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CVE-2026-19193-PoC — CVE-2026-19193 Proof of Concept | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/patrickt2017/cve-2026-19193-poc
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GitHubpatrickt2017/cve-2026-19193-poc

CVE-2026-19193-PoC

CVE-2026-19193 Proof of Concept

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21 month agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-19193 - Proof of Concept

Arbitrary Process Termination via Unauthenticated Minifilter Message Handler in Jiangmin Antivirus Kernel Driver (kvcore.sys)

Affected Asset:

Product: Jiangmin Antivirus V21

Component: kvcore.sys (Core Kernel Driver)

Version: 1.23.6.27

SHA-256 Hash: AE4ABB650C7DF1D3654AFC814617DE6F6589DC2C3BE434154B3BE0F6521E2259

Severity

High - 7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Description of the Vulnerability

The Jiangmin Antivirus kernel driver, kvcore.sys exposes a minifilter communication port ("\KvCorePortX0") that accepts command messages from user-mode processes. The driver's MessageNotifyCallback (FUN_140008c60) dispatches a command code (0x1D / CMD_TERMINATE_PROCESS) to the function FUN_14000cf14, which terminates an arbitrary process specified by PID using the following kernel function chain:

  • PsLookupProcessByProcessId(PID)
  • ObOpenObjectByPointer(PROCESS_TERMINATE)
  • ZwTerminateProcess(handle, 0)

The vulnerability exists because in FUN_14000688c, the filter communication port is created using FltBuildDefaultSecurityDescriptor() with an overly permissive access mask (0x1F0001), granting connection rights to EVERYONE (S-1-1-0). This allows any user-mode process to connect.

When a user-mode process sends a message to the KvCorePortX0 minifilter, the MessageNotifyCallback callback function (at FUN_140008c60) performs no caller authentication. There are no calls to SeSinglePrivilegeCheck(), PsGetCurrentProcess() validation, token verification, or any process allowlist check.

Download Tool

Proof of Concept/Step to Reproduce

The PoC needs to run in an administrator command prompt and the kvcore.sys driver must be running

  • either Jiangmin Antivirus running or
  • Use sc.exe to manually create a kernel service (sc.exe create kvcore type= kernel binPath= <driver-path> ; sc.exe start kvcore)

Example:

root@kitploit:~
.\kvcore_kill_poc.exe --name "MsMpEng.exe"
.\kvcore_kill_poc.exe --pid 3340

Test result in Windows 11 24H2 (Build 26200):

Mitigations and Recommendations

  1. Implement caller authentication in the MessageNotifyCallback
    • e.g., validate the caller's process identity against an allowlist of trusted Jiangmin user-mode components, verify the connecting process's image path
  2. Restrict the filter communication port's security descriptor
  3. Replace FltBuildDefaultSecurityDescriptor(0x1F0001) with a custom DACL that grants access only to SYSTEM and Administrators group