jaf0rk/cve-2023-20938Análise técnica e exploit de prova de conceito para CVE-2023-20938, uma vulnerabilidade de uso após liberação no driver Binder do kernel Android, permitindo escalonamento local de privilégios.
Nota adicional: No ambiente Android real, aplicativos comuns não podem registrar serviços através do servicemanager, mas podem implementar a conexão entre dois processos através do ITokenManager. Este caso de teste usa o ITokenManager.
commit ee965fe12def46132d0087a9f353750d717e717c (HEAD -> android12-5.10.136_r00, tag: android12-5.10.136_r00)
Merge: b7247246f637 fb39cdb9eac1
Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Date: Tue Aug 16 12:45:36 2022 +0200
[ 43.177167] ==================================================================
[ 43.178189] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.178438] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888116e99d58 by task poc/89
[ 43.178646]
[ 43.179102] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: poc Not tainted 5.4.219 #1
[ 43.179309] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 43.179766] Call Trace:
[ 43.180332] dump_stack+0x76/0x9c
[ 43.180514] ? binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.180738] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200
[ 43.180962] ? binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.181131] ? binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.181303] __kasan_report.cold+0x1d/0x35
[ 43.181464] ? binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.181626] kasan_report+0x10/0x20
[ 43.181761] binder_ioctl+0x48de/0x50b0
[ 43.181966] ? switch_mm_irqs_off+0x388/0xd80
[ 43.182127] ? __switch_to_asm+0x42/0x80
[ 43.182250] ? binder_thread_write+0x2070/0x2070
[ 43.182392] ? __schedule+0x71b/0x18b0
[ 43.182513] ? io_schedule_timeout+0x150/0x150
[ 43.182660] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x635/0xc10
[ 43.182803] ? wait_woken+0x1c0/0x1c0
[ 43.182944] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x19/0x3f0
[ 43.183092] ? do_nanosleep+0x246/0x4c0
[ 43.183218] ? schedule_timeout_idle+0x50/0x50
[ 43.183363] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x70
[ 43.183519] ? memset+0x20/0x40
[ 43.183632] do_vfs_ioctl+0x91e/0xef0
[ 43.183759] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0x36f/0x510
[ 43.183896] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 43.184034] ? selinux_bprm_set_creds+0xcb0/0xcb0
[ 43.184182] ? memset+0x20/0x40
[ 43.184289] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x61d/0xb10
[ 43.184458] ? __x64_sys_rseq+0x4f0/0x4f0
[ 43.184600] ? security_file_ioctl+0x4b/0x90
[ 43.184742] ksys_ioctl+0x59/0x90
[ 43.184853] ? switch_fpu_return+0xc2/0x210
[ 43.184987] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x69/0xa0
[ 43.185112] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x231/0x2c0
[ 43.185260] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[ 43.185384] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 43.185665]
[ 43.185836] Allocated by task 89:
[ 43.186060] save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 43.186211] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
[ 43.186380] binder_new_node+0x49/0x870
[ 43.186519] binder_transaction+0x4002/0x5d20
[ 43.186669] binder_thread_write+0x454/0x2070
[ 43.186816] binder_ioctl+0xff9/0x50b0
[ 43.186950] do_vfs_ioctl+0x91e/0xef0
[ 43.187070] ksys_ioctl+0x59/0x90
[ 43.187177] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x69/0xa0
[ 43.187296] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[ 43.187419] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 43.187628]
[ 43.187760] Freed by task 67:
[ 43.187921] save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 43.188082] __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x170
[ 43.188286] kfree+0x90/0x250
[ 43.188485] binder_deferred_func+0xba6/0x1040
[ 43.188777] process_one_work+0x6fe/0x1250
[ 43.188989] worker_thread+0x534/0x1200
[ 43.189156] kthread+0x314/0x3e0
[ 43.189278] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 43.189412]
[ 43.189509] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888116e99d00
[ 43.189509] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
[ 43.190587] The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
[ 43.190587] 128-byte region [ffff888116e99d00, ffff888116e99d80)
[ 43.191116] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 43.191529] page:ffffea00045ba640 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88811a801480 index:0x0
[ 43.192177] flags: 0x200000000000200(slab)
[ 43.192678] raw: 0200000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88811a801480
[ 43.192969] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 43.193251] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 43.193438]
[ 43.193518] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 43.193928] ffff888116e99c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 43.194205] ffff888116e99c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 43.194434] >ffff888116e99d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 43.194728] ^
[ 43.194976] ffff888116e99d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 43.195291] ffff888116e99e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 43.195653] ==================================================================
[ 43.196033] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 43.197301] binder: release 89:89 transaction 12 in, still active
[ 43.197576] binder: release 89:89 transaction 9 out, still active
[ 43.198094] binder: send failed reply for transaction 12, target dead
[ 43.198392] binder: send failed reply for transaction 9, target dead
TODO: escrita do exploit em andamento...