
Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-30088, a Windows kernel TOCTOU vulnerability in AuthzBasepCopyoutInternalSecurityAttributes enabling arbitrary write via race condition for privilege escalation.
//0x30 bytes (sizeof)
struct _AUTHZBASEP_SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES_INFORMATION
{
ULONG SecurityAttributeCount; //0x0
struct _LIST_ENTRY SecurityAttributesList; //0x8
ULONG WorkingSecurityAttributeCount; //0x18
struct _LIST_ENTRY WorkingSecurityAttributesList; //0x20
};
When performing copy the SecurityAttributesList, the kernel setup the list of SecurityAttribute's structure *directly* to the user supplied pointer. After that, it calls to RtlCopyUnicodeString and AuthzBasepCopyoutInternalSecurityAttributeValues functions to copy out name and value of the SecurityAttribute structure, leading to multiple TOCTOU in this function.
With a simple racing thread to modify the Buffer pointer of the attribute name before RtlCopyUnicodeString is called [*], I can easily archive an arbitrary address write with a fixed value and size controlled.

[...]
p_SecurityAttributesList = &a1->SecurityAttributesList;
Flink = a1->SecurityAttributesList.Flink;
if ( Flink == p_SecurityAttributesList )
return (unsigned int)inserted;
v13 = a2 + 0x98;
while ( 1 )
{
if ( (unsigned int)Feature_2516935995__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsage() )
{
inserted = AuthzBasepProbeAndInsertTailList(a2 + 8, v13 - 0x68);
if ( inserted < 0 )
goto LABEL_24;
}
else
{
[...]
}
++*(_DWORD *)a2;
*(_WORD *)(v13 - 56) = Flink[3].Flink;
*(_DWORD *)(v13 - 52) = HIDWORD(Flink[3].Flink);
*(_QWORD *)(v13 - 24) = v13 - 32;
*(_QWORD *)(v13 - 32) = v13 - 32;
*(_QWORD *)v13 = v13 - 8;
*(_QWORD *)(v13 - 8) = v13 - 8;
*(_QWORD *)(v13 - 48) = 0i64;
*(_DWORD *)(v13 - 40) = 0;
*(_DWORD *)(v13 - 16) = 0;
Flink_low = LOWORD(Flink[2].Flink);
v19 = Flink_low;
v17 = (wchar_t *)((v10 + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEui64);
v15 = (unsigned __int64)v17 + Flink_low;
if ( (unsigned __int64)v17 + Flink_low > v6 )
break;
if ( (unsigned int)Feature_3391791421__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsage() )
{
*(_QWORD *)&v18.Length = 0i64;
v18.MaximumLength = Flink_low;
v18.Buffer = v17;
RtlCopyUnicodeString(&v18.Length, (unsigned __int16 *)&Flink[2]);
*(_UNICODE_STRING *)(v13 - 0x48) = v18;
}
else
{
[...]
}
inserted = AuthzBasepCopyoutInternalSecurityAttributeValues(
(__int64)Flink,
v13 - 104,
v15,
(int)v6 - (int)v15,
&v19);
[...]
5: kd>
nt!AuthzBasepCopyoutInternalSecurityAttributes+0x1aa:
fffff803`5dbcf14a e8810fa5ff call nt!RtlCopyUnicodeString (fffff803`5d6200d0)
5: kd> r
rax=0000025a81d006a0 rbx=0000025a81d00590 rcx=ffffe20697c4f778
rdx=ffffa609c7a101a0 rsi=0000025a81d00598 rdi=0000025a81d00628
rip=fffff8035dbcf14a rsp=ffffe20697c4f740 rbp=0000025a81d006c0
r8=0000000000000003 r9=0000025a81d00590 r10=ffffa609c816ef78
r11=ffffe20697c4f7d0 r12=0000000000000a70 r13=ffffa609ca9b1118
r14=ffffa609c7a10180 r15=0000025a81d01000
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0010 ss=0018 ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00040202
nt!AuthzBasepCopyoutInternalSecurityAttributes+0x1aa:
fffff803`5dbcf14a e8810fa5ff call nt!RtlCopyUnicodeString (fffff803`5d6200d0)