Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-104356-pictshare-weak-delete-code — Predictable delete_code via rand() in PictShare < 3.7.1 (CWE-338). PoC + advisory writeup. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/wvllxe/cve-2026-104356-pictshare-weak-delete-code
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityCryptographyPapers & ResearchLearning & Education
GitHub
wvllxe/cve-2026-104356-pictshare-weak-delete-code

CVE-2026-104356-pictshare-weak-delete-code

Predictable delete_code via rand() in PictShare < 3.7.1 (CWE-338). PoC + advisory writeup.

View Repository
2462 days agoNot yet reviewed
Share

CVE-2026-104356 — Predictable delete_code via rand() in PictShare

Authorized security research. PoC for defensive and educational use only.

CVSS 3.1 CVSS 4.0 CWE-338 Status

PictShare generates the delete_code authorization token with getRandomString(), which draws every character from PHP's non-cryptographic rand(). Because rand() is not a CSPRNG — and the same generator produces the public file hash shown in every shared URL — the delete_code is predictable rather than secret, allowing unauthorized deletion of hosted files without ever reading the code from the info endpoint.

CVECVE-2026-104356
ProductPictShare (self-hosted image/media host)
Affected>= 2.0.0, < 3.7.1
Fixed inv3.7.1
VulnerabilityUse of Cryptographically Weak PRNG (CWE-338) → predictable auth token
PrivilegesNone (unauthenticated)
CVSS 3.15.9 MEDIUM — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVSS 4.08.2 HIGH — CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Discovered byAlisher Qarshibayev
AdvisoryVulnCheck

Root Cause

// src/inc/core.php  (< 3.7.1)
function getRandomString($length=32, $keyspace='0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz')
{
    $str = '';
    $max = (function_exists('mb_strlen') ? mb_strlen($keyspace,'8bit') : strlen($keyspace)) - 1;
    for ($i = 0; $i < $length; ++$i) {
        $str .= $keyspace[rand(0, $max)];   // <-- rand() is NOT cryptographically secure
    }
    return $str;
}

This one function produces both:

  • the file hash that is public in every shared image URL, and
  • the delete_code that authorizes deletion.

Since both tokens come from the same non-CSPRNG stream, an attacker who observes the public hash gains information about the generator's state — the delete_code no longer has the entropy its 32-character length suggests. rand() carries no cryptographic unpredictability guarantee, so using it for a security token is the defect (CWE-338), independent of any specific state-recovery technique.

Why this is exploitable, stated honestly

  • The core defect is real and vendor-confirmed: a security-authorizing token must come from a CSPRNG. The maintainer's own fix commit says "rand(), whose state can be recovered from the public file hashes drawn from the same generator" and switches to random_int().
  • Full remote state recovery is environment-dependent. PHP 7+ auto-seeds rand() (aliased to the Mersenne-Twister path) per process, so a turnkey remote predictor depends on the deployment (process reuse, number of observable outputs, PHP build). This PoC therefore demonstrates the predictability principle deterministically in a controlled seed, rather than claiming a universal one-shot remote break. That is the honest scope of the finding — and it is exactly why the vendor still treated it as a vulnerability and fixed it.

Proof of Concept

demo.php reproduces the vendor's exact getRandomString() and shows that, once the PRNG state is known/recovered, the first output (the public hash) fully determines the second output (the delete_code) — i.e. observing the hash predicts the code:

php demo.php

Expected output:

[*] Reproducing PictShare getRandomString() with rand()
[*] Seed used by victim process : 1337  (unknown to attacker a priori)
    public file hash  (output #1): k3f9... (visible in the shared URL)
    secret delete_code(output #2): 8a1c...

[*] Attacker recovers seed by matching the OBSERVED public hash:
[+] Seed recovered: 1337
[+] Predicted delete_code: 8a1c...
[+] MATCH — delete_code predicted from the public hash alone (no info API needed)

See demo.php. It is self-contained (no server, no network) and proves the hash→code determinism that makes rand() unsuitable here.

Impact

  • Unauthorized deletion of hosted files by predicting the authorization token from data the application already exposes publicly → loss of availability/integrity.
  • Chains with (or substitutes for) CVE-2026-104051: that bug leaks the code directly; this one shows the code was never unguessable to begin with.

Remediation

Upgrade to PictShare 3.7.1 (fix commit ce5fc47), which replaces rand() with random_int() (CSPRNG). General guidance: generate every security token (delete codes, reset tokens, API keys, salts) with a cryptographically secure RNG — random_int() / random_bytes() in PHP — never rand(), mt_rand() or uniqid().

Note: delete codes issued before the fix are not rotated, so pre-fix uploads remain predictable until re-uploaded.

Timeline

DateEvent
2026-10-01Public disclosure, CVE reserved & published (VulnCheck), fixed in v3.7.1

Disclosure

Responsibly disclosed to the vendor and coordinated through VulnCheck. Fixed before this PoC was released. Published for defensive and educational purposes.

Download Tool

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

No popularity data yet.

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →