pennacle-security/summitOpen-source web security testing platform: proxy, scanner and fuzzer in one CLI. By Pennacle Security.
One scriptable CLI for web security testing: scanner, proxy, fuzzer, authorization testing, WAF analysis, link-hijack detection and recon.
Free where the equivalents are paid - by Pennacle Security.
We use Burp and ZAP every day. We also kept wanting three things they are not: a scanner we can script against in CI, findings that tell us how sure they are, and a codebase small enough to read in one sitting. Summit is that tool - v0.5, MIT, one dependency (requests), built in the open.
Full documentation: pennacle-security.github.io/summit
Capabilities that usually sit behind paid tooling, plus the scanning core:
| Capability | Summit | The usual route |
|---|---|---|
| Broken access control testing (BOLA/IDOR) | summit authorize | Autorize-style add-on / paid workflows |
| Hidden parameter discovery | summit mine | Param Miner-style add-on |
| OpenAPI-driven scanning | summit scan --openapi | add-ons |
| WAF fingerprinting + bypass probing | built in | partial / add-ons |
| Broken-link hijack detection | built in | paid extension |
| SQLi, XSS, redirect, traversal, takeover, host header, CORS | built in | core scanners (free) |
| Recon chain: subfinder -> httpx -> nmap | summit recon | manual gluing |
| Rate limiting, retries, JWT/encoder toolkit | built in | add-ons / paid |
| CI-ready, confidence-labelled findings | the whole point | paid automation |
Every finding carries a confidence label: confirmed (an observed fact) or potential (a heuristic). That distinction runs through the entire tool.
git clone https://github.com/pennacle-security/summit.git
cd summit
pip install -e .
Python 3.10+. Then watch it work against a deliberately vulnerable local target:
python examples/vuln_app.py # terminal 1 - the target (127.0.0.1 only)
summit scan http://127.0.0.1:8765 # terminal 2 - the scan
A fuller pass on a real engagement looks like this:
summit recon target.com --json recon.json # subdomains -> hosts -> ports
summit scan https://target.com --depth 2 --rate 10 # crawl + all checks
summit scan --openapi api-spec.json # API: scan what the spec admits to
summit authorize https://target.com/admin?user=1 \
--role 'admin=Cookie: session=abc' \
--role 'user=Cookie: session=xyz' # BOLA/IDOR testing
Every claim on this page is reproduced by examples/evidence.py - it runs the demo target live, measures each feature, and prints PASS/FAIL with the real numbers. CI executes it on every push; a claim that stops holding fails the build.
python examples/evidence.py)[PASS] full scan: 16 seeded check families detected, zero false positives
53 findings in 22.9s (344 requests), missing=none, control link flagged=no, 19 finding(s) carry confidence=confirmed
[PASS] resource takeover fingerprint detected on the target's own 404
Possible AWS S3 resource takeover | AWS S3: 'nosuchbucket'
[PASS] host header injection: marker domain echoed back by the app
Host: summit-host-probe.example -> reflected (reset-link poisoning surface)
[PASS] CORS reflects an arbitrary origin with credentials allowed
ACAO: https://summit-cors-probe.example; ACAC: true
[PASS] WAF bypass: naive filter blocks, tampered payload lands decoded
raw payload -> HTTP 403 (blocked); URL-encoded once -> HTTP 200, payload reflected decoded: True
[PASS] CAPTCHA challenge detected (reported, not solved)
/login -> reCAPTCHA via marker 'recaptcha/api.js'
[PASS] rate limiting: --rate 5 paces 12 requests to ~2.2s; unlimited runs free
12 requests at rate 5 -> 2.20s (theoretical floor: 2.2s); 12 requests unlimited -> 0.02s
[PASS] concurrency on a latency-bearing target: 8 workers vs serial
40 requests x 25ms latency: serial 1.33s -> parallel 0.18s (7.3x speedup)
[PASS] smart prioritizer ranks known-injectable parameters first
probing starts with: [('query', 'search?query=laptop'), ('id', 'user?id=1'), ('url', 'example.com')]
[PASS] toolkit decodes JWT header/payload and states the signature is unverified
signature NOT verified - decoding only
[PASS] update check compares versions numerically (0.3 < 0.10)
is_outdated('0.3.0', '0.10.0') -> True; is_outdated('1.0.0', '0.9.9') -> False
[PASS] broken access control: admin panel served identically to a low-privilege role
verdict=broken; finding=Broken access control (BOLA/IDOR candidate)
[PASS] hidden parameter mining finds the undocumented debug parameter, zero noise
1 finding(s): ['debug'] (all confirmed reflections)
[PASS] openapi-driven scan: spec alone leads the engine to seeded SQLi and XSS
2 spec target(s) scanned -> 10 findings, sqli-error=yes, xss-reflection=yes
[PASS] OS command injection: marker executed and echoed by the server
semicolon: exec marker x2, control marker x1 | CWE-78
[PASS] server-side template injection: {{7*7}} came back as 49
Jinja2/Twig: {{7*7}} -> 49 | CWE-1336
[PASS] CRLF injection: X-Summit-CRLF header materialized in the response
X-Summit-CRLF: injected | CWE-113
[PASS] sensitive file exposure: /.env confirmed by content signature
content signature: 'APP_KEY=' | CWE-538
[PASS] CVE detection: Apache/2.4.49 banner maps to known CVEs
detect_cves('Apache/2.4.49') -> ['CVE-2021-41773', 'CVE-2021-42013']
evidence summary: 19/19 claims verified
A visual of a real scan against the demo target: