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AtomicSyscall — Ferramentas e PoCs para investigação de syscalls do Windows. | Kitploit
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AtomicSyscall

Ferramentas e PoCs para investigação de syscalls do Windows.

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AtomicSyscall

Ferramentas e PoCs para investigação de syscalls do Windows.

Índice

  • AtomicSyscall
    • HeavensGate
    • SyscallDumper
    • SyscallPoCs
    • SyscallResolvers
    • Get-SyscallNumber.ps1
    • Referência
    • Agradecimentos

HeavensGate

Este diretório é para a técnica Heaven's Gate. Veja README.md

SyscallDumper

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Project

Esta ferramenta serve para extrair syscalls do Windows de ntdll.dll ou win32u.dll:``` C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -h

SyscallDumper - Tool to dump syscall.

Usage: SyscallDumper.exe [Options] [INPUT_DLL_1] [INPUT_DLL_2]

root@kitploit:~
-h, --help : Displays this help message. -d, --dump : Flag to dump syscall from ntdll.dll or win32u.dll. -D, --diff : Flag to take diff between 2 dlls. -f, --format : Specifies output format. "c" for C/C++, "cs" for CSharp, "py" for Python. -n, --number : Specifies syscall number to lookup in decimal or hex format. -o, --output : Specifies output file (e.g. "-o result.txt"). -s, --search : Specifies search filter (e.g. "-s createfile"). INPUT_DLL_1 : Specifies path of ntdll.dll or win32u.dll. Older one in diffing. INPUT_DLL_2 : Specifies path of ntdll.dll or win32u.dll. Newer one in diffing.
root@kitploit:~
Para despejar números de syscall de ntdll.dll ou win32u.dll, use a opção `-d` (`--dump`).
Se você não especificar a DLL de origem, esta ferramenta despeja números de syscall de `C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll` e `C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll`:```
C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d

[*] No target is specified.
[>] Dumping from system default ntdll.dll and win32u.dll.
[>] Loading C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll.
[+] C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : ntdll.dll
[+] Got 463 syscall(s).
[>] Loading C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll.
[+] C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : win32u.dll
[+] Got 1258 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Syscall Name                                          | Number | Number (hex) |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| NtAcceptConnectPort                                   | 2      | 0x0002       |
| NtAccessCheck                                         | 0      | 0x0000       |

--snip--

| NtWriteVirtualMemory                                  | 58     | 0x003A       |
| NtYieldExecution                                      | 70     | 0x0046       |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Found 463 syscall(s).


[Syscall Table from C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Syscall Name                                            | Number | Number (hex) |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| NtBindCompositionSurface                                | 4373   | 0x1115       |
| NtCloseCompositionInputSink                             | 4374   | 0x1116       |

--snip--

| NtValidateCompositionSurfaceHandle                      | 5350   | 0x14E6       |
| NtVisualCaptureBits                                     | 5351   | 0x14E7       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Found 1258 syscall(s).

Se você quiser filtrar o nome do syscall do resultado do dump, use a opção -s (--search). E você pode salvar o resultado em um arquivo com a opção -o (--output) da seguinte forma:``` C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\SyscallSamples\1809x64\ntdll.dll -s token -o result.txt

[>] Loading C:\SyscallSamples\1809x64\ntdll.dll. [+] C:\SyscallSamples\1809x64\ntdll.dll is loaded successfully. [] Architecture : AMD64 [] Image Name : ntdll.dll [+] Got 462 syscall(s). [>] Trying to save results. [*] Output File Path : c:\Tools\result.txt [+] Results are saved successfully.

c:\Tools>type result.txt [Syscall Table from C:\SyscallSamples\1809x64\ntdll.dll]


| Syscall Name | Number | Number (hex) |

| NtAdjustGroupsToken | 107 | 0x006B | | NtAdjustPrivilegesToken | 65 | 0x0041 | | NtAdjustTokenClaimsAndDeviceGroups | 108 | 0x006C | | NtCompareTokens | 155 | 0x009B | | NtCreateLowBoxToken | 172 | 0x00AC | | NtCreateToken | 191 | 0x00BF | | NtCreateTokenEx | 192 | 0x00C0 | | NtDuplicateToken | 66 | 0x0042 | | NtFilterToken | 222 | 0x00DE | | NtFilterTokenEx | 223 | 0x00DF | | NtImpersonateAnonymousToken | 246 | 0x00F6 | | NtOpenProcessToken | 290 | 0x0122 | | NtOpenProcessTokenEx | 48 | 0x0030 | | NtOpenThreadToken | 36 | 0x0024 | | NtOpenThreadTokenEx | 47 | 0x002F | | NtQueryInformationToken | 33 | 0x0021 | | NtQuerySecurityAttributesToken | 339 | 0x0153 | | NtSetInformationToken | 404 | 0x0194 |

