CVE-2026-64560 temporary-root exploit for realme RMX6699 (Snapdragon 8 Elite, kernel 6.6.118, Android 17/COOS17)
Temporary-root exploit for the realme RMX6699 (Snapdragon 8 Elite / SM8750), kernel 6.6.118-android15-8-g9bc34d5b0c79.
⚠️ Experimental kernel exploit. It can panic/reboot the device or corrupt kernel state. Only run it on a device you own or are authorised to test.
Use-after-free in Linux posix-cpu-timers: a race between deleting a process
CPU timer and a non-leader exec(). Local, unprivileged; CVSS 3.1 = 7.8.
Upstream fix 920f893f735e92ba3a1cd9256899a186b161928d (first in 6.6.147).
This device runs 6.6.118 → vulnerable.
| Device | realme RMX6699 (RE6400L1), Snapdragon SM8750 "sun" |
| OS | realme UI 17 / COOS17 / Android 17 (SDK 37), RMX6699_17.0.0.111(CN01) |
| Kernel | 6.6.118-android15-8-g9bc34d5b0c79-abogki537459655-4k (aarch64, 4K pages, KASLR) |
| CPUs | 8 — cpu0-5 mid, cpu6-7 prime |
Profile: profiles/rmx6699/rmx6699-9bc34d5b0c79.json
Symbol table: symbols_rmx6699.json
Source of truth: src/exploit-fanout-rmx6699.c
Rendered build source: build/rmx6699-a17/exploit-rmx6699-a17.c
uid=0), no partition writes,
lost on reboot.misc fops table, opens /dev/uhid, sets uid 0 + SELinux permissive and
starts a temp-su broker.A prebuilt APK is attached to the rolling release
app-latest
(rebuilt by CI on every push to main; v* tags carry one too), or grab it
from the latest
workflow run.
adb install -r RMX6699-root-*.apk./dev/uhid, so it has to run as shell (uid 2000) or
root — Shizuku is what gives it that identity.The exploit payload and the temp-su broker are bundled inside the APK. The
KernelSU late-load module/manager are not bundled: the exploit root path
works without them and the jailbreak step just reports them as unavailable.
If the app misses, it can retry after a reboot (auto-reboot is off by default).
Needs an aarch64 musl/static toolchain (no NDK):
gcc -O2 -static -pthread -s -I tools \
-o bin/cve-2026-64560-fanout-rmx6699 \
build/rmx6699-a17/exploit-rmx6699-a17.c tools/bionic_compat.c
Or via the Go tool: ./cve64560 build --profile profiles/rmx6699/rmx6699-9bc34d5b0c79.json.
Sanity check: readelf -l <out> | grep -E 'INTERP|DYNAMIC' must be empty.
The first gate opens /dev/uhid → run as shell (uid 2000) or root:
adb push bin/cve-2026-64560-fanout-rmx6699 /data/local/tmp/f
adb push bin/su /data/local/tmp/su # temp-su broker
adb shell chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/f /data/local/tmp/su
adb shell "cd /data/local/tmp && printf '/data/local/tmp/su --daemon\nexit\n' | ./f --run"
Success chain:
STAGE0_GATE_PASS → MISC_BRIDGE_*_PASS → STAGE8_PERMISSIVE_PASS →
ROOT_CHILD_HOLD_PASS → TEMP_SU_DAEMON_STARTED.
stage0_hot_order[]) — biases the KASLR race
toward known-good slot/threshold lanes and deprioritises a panic-prone lane.validate_misc_bridge() now keeps the validated
/dev/uhid fd (g_bridge_fd) and the main bridge block reuses it instead of
opening the forged device a second time (the second open was the panic
point). Falls back to a fresh open when unset.android-app/ — a Material3 + Shizuku app that stages the payload and
auto-chains exploit → KernelSU late-load → manager install/open, with a live
root-state card. Built by
.github/workflows/android.yml; prebuilt APKs
land on the app-latest
release and as workflow artifacts.
It ships the exploit payload + su as assets. The third-party KernelSU
binaries (ksud, ku.ko, manager.apk) are deliberately not committed —
drop them into android-app/app/src/main/assets/ before building to enable
the auto-jailbreak step. Without a keystore.properties the release APK is
signed with the debug key, which is fine for sideloading.
Apache-2.0. Derived from
Become-ILLUSORY/cve-2026-64560-a16
(the RMX5010/A16 port), itself derived from the NebuSec/CyberMeowfia OP13 PoC.
See NOTICE and docs/UPSTREAM.md. No firmware, raw kernel image, keys, or
device-unique secrets are included.