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aquos-r7-ghostlock — Device-specific Linux 5.10 kernel root exploit for Sharp AQUOS R7 (CVE-2026-43499), granting temporary UID 0 with SELinux permissive and an su daemon. | Kitploit
أدوات/GitHubGitHub/pirosap/aquos-r7-ghostlock
Android SecurityPrivilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationReverse EngineeringPost-ExploitationMobile SecurityPayload DevelopmentBinary Exploitation
GitHubpirosap/aquos-r7-ghostlock

aquos-r7-ghostlock

Device-specific Linux 5.10 kernel root exploit for Sharp AQUOS R7 (CVE-2026-43499), granting temporary UID 0 with SELinux permissive and an su daemon.

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AQUOS R7 GhostLock temporary root

Device-specific Linux 5.10 port of GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499) for the Sharp AQUOS R7. The validated target is the AQUOS R7 (Mineva, SGA202SH/A202SH) running Android 14 build 03.00.11, kernel 5.10.237-android12-9-00013-gd09ef2e980e0-ab13968955 (SM8450). The previous validated target, build 03.00.06 / kernel 5.10.218-android12-9-00041-g124993efd06e-ab12385094, is preserved in git tag v1.0-030006.

This is a port of aquos-r6-ghostlock (AQUOS R6, kernel 5.4.61-qgki). Every constant — KASLR handling, the selinux_state leak window, task/cred offsets, the zero-BSS scratch region — was re-derived and validated against the R7 kernel; the R6 stack geometry served only as a starting reference.

A successful run gives you UID 0 with SELinux permissive and starts a small su command daemon. It does not grant a full Linux capability set and the change is not persistent: a reboot restores the stock kernel state.

Build

The Android NDK clang targeting aarch64-linux-android29 is required (tested with NDK r30):

make build/ghostlock510   # ~3.4 MB static binary
make strip                # optional; ~0.6 MB, same behaviour

Reproducibility (03.00.11 calibration): this source, built with the toolchain above, is byte-identical (MD5 25fc1d5d0e92d36c56f00f983a49667d) to the binary used in the on-device 03.00.11 test. The release asset is the llvm-strip-ed form of exactly that binary (598,672 bytes, SHA-256 5c413a80e9fcc41032412f4e0e5183bc723dde9a2e0ace5a6d9c79681b04b9cd). For the 03.00.06 build see tag v1.0-030006 (unstripped MD5 fa896ebd361519766b46cc2bab70dea2).

Run

Push the binary (release asset or your own build) and run it once:

adb push ghostlock510 /data/local/tmp/ghostlock510
adb shell chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/ghostlock510
adb shell "setsid nohup /data/local/tmp/ghostlock510 --use-setattr --stamp3 --perm-pc --cred-swap --install-su --stamp-off 0xf0 --log /data/local/tmp/ghostlock510.log </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 &"

Use the installed su client for root commands (full path required):

adb shell "/data/local/tmp/su -c 'id; getenforce'"
# uid=0(root) gid=2000(shell) groups=2000(shell) context=u:r:kernel:s0
# Permissive

su talks to the exploit's daemon over loopback TCP (port 9999); no persistent root shell is attached. Commands are line-based, and nesting su inside su does not work. Interactive programs (vi, top, …) want a PTY; an interactive su mode on top of the daemon is left as future work.

One exploit run per boot

Measured on this exact build (see VERIFICATION.md):

  • The first run after a clean boot succeeded 10/10 times, independent of when it was executed (30–300 s after boot completion).
  • A second run while a root session was still alive triggered a kernel panic within seconds. The device recovers automatically (~40–90 s).

So: reboot, run ghostlock510 once, and do not run it again while that session lives. Reboot is the cleanup path.

Important safety notes

  • Calibrated for the exact device/build above. Do not run it on other kernels without independently validating every offset and stack geometry.
  • After a successful run, kernel PI references point into a live worker thread's stack. Do not kill the parked exploit process(es).
  • Use only on hardware you own or are explicitly authorized to test.

Calibration provenance

Large external inputs are deliberately not included in this repository:

  • 03.00.11: kernel offsets and disassembly were taken from the vmlinux/System.map of Android CI kernel build 13968955; byte-level identity with the kernel actually running on the device was verified via its boot_b image (all 23 PT_LOAD segments, per-segment compare). The CVE fix (5.10.y backport 2026-07-21) post-dates this tree (HEAD 2025-08-20), and kernel/futex/core.c is blob-identical to the 03.00.06 build — the vulnerability is still present.
  • 03.00.06 (tag v1.0-030006): offsets came from Android CI kernel build 12385094, byte-verified via the device boot_a image.
  • SHARP OSS firmware 03.00.01 was used as the device source reference.

References

  • mouseos/aquos-r6-ghostlock — the direct porting source (AQUOS R6, Apache-2.0).
  • R0rt1z2/GhostLock — the upstream 5.10-series PoC (Amazon devices); the --stamp3 / --use-setattr approach was inspired by it (no license stated in that repository).

License

Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE and NOTICE.

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