
Exploit for CVE-2022-26134, an OGNL injection vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution.
Turn saved request-URI logs into reproducible analyst cases and review claimed Confluence mitigation evidence locally. The original paper and slides are preserved. The Python workflows extend that research with assistant support. They send no requests, scan no hosts and do not certify that a deployment is patched.
Use Python 3.11 or newer from the repository root. The basic case workflow uses only the standard library. Private case publication requires POSIX.
python -m detection
python -m detection demo
The first command lists workflows without creating files. The demo uses synthetic combined-log bytes, gzip and temporary SQLite. Expect:
{
"status": "compressed_log_exercise_passed",
"lines_parsed": 2,
"emitted_findings": 1,
"source_reproduction": "reproduced"
}
The full JSON also reports rejection of recompressed and truncated evidence. Temporary files are removed. This establishes local consistency, not source truth, code execution, successful mitigation or real collector identity.
On POSIX, use a fresh private directory outside the repository:
case_dir=$(mktemp -d)
python -m detection case tests/fixtures/combined-access.log \
--output "$case_dir/case.sqlite" --scope synthetic --log-format combined \
--created-at 2026-10-19T00:02:00Z
python -m detection verify "$case_dir/case.sqlite" tests/fixtures/combined-access.log \
--scope synthetic --log-format combined
python -m detection export "$case_dir/case.sqlite" --output "$case_dir/review.json"
Expect stored with a case key and queue, then reproduced. The export contains
report_type: case-document-export, a database digest and the retained case document.
The timestamp above is a fixture creation claim. Use an appropriate reviewed timestamp
and --scope owned or authorized only for inputs you are permitted to handle.
Existing destinations are preserved. Keep the directory private and remove it when
finished. No output is uploaded. A no-finding log returns no_findings without a case
file; that result does not establish an environment is safe.
verify checks the supplied original against the stored case. The plain export
command separately checks store integrity; it does not bind a source check into its
output. For a source-checked export, select the exact returned case key and follow
the retained-source export guide.
| Goal | Command or guide |
|---|---|
| Check required arguments | python -m detection COMMAND --help |
| Locate malformed saved-log lines without printing requests | inspect; syntax inspection |
| Saved lab, combined or NGINX JSON logs, plain or gzip | case, verify, export; input guides |
| Ordered rotated logs, including no-finding receipts | collection; collection guide |
| Request-level findings from one fully replayed collection source | collection export --format review; private source review |
| Reproduce a received review using just its selected original | review; recipient checks and limits |
| Signed self-contained collections | package; package and key-policy guide |
| Saved version/workaround claims with private output | mitigation; mitigation walkthrough and input limits |
| Reproduce a mitigation assessment from its exact original | mitigation-receipt demo; private receipt and recipient commands |
| Signed node/cluster claims, recovery and handoffs | Complete workflow catalog |
| Original research and artifacts | Case study, paper and slides |
| Interfaces and legacy module locations | Detection guide, compatibility |
All original python -m detection.MODULE commands remain available. The entry point
only selects existing workflows; it does not relax their scope, policy, pin, clock or
private-file requirements. Signing needs the optional requirements-signing.txt.
python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
python -m unittest discover -s CVE-2022-26134-OGNL-Injection/tests -v
Tests use synthetic or local data. Signing tests need the optional dependency; skipped tests do not establish signature verification. A signature authenticates an enrolled key's claim, not log truth or actual mitigation. Policy enrollment, fresh revocation distribution and rollback-resistant trust state remain unfinished. Keep real logs, personal data, records and private keys outside Git.