[] Found 18 syscall(s). [] Filter String : "token"

root@kitploit:~
Usando a opção `-n` (`--number`), você pode pesquisar o nome da syscall pelo número da syscall da seguinte forma.
Se você quiser especificar o número da syscall em formato hexadecimal, ele deve começar com "0x".```
C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll -n 85

[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll.
[+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : ntdll.dll
[+] Got 470 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll]

----------------------------------------
| Syscall Name | Number | Number (hex) |
----------------------------------------
| NtCreateFile | 85     | 0x0055       |
----------------------------------------

[*] Found 1 syscall(s).


C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll -n 0x55

[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll.
[+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : ntdll.dll
[+] Got 470 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\dev\SyscallSamples\21H1x64\ntdll.dll]

----------------------------------------
| Syscall Name | Number | Number (hex) |
----------------------------------------
| NtCreateFile | 85     | 0x0055       |
----------------------------------------

[*] Found 1 syscall(s).

Se você quiser alterar o formato de saída, use a opção -f (--format). Atualmente, C/C++ (c), CSharp (cs) e Python (py) são suportados:``` C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll -f c

[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll. [+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll is loaded successfully. [] Architecture : ARM64 [] Image Name : ntdll.dll [+] Got 486 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll]

enum NT_SYSCALLS { NtAcceptConnectPort = 2, NtAccessCheck = 0, NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm = 41,

--snip--

root@kitploit:~
NtWriteVirtualMemory = 58,
NtYieldExecution = 70

}

[*] Found 486 syscall(s).

C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll -f cs

[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll. [+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll is loaded successfully. [] Architecture : ARM64 [] Image Name : ntdll.dll [+] Got 486 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll]

public enum NT_SYSCALLS { NtAcceptConnectPort = 2, NtAccessCheck = 0, NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm = 41,

--snip--

root@kitploit:~
NtWriteVirtualMemory = 58,
NtYieldExecution = 70

}

[*] Found 486 syscall(s).

C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -d C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll -f py

[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll. [+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll is loaded successfully. [] Architecture : ARM64 [] Image Name : ntdll.dll [+] Got 486 syscall(s).

[Syscall Table from C:\dev\SyscallSamples\Win11Arm64\ntdll-arm64.dll]

g_NtSyscalls = { "NtAcceptConnectPort": 2, "NtAccessCheck": 0, "NtAccessCheckAndAuditAlarm": 41, "NtAccessCheckByType": 99, "NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm": 89,

--snip--

root@kitploit:~
Para calcular a diferença entre as tabelas de syscalls de 2 DLLs, use a opção `-D` (`--diff`) da seguinte forma:```
C:\Tools>SyscallDumper.exe -D C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1809x64\win32u.dll C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1903x64\win32u.dll

[>] Trying to take diff.
    [*] Old File : C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1809x64\win32u.dll
    [*] New File : C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1903x64\win32u.dll
[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1809x64\win32u.dll.
[+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1809x64\win32u.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : win32u.dll
[+] Got 1242 syscall(s).
[>] Loading C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1903x64\win32u.dll.
[+] C:\dev\SyscallSamples\1903x64\win32u.dll is loaded successfully.
    [*] Architecture : AMD64
    [*] Image Name   : win32u.dll
[+] Got 1258 syscall(s).

################################################
#               DELETED SYSCALLS               #
################################################

-------------------------------------------------------------------
| Syscall Name                            | Number | Number (hex) |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
| NtDCompositionCreateSharedVisualHandle  | 4391   | 0x1127       |
| NtGdiDdDDINetDispStopSessions           | 4608   | 0x1200       |
| NtGdiDdDDISetDisplayPrivateDriverFormat | 4664   | 0x1238       |
| NtMITCoreMsgKGetConnectionHandle        | 4907   | 0x132B       |
| NtMITCoreMsgKSend                       | 4909   | 0x132D       |
| NtMITSynthesizeMouseWheel               | 4919   | 0x1337       |
| NtMITWaitForMultipleObjectsEx           | 4922   | 0x133A       |
| NtUserGetPointerFrameArrivalTimes       | 5105   | 0x13F1       |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Deleted 8 syscall(s).


################################################
#               MODIFIED SYSCALLS              #
################################################

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Syscall Name                                       | Number       | Number (hex)     |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| NtDxgkEndTrackedWorkload                           | 4435 -> 4436 | 0x1153 -> 0x1154 |
| NtDxgkGetAvailableTrackedWorkloadIndex             | 4436 -> 4437 | 0x1154 -> 0x1155 |

--snip--

| NtValidateCompositionSurfaceHandle                 | 5334 -> 5350 | 0x14D6 -> 0x14E6 |
| NtVisualCaptureBits                                | 5335 -> 5351 | 0x14D7 -> 0x14E7 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Modified 623 syscall(s).


################################################
#                 NEW SYSCALLS                 #
################################################

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Syscall Name                                            | Number | Number (hex) |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| NtDCompositionCreateSharedResourceHandle                | 4391   | 0x1127       |
| NtDxgkDispMgrOperation                                  | 4435   | 0x1153       |

--snip--

| NtUserSetMagnificationDesktopMagnifierOffsetsDWMUpdated | 5283   | 0x14A3       |
| NtUserSetProcessMousewheelRoutingMode                   | 5293   | 0x14AD       |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[*] Added 24 syscall(s).

SyscallPoCs

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Project

O objetivo deste projeto é investigar como atacantes resolvem e executam syscalls do Windows. Todos os PoCs tentam listar os módulos do kernel usando a syscall NtQuerySystemInformation.

Nome do PoCDescrição
PhysicalResolvePoCEste PoC simplesmente resolve os números de syscall de NtQuerySystemInformation a partir de C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll.
HellsGatePoCEste PoC resolve os números de syscall de NtQuerySystemInformation pela técnica Hell's Gate.
HalosGatePoCEste PoC resolve os números de syscall de NtQuerySystemInformation pela técnica Halo's Gate.

SyscallResolvers

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Project

O objetivo deste projeto é ajudar a aprender como funcionam as técnicas de resolução de números de syscall em memória:

Nome do PoCDescrição
HellsGateResolverEste PoC resolve os números de syscall em ntdll.dll pela técnica Hell's Gate. Não funciona para funções corrigidas (patched) com produtos antivírus.
HalosGateResolverEste PoC resolve os números de syscall em ntdll.dll pela técnica Halo's Gate.
InitialProcessResolverEste PoC resolve os números de syscall em ntdll.dll a partir do processo inicial criado por NtCreateUserProcess.
KnownDllsResolverEste PoC resolve os números de syscall em ntdll.dll com \KnownDlls\ntdll.dll.

A figura a seguir mostra a diferença entre Hell's Gate e Halo's Gate em um ambiente com software antivírus instalado. A técnica Hell's Gate não funciona para a função NtCreateProcessEx corrigida (patched). Por outro lado, a técnica Halo's Gate funciona para a função NtCreateProcessEx corrigida (patched):

syscallresolvers.png

Em algumas máquinas com software antivírus instalado, parte do código de ntdll.dll é interceptado (hookado) conforme a seguinte saída do depurador:``` 0:001> u ntdll!ntcreateprocessex ntdll!NtCreateProcessEx: 00007fffb33ef700 e9930a1800 jmp 00007fffb3570198 00007fffb33ef705 cc int 3 00007fffb33ef706 cc int 3 00007fffb33ef707 cc int 3 00007fffb33ef708 f604250803fe7f01 test byte ptr [SharedUserData+0x308 (000000007ffe0308)],1 00007fffb33ef710 7503 jne ntdll!NtCreateProcessEx+0x15 (00007fffb33ef715) 00007fffb33ef712 0f05 syscall 00007fff`b33ef714 c3 ret

root@kitploit:~
Mas processos criados por `NtCreateUserProcess` ou `NtCreateProcessEx` são carregados apenas com ntdll.dll não hookada no estado inicial.
Podemos confirmar isso escaneando a memória do processo inicial suspenso.
Processos suspensos não podem ser anexados com depurador, então escrevi uma pequena ferramenta [ProcMemScan](https://github.com/daem0nc0re/TangledWinExec/tree/main/ProcMemScan).
Para testá-la, implementei a flag `-d` que pode pausar o processo inicial no InitialProcessResolver após a detecção do número de syscall:```
PS C:\Dev> .\InitialProcessResolver.exe -n ntcreateprocessex -d

[>] Trying to create initial process.
[+] Initial process is created successfully.
    [*] Process Name : svchost
    [*] Process ID   : 1336
[>] Trying to dump Nt API address.
[*] ntdll.dll @ 0x00007FFFB3350000
[+] Got 491 entries (Architecure: AMD64).
[+] NtCreateProcessEx @ 0x00007FFFB33EF700
[+] Syscall number for NtCreateProcessEx is 77 (0x4D).
[*] Debug break. To exit this program, hit [ENTER] key.

Podemos confirmar que o número da syscall para NtCreateProcessEx é 77 a partir da saída, e o processo svchost criado por InitialProcessResolver é 1336. Ao escanear este svchost com ProcMemScan, podemos ver que o processo svchost carrega apenas ntdll.dll da seguinte forma:``` PS C:\Dev> .\ProcMemScan.exe -p 1336 -l

[>] Trying to get target process memory information. [*] Target process is 'svchost' (PID : 1336). [+] Got target process memory information.

root@kitploit:~
          Base           Size State       Protect                    Type        Mapped

0x0000000000000000 0x7FFE0000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x000000007FFE0000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000007FFE1000 0xC000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x000000007FFED000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000007FFEE000 0xBCE9C12000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x000000BD69C00000 0x28000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69C28000 0x3000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READWRITE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69C2B000 0x1D5000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69E00000 0x79000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69E79000 0x3000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READWRITE, PAGE_GUARD MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69E7C000 0x4000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READWRITE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x000000BD69E80000 0x145FCB70000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00000203669F0000 0x20000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READWRITE MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x0000020366A10000 0x1F000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x0000020366A2F000 0x7BF1C9D61000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00007DF530790000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_EXECUTE_READ MEM_PRIVATE N/A 0x00007DF530791000 0xF000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00007DF5307A0000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007DF5307A1000 0xF000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00007DF5307B0000 0x1C67000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007DF532417000 0x2000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_NOACCESS MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007DF532419000 0x165000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007DF53257E000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_NOACCESS MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007DF53257F000 0x1F7D2E4F000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FED053CE000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FED053CF000 0x809C3D000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF50F00C000 0x2000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF50F00E000 0x1F049000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF52E057000 0x1426000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_NOACCESS MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF52F47D000 0x9000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF52F486000 0x132A000 MEM_RESERVE NONE MEM_MAPPED N/A 0x00007FF5307B0000 0x270F80000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00007FF7A1730000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A1731000 0x7000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_EXECUTE_READ MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A1738000 0x4000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A173C000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_WRITECOPY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A173D000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A173E000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_WRITECOPY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A173F000 0x2000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe 0x00007FF7A1741000 0x811C0F000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A 0x00007FFFB3350000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB3351000 0x130000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_EXECUTE_READ MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB3481000 0x4D000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB34CE000 0xC000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_WRITECOPY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB34DA000 0xF000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB34E9000 0x1000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READWRITE MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB34EA000 0x3000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_WRITECOPY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB34ED000 0x77000 MEM_COMMIT PAGE_READONLY MEM_IMAGE C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll 0x00007FFFB3564000 0x4CA8C000 MEM_FREE PAGE_NOACCESS NONE N/A

[*] Completed.

PS C:\Dev>

root@kitploit:~
E o código `NtCreateProcessEx` não está hookado:```
PS C:\Dev> .\ProcMemScan.exe -p 1336 -d -b 0x00007FFFB33EF700 -r 20

[>] Trying to dump target process memory.
[*] Target process is 'svchost' (PID : 1336).
[+] Got target process memory.
    [*] BaseAddress       : 0x00007FFFB33EF000
    [*] AllocationBase    : 0x00007FFFB3350000
    [*] RegionSize        : 0x92000
    [*] AllocationProtect : PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY
    [*] State             : MEM_COMMIT
    [*] Protect           : PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
    [*] Type              : MEM_IMAGE
    [*] Mapped File Path  : C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
    [*] Hexdump (0x20 Bytes):

                           00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F

        00007FFFB33EF700 | 4C 8B D1 B8 4D 00 00 00-F6 04 25 08 03 FE 7F 01 | L.Ñ,M... ö.%.._..
        00007FFFB33EF710 | 75 03 0F 05 C3 CD 2E C3-0F 1F 84 00 00 00 00 00 | u...AI.A ........


[*] Completed.

PS C:\Dev>

initialprocessresolver.png

Get-SyscallNumber.ps1

Voltar ao topo

Script

Neste script, as 3 funções a seguir são implementadas:

  • Get-ModuleHandle : Como o nome indica, esta função resolve o endereço base do módulo carregado como a API GetModuleHandle.

  • Get-ProcAddress : Como o nome indica, esta função resolve o endereço da função exportada como a API GetProcAddress.

  • Get-SyscallNumber : Esta função resolve o número de syscall com a técnica Hell's Gate ou Halo's Gate.

Se você quiser resolver o endereço base de um módulo, como ntdll.dll, defina o nome do módulo como 1º argumento ou a opção -ModuleName:``` PS C:> Import-Module C:\dev\Get-SyscallNumber.ps1 PS C:> Get-ModuleHandle ntdll.dll 140720055189504 PS C:> (140720055189504).ToString("X16") 00007FFBF0E70000 PS C:> Get-ModuleHandle -ModuleName kernel32.dll 140720022028288 PS C:> (140720022028288).ToString("X16") 00007FFBEEED0000 PS C:>

root@kitploit:~
Para resolver o endereço de uma função exportada em um módulo, defina o endereço base do módulo e o nome da função exportada para a função `Get-ProcAddress`.
O endereço base do módulo deve ser especificado com o 1º argumento ou a opção `-Module`.
O nome da função exportada deve ser especificado com o 2º argumento ou a opção `-ProcName` da seguinte forma:```
PS C:\> $ntdll = Get-ModuleHandle -ModuleName ntdll.dll
PS C:\> Get-ProcAddress $ntdll NtCreateToken
140720055839008
PS C:\> (140720055839008).ToString("X16")
00007FFBF0F0E920
PS C:\> Get-ProcAddress -ProcName ntcreatetoken -Module $ntdll
140720055839008
PS C:\>

Se você quiser saber o número da syscall, defina o nome da syscall como 1º argumento ou use a opção -SyscallName para a função Get-SyscallNumber:``` PS C:> Get-SyscallNumber ntcreateuserprocess Syscall Number : 0xC8 200 PS C:> Get-SyscallNumber -SyscallName ntcreateprocessex Syscall Number : 0x4D 77 PS C:>

root@kitploit:~
![getsyscallnumber.png](https://assets.kitploit.com/production/public/readmes/47889/69eabff97f4b9a8ce6562654c3f7014317bd25f0003f16eb2e7882e05ffff624.png)


## Referência

[Voltar ao topo](#atomicsyscall)

### Fundamentos

* [https://jhalon.github.io/utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-1/](https://jhalon.github.io/utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-1/)

* [https://jhalon.github.io/utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-2/](https://jhalon.github.io/utilizing-syscalls-in-csharp-2/)

* [https://github.com/jhalon/SharpCall](https://github.com/jhalon/SharpCall)

### Heaven's Gate
* [https://wbenny.github.io/2018/11/04/wow64-internals.html](https://wbenny.github.io/2018/11/04/wow64-internals.html)

* [https://medium.com/@fsx30/hooking-heavens-gate-a-wow64-hooking-technique-5235e1aeed73](https://medium.com/@fsx30/hooking-heavens-gate-a-wow64-hooking-technique-5235e1aeed73)

* [https://mark.rxmsolutions.com/through-the-heavens-gate/](https://mark.rxmsolutions.com/through-the-heavens-gate/)

* [https://speakerdeck.com/aaaddress1/rebuild-the-heavens-gate-from-32-bit-hell-back-to-heaven-wonderland](https://speakerdeck.com/aaaddress1/rebuild-the-heavens-gate-from-32-bit-hell-back-to-heaven-wonderland)

* [http://blog.rewolf.pl/blog/?p=102](http://blog.rewolf.pl/blog/?p=102)

* [https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/wow64-subsystem-internals-and-hooking-techniques](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/wow64-subsystem-internals-and-hooking-techniques)

* [https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/02/the-0x33-segment-selector-heavens-gate.html](https://www.malwaretech.com/2014/02/the-0x33-segment-selector-heavens-gate.html)

* [https://int0h.wordpress.com/2009/12/24/the-power-of-wow64/](https://int0h.wordpress.com/2009/12/24/the-power-of-wow64/)

* [https://modexp.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/dllpic-injection-on-windows-from-wow64-process/](https://modexp.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/dllpic-injection-on-windows-from-wow64-process/)

### Hell's Gate

* [https://vxug.fakedoma.in/papers/VXUG/Exclusive/HellsGate.pdf](https://vxug.fakedoma.in/papers/VXUG/Exclusive/HellsGate.pdf)

* [https://github.com/am0nsec/HellsGate](https://github.com/am0nsec/HellsGate)


### Halo's Gate

* [https://blog.sektor7.net/#!res/2021/halosgate.md](https://blog.sektor7.net/#!res/2021/halosgate.md)


### Agradecimentos

[Voltar ao topo](#atomicsyscall)

Obrigado pelas suas pesquisas e postagens no blog:

* Paul Laîné ([@am0nsec](https://twitter.com/am0nsec))

* smelly__vx ([@smelly__vx](https://twitter.com/smelly__vx))

* reenz0h ([@sektor7net](https://twitter.com/sektor7net))

* Jack Halon ([@jack_halon](https://twitter.com/jack_halon))
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