 之后的唯一入口
原理与完整步骤见 ops/OPS.md。
<NN> 只是个轮次标签(进文件名和日志,不参与逻辑),随便给个整数。
每个 boot 只跑一次;想再来一遍就正常重启手机(不是 fastboot,也不是 9008/EDL)。
完整的参数解释、逐阶段判据、Termux 客户端全部子命令、故障排查表 → USAGE.md。
| 写分区 | 零。不碰 boot/system/vendor/userdata,不 remount |
| 持久化 | 零。重启即全部恢复 |
| 改用户数据 | 零 |
| 第三方依赖 | 零。单个静态二进制,无动态库、无 su、无 Magisk |
| 最坏结果 | 内核 oops → panic_on_oops=1 让手机自动重启,约 5 秒,数据无恙 |
代价是另一面:交付的 rootd 一死,这次 boot 的 uid0 就永久没了,只能再重启一次 ——
二进制里没有 keeper / 自我重生机制(设计过,没实现)。
ops/ 的运维层绕开了这条:跑完立刻用 rootd 的一条连接把 uid0 的 rootgate 部署成
常驻进程(脱离 pty、PPid=1),之后 rootd 死不死都不影响日常使用,见 ops/OPS.md。
rootd 监听的是 TCP 127.0.0.1:10369。在 Android 上,loopback 不是信任边界——
任何一个有 INTERNET 权限的 App 都能连上它。
唯一的门是 /data/data/com.termux/files/home/zd_secret
(64 个十六进制字符 = 32 字节随机值,权限 0600,属主是 Termux 的 uid):
cat、不要截图、不要放进日志或云同步。AF_UNIX socket + 目录 0600 + SO_PEERCRED。
交付二进制里没有这个改进,仍是 TCP + secret;ops/rootgate.py 按这个方向实现了
一版独立的常驻通道(不监听任何网络端口、逐连接校验对端 uid),可以作为替代,见 ops/OPS.md。rootd 的协议里也没有写文件的操作(帧类型 G/I/R/X/F/P/Q,没有 W):
它自己能读文件、能 exec,但不是一个「任意文件写入器」